Opinion
No. 4-496 / 03-1389
Filed January 13, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for WebsterCounty, Joel E. Swanson, Judge.
Breezy Property Company, L.L.C., appeals from adverse rulings of the district court denying its petition for declaratory judgment and to quiet title in real estate obtained through quit claim deeds. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.
Ernest Kersten, Fort Dodge, for appellant.
Mark Crimmins of Bennett, Crimmins, Ostrander Yung, for all appellees except Coats Utilities Co.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Hecht and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Breezy Property Company, L.L.C., appeals from adverse rulings of the district court denying its petition for declaratory judgment and for quieted title in real estate. We now reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with our opinion.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On July 18, 1967, Wonie Coats and Gordon and Leona Brown (original proprietors) filed and recorded a plat of the Coats Second Subdivision with the Office of the Webster County Recorder. Along with that original plat and its accompanying map, the original proprietors attached a statement of dedication that read as follows: "[W]e hereby dedicate to public use all of that portion of the attached Plat which is marked Walnut Drive, Elm Drive, Oak Drive, Tower Drive, Maple Drive, and Circle Drive."
It was later determined by the Webster County Auditor that the plat and dedication of Coats Second Subdivision was insufficient for taxation and assessment purposes because it failed to adequately describe the parcels of land by metes and bounds. The county auditor filed a Notice to File Plat, requesting the original proprietors to re-file a plat containing the proper legal description of the parcels, or failing that, the auditor would file and record an Auditor's plat. See Iowa Code §§ 409.31, .33, .36 (1966). The original proprietors accepted the Auditor's plat, which did not contain the dedicatory language recited above, and that plat was filed and recorded on October 22, 1974.
This appeal concerns the title to the real estate that was dedicated to the public as streets in the Second Coats Subdivision, namely portions of Maple Drive, Elm Drive, and all of Walnut Drive and Circle Drive (the real estate). After performing a title search, Timothy McGuire contacted all of the successors in interest of the original proprietors of the Second Coats Subdivision and obtained from them quit claim deeds for the real estate. McGuire then quit-claimed his interest to Breezy Property Company, L.L.C. (Breezy) by deed recorded on November 13, 2002. McGuire is a co-owner of Breezy.
The real estate has never been accepted into the Webster County secondary road system, and has not been developed or maintained as streets. Instead, the public has used portions of the real estate for dirt bike and ATV travel, which Timothy McGuire testified was "extensive." Finding this use irritating, McGuire obtained the quit claim deeds for the express purpose of fencing off the real estate, and to otherwise establish usage restrictions as a means of curtailing the off-road activity. Breezy, on obtaining and recording the quit claim deeds, filed suit in Webster County District Court, seeking to have title to the real estate quieted in Breezy, and seeking a declaratory judgment as to the relative rights of the parties regarding access to and use of the real estate. The named defendants to this suit are all owners of parcels adjacent to the real estate or owners of utility easements in the area, and thus have interests affected by the quiet title action.
The matter came before the district court at a hearing on August 7, 2003. The district court found that although no city or county had ever formally accepted the dedication of the real estate, the public had nonetheless accepted the dedication by their use of the real estate while operating off-road vehicles and in accessing lots serviced by the real estate. The district court relied on these uses by the public in concluding that the persons from whom Breezy obtained the quit claim deeds had no transferable interest in the real estate. Based on this determination, the district court declared the quit claim deeds null and void, and quieted title to the real estate in the public.
Breezy now appeals, arguing the district court erred in voiding the quit claim deeds and quieting title to the real estate in the public. Breezy requests further that title be quieted in Breezy, and that Breezy be authorized to erect fences and establish usage restrictions on the real estate.
II. Standard and Scope of Review.
We review matters coming before us in equity, including actions to quiet title, de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; Shine v. State, 458 N.W.2d 864, 865 (Iowa Ct.App. 1990). We give weight to the fact findings of the trial court, but are not bound by them. Shine, 458 N.W.2d at 865. The plaintiffs must recover on the strength of their own title, not on the weakness of the defendants', but need only show title superior to that of the defendants. Cheney v. Womans Baptist Foreign Missionary Society, 243 Iowa 134, 137, 50 N.W.2d 651, 652 (Iowa 1952).
III. Discussion.
A. Was there a dedication?
The district court correctly determined the real estate was dedicated as platted roads in the Coats Second Subdivision. In doing so, the court properly relied on common law dedication principlesenunciated in Marksbury v. State, 322 N.W.2d 281 (Iowa 1982). In Marksbury, our supreme court identified the following elements necessary to establish an express common law dedication:
(1) an appropriation of the land by the owner for a public use, evidenced by a positive act or declaration manifesting an intent to surrender the land to the public; (2) an actual parting with the use of the property to the public; and (3) an actual acceptance of the property by the public.Id. at 284.
Breezy contends that while the language of the original plat contained a valid dedication, that plat was superseded by the subsequent filing and recording of the Auditor's plat. There is no evidence that the Auditor's plat contained language dedicating streets for public use, and thus Breezy contends that because there is no dedication in the current recorded plat, the first element of Marksbury cannot be satisfied. We find this argument to be without merit. The original proprietors clearly evidenced their intent to dedicate the real estate to public use in their original recorded plat. There is no evidence in the record tending to prove the Auditor's plat of the second subdivision did anything to alter the plat design other than add the metes and bounds descriptions of the parcels identified in the prior subdivision plat. We find the proprietors accepted the Auditor's plat, and there is no evidence that they subsequently withdrew their dedication of the real estate. Thus, we conclude the first element is clearly satisfied by the statement of the original proprietors in their plat of the Coats Second Subdivision dedicating the real estate in question for public use.
We also find the original proprietors actually parted with the real estate upon the filing of the plat of the subdivision and upon the sale of certain parcels within the subdivision. Thus the second element necessary for an express common law dedication is also satisfied.
We further find, as the district court did, that the third element for an express dedication is satisfied by the use of the real estate by the public. "[A]cceptance [of a dedication] may be by some formal action, as by the council of an incorporated city or town, or by public use. And this use need not be continuous or heavy." Henry Walker Park Assn. v. Mathews, 249 Iowa 1246, 1253, 91 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Iowa 1958) (emphasis supplied). "Even where there is no formal acceptance of a street and public use is relied on to show acceptance, the use need only be such as the public wants and necessities demand." Kelroy v. City of Clear Lake, 232 Iowa 161, 173, 5 N.W.2d 12, 19-20 (Iowa 1942) (emphasis supplied). Timothy McGuire testified that the public use of the real estate for recreational purposes was extensive. There is also evidence that some of the appellees are owners of lots that would be serviced by the real estate, who have used the real estate for purposes of ingress and egress to those lots. The dedication within the subdivision plat is stated generally, dedicating the real estate for "public use" without further delineation. After a careful review of the record, we find ample evidence that the public has used the real estate so dedicated in line with its "wants and necessities." In concluding that the third Marksbury element is satisfied, we hold that the original proprietors made, and the public accepted, an express dedication of the real estate in question. B. Where does title lie?
In Henry Walker, the court held that use need not be by a large number of citizens for acceptance by the public to be effectuated. Henry Walker, 249 Iowa at 1256, 91 N.W.2d at 710. Rather, that court analogized public use with public nuisance, and stated that "it is sufficient if enough citizens are affected by a nuisance to constitute the public, even though they are but a small fraction of the entire population." Id. Thus, Breezy may not successfully attack the evidence of public use on the ground that only a small percentage of the public use the real estate for either access to their lots, or for recreational purposes.
We note, in passing, that lack of maintenance or presence of obstructions that prevent full access and use of the streets is not considered abandonment of any public acceptance. Henry Walker, 249 Iowa at 1253-54, 91 N.W.2d at 708. Therefore, Breezy may not rely on the rugged, unimproved condition of the property to qualify the public's use of the dedicated real estate.
In declaring the quit claim deeds null and void, the district court did not articulate a conclusion on the question of what, if any, interest in the real estate was transferred by the proprietors' dedication and public's acceptance of the real estate. "Whenever, from the facts expressly found, others may fairly be inferred which will support the judgment such inference will be drawn." Offerman v. Dickinson, 175 N.W.2d 423, 425-26 (Iowa 1970); see also Allied Mutual Casy. Co. v. Dahl, 255 Iowa 208, 220, 122 N.W.2d 270, 278 (Iowa 1963) (finding that accident arose out of employment was inferred from trial court's judgment that automobile liability insurance policy did not provide coverage). The district court concluded "[t]he Plaintiff's claim of title is based upon Quit Claim Deeds from individuals having no transferable interest in the caption real estate." The only theory upon which the district court could have voided the quit claim deeds acquired by Breezy would have been by finding that the dedication, once accepted, transferred to the public an interest equivalent to a deed in fee simple in the real estate.
Statutory dedications do grant the equivalent of a deed in fee simple to the public and occur when a duly acknowledged plat is recorded and approved by a city or town. Burroghs v. City of Cherokee, 134 Iowa 429, 432, 109 N.W. 876, 877 (Iowa 1906); see also Iowa Code §§ 409.13, .14 (1966). However, in this case we are not dealing with a statutory dedication, but rather with the common law variety. While there is some evidence when viewing the 1974 map of the plat included in the record that the Coats Second Subdivision abuts the town of Coalville, there is no evidence that either the original plat or the Auditor's plat were submitted to and approved by the Coalville city council, as then required by Iowa Code section 409.14 (1966) to effectuate a valid statutory dedication.
We note that the statutory framework defining the requirements for the recording of subdivision plats was amended after the common law dedication was accepted by the public in this case. See Iowa Code ch. 409A (1991). The current version requires that "[a] proposed subdivision plat lying within the jurisdiction of a governing body shall be submitted to that governing body for review and approval prior to recording." Iowa Code § 354.8 (2003) (emphasis supplied). Upon the approval of the governing body, the recording of an official plat to which a dedication is attached transfers to the public the equivalent of a deed in fee simple. Id. § 354.19. The governing body is now defined as either the city council or the board of supervisors, meaning that plats of both unincorporated town sites and additions to existing towns and cities may now tender statutory dedications to the public in fee simple equivalent. Cf. Town of Kenwood Park v. Leonard, 177 Iowa 337, 340, 158 N.W. 655, 658 (Iowa 1916) ("The filing of a plat dedicating a highway in an unincorporated village does not convey to the village, or to the public, the fee title. By such dedication, the general public acquires only an easement in the highway, a right to use it for public purposes.") Our interpretation is supported by the stated purpose of chapter 354 "[t]o provide for statewide, uniform procedures and standards for the platting of land while allowing the widest possible latitude to cities and counties to establish and enforce ordinances regulating the division and use of land. . . ." Iowa Code § 354.1(3) (emphasis supplied). An official plat is defined as "an auditor's plat or a subdivision plat that meets the requirements of this chapter that has been filed for record in the offices of the recorder, auditor, and assessor." Id. § 354.2 (12). Because we conclude the acceptance of the common law dedication of the real estate occurred before the legislature adopted these amendments to chapter 354, however, the dedication did not accomplish a transfer in fee simple equivalent of the plat proprietors' ownership interest.
Because we conclude a common law dedication was accomplished by the plat proprietors, the title to the disputed property remained in the grantors and the public received only an easement. See Dugan v. Zurmuehlen, 203 Iowa 1114, 1117, 211 N.W. 986, 988 (Iowa 1927) (right conferred by common-law dedication is an easement only, while in most statutory dedications the fee of the property is in the municipality to which the dedication was made). We hold, therefore, that the common law dedication accepted by the public conferred upon the public an easement only. Notwithstanding the common law dedication of the real estate, the successors in interest of the original proprietors of the Coats Second Subdivision retained a transferable interest in the real estate. Those successors in interest transferred their ownership interests to Breezy subject to the public's easement via quit-claim deeds. As such, we conclude Breezy has the superior claim to title to the real estate subject to the public's easement to use the dedicated streets. Cheney, 243 Iowa at 137, 50 N.W.2d at 652. We therefore reverse the district court's decision voiding of the deeds, and quiet title to the real estate in Breezy.
C. May Breezy erect a fence or otherwise impose use restrictions on the real estate?
The character and scope of the interest in land dedicated to public use depend on the intention of the dedicator as manifested in the dedication itself. De Castello v. City of Cedar Rapids, 171 Iowa 18, 22, 153 N.W. 353, 355 (Iowa 1915). The dedicatory language used by the original proprietors in this case contemplates a broad range of uses by the public. Having already found that the public's use of the real estate for the operation of recreational vehicles constituted acceptance of the dedication, it would be incongruous to now hold that the successor to the fee interest, Breezy, may now prohibit the public's enjoyment of the easement either by use restrictions or by erecting a fence. We note that many of the lots to be serviced by the dedicated streets have been purchased in reliance of the use of the "streets" for ingress and egress. Fencing off the real estate would clearly impinge those owners' access to their lots as contemplated in the easement, and any judicial approval of Breezy's intention to do so would clearly be inequitable under the circumstances.
Our decision is informed by the similar circumstances presented in Henry Walker Park. There the defendant also desired to build a fence across a dedicated street, but had offered to place gates in the fence, allowing ingress and egress. Henry Walker, 249 Iowa at 1259, 91 N.W.2d at 712. The court refused to accept this as a viable solution because "the formal dedication of the use of Front Street and the common-law dedication of the parking lot created unimpeded easements." Id. Although Breezy holds title to the real estate in fee, it holds that title subject to the public's easement, and has no right to obstruct the public's right to use the dedicated streets for lawful purposes.