Opinion
CIVIL 3:23-CV-1473
11-14-2023
HAJI BRELAND, Plaintiff, v. WILKES BARRE SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.
Munley, Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Daryl F. Bloom, United States Magistrate Judge
I. Factual Background
This case comes before us for a screening review of the plaintiff's pro se civil complaint. The plaintiff, Haji Breland, brought this action against the Wilkes Barre School District and the Wilkes Barre Police Department. (Doc. 1). His complaint alleges a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act against these entities arising out of his former employment with the school district and conduct that he claims amounted to racial discrimination. (Id.).
Liberally construed, Breland's complaint and attached exhibits assert that he was hired by Wilkes Barre School District as a night janitor in February of 2022. (Doc. 1-1- at 3). In March, his hours changed, and he arrived for his shift early. (Id.). Breland, an African American man, alleges that two Caucasian women who worked at the school did not recognize him and called the police, reporting that they did not feel safe. (Doc. 1 at 2). When the Wilkes Barre Police Department officers arrived, Breland was allegedly questioned about a missing Caucasian child. (Id.; Doc. 1-1 at 3). Breland then asserts that he was harassed by police officers on several other occasions while he was working at the school. (Doc. 1 at 2; Doc. 1-1 at 3-4). He reported the harassment of the teachers and the police to his Union president and the Superintendent of the school district, whom he contends tried to cover it up and intimidate him. (Doc. 1-1 at 4). This included attempting to prohibit him from leaving on a day that he was not feeling well. (Id.). On that day, Breland left the school anyway because he was frustrated about the way he was being treated. (Id.). The same day he received a letter from the school district stating that he had been discharged. (Id.). Breland filed a complaint with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, who issued him a Right to Sue letter on June 8, 2023. (Doc. 1-1, at 7-8).
Along with this complaint, Breland filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2). This motion was granted, and the complaint was deemed filed pending a preliminary screening review by the magistrate judge. (Doc. 5). The case was then reassigned to the undersigned. After consideration, we conclude that the complaint, as currently pleaded, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, we recommend that the complaint be dismissed without prejudice to afford the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint.
II. Discussion
A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints - Standard of Review
We have a statutory obligation to preliminarily review pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We review such complaints to determine whether there are frivolous or malicious claims, or if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. This statutory preliminary screening mirrors review under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this legal benchmark, under federal pleading standards a plaintiff is required to set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”).
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized: [A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.' ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” determination will be “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally, if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the court may consider such document in its determination. See Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002).
However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion to dismiss. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261.
Finally, when reviewing a pro se complaint, we are reminded that such complaints are to be construed liberally, “so ‘as to do substantial justice.'” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f)). We must apply the relevant law even if the pro se plaintiff does not mention it by name. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)). However, a pro se complaint must still meet the basic requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which states that a complaint must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, . . . (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
B. This Complaint should be Dismissed Without Prejudice.
Breland asserts his claims against the defendants under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation. After consideration, while we conclude that Breland has asserted factual allegations that appear to be sufficient to allege discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, Breland's complaint is devoid of any request for relief. Accordingly, this complaint fails to meet the basic requirements of Rule 8, which requires that “a claim for relief must contain [] a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(3).
To state a claim of racial discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position he was in; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) there are circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Makky v Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008). Additionally, to state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection between the protected activity and adverse employment action. Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2006).
Here, the substance of Breland's factual allegations appears to meet these pleading requirements. The gravamen of Breland's complaint is that he was singled out by two Caucasian teachers and Caucasian police officers, who he alleges harassed him because of his race. He further asserts that when he reported the harassment to the administration at the school district, the school district tried to cover it up and intimidate him, and later discharged him from employment. However, Breland's complaint contains no claim for relief whatsoever. This failure to request any sort of relief defies Rule 8's basic requirement that a complaint contain “a demand for the relief sought.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(3); see RKO-Stanley Warner Theatres, Inc. v. Mellon Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 436 F.2d 1297,1304 (3d Cir. 1970). Accordingly, we recommend that this complaint be dismissed, but that Breland be afforded an opportunity to amend his complaint to endeavor to comply with the requirements of Rule 8. See Scibelli v. Lebanon Cnty., 219 Fed.Appx. 221, 222 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[A]n order dismissing a complaint under Rule 8 clearly is without prejudice as it is not an adjudication on the merits.”).
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiff endeavoring to correct the defects cited in this report, provided that the plaintiff acts within 20 days of any dismissal order.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.