Opinion
2021 CA 1583 2021 CA 1585
07-06-2023
SEAN MICHAEL BREEN v. KACIE MAGEE BREEN AND ABC INSURANCE COMPANY BRIDGET MARIE BREEN DUNBAR, PATRICK VERNON BREEN, RYAN MICHAEL BREEN, AND DEVIN THOMAS BREEN v. KACIE MAGEE BREEN AND FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY
Sean M. Breen Mandeville, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff-2nd Appellant In Proper Person Antonio Le Mon Covington, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff-1st Appellant Aaron D. Knapp Richard L. Ducote Covington, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant-Appellee Kacie Magee Breen
On Appeal from the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Parish of st. Tammany, State of Louisiana Number 2015-11809 Consolidated With Number 2015-13096 Division B Honorable August J. Hand, Judge
Sean M. Breen Mandeville, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff-2nd Appellant In Proper Person
Antonio Le Mon Covington, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff-1st Appellant Aaron D. Knapp
Richard L. Ducote Covington, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant-Appellee Kacie Magee Breen
Before: Guidry, C.J., McClendon, Welch, Theriot, Holdridge, Chutz, Penzato, Lanier, Wolfe, Hester, Miller, and Greene, JJ.
CHUTZ, J.
Appellants-plaintiffs, Sean Michael Breen (Sean) and Aaron Dylan Knapp (Aaron), appeal a district court judgment dismissing their wrongful death suit on a peremptory exception of res judicata and awarding defendant-appellee, Kacie M. Breen, attorney fees and costs. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Each appellant filed a separate appeal, and the two appeals are consolidated herein.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 1, 2015, Kacie Magee Breen (Kacie) fatally shot her husband, Dr. Wayne Breen (the decedent). Kacie alleged the shooting was in self-defense, and she has never been charged or convicted for the killing of her husband. On April 7, 2016, a St. Tammany Parish grand jury returned a "no true bill" with respect to the shooting.
On May 1, 2015, Sean, a son of the decedent from his first marriage, filed a petition for damages for the wrongful death of his father resulting from the allegedly unjustified shooting by Kacie. In her answer, Kacie admitted intentionally shooting the decedent but asserted she acted while in imminent fear for her life due to his violent, physical attack upon her. She specifically raised the affirmative defense of self-defense. On April 27, 2018, the petition was amended to add Aaron, who is Sean's half-brother and the biological son of the decedent from an extra-marital relationship, as a plaintiff.
Five children were born to the decedent from his first marriage, i.e., Bridget Marie Breen Dunbar, Patrick Vernon Breen, Ryan Michael Breen, Devin Thomas Breen and Sean Michael Breen (collectively, the adult Breen children). Sean's siblings filed a separate wrongful death suit against Kacie, which they later voluntarily dismissed.
Due to competing claims, two insurance companies that had issued policies insuring the decedent's life commenced a federal interpleader proceeding in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Kacie, the adult Breen children (including Sean), and the administratix of the estate were named as claimants to the insurance funds deposited in the court's registry. Kacie was the named beneficiary in both policies. Aaron attempted to intervene in the interpleader proceeding on February 6, 2017, but his motion was denied as untimely given the impending trial date of March 20, 2017.
The federal court entered judgment in favor of Kacie on June 9, 2017, finding she was the sole claimant entitled to the deposited insurance funds. In reaching this conclusion, the federal court found the adult Breen children failed to meet their burden of proving Kacie participated in the intentional, unjustified killing of the insured (the decedent) so as to bar her from receiving any life insurance proceeds pursuant to La. R.S. 22:901 (D). See Pruco Life Insurance Company v. Breen, 289 F.Supp.3d 777, 798-99 (E.D. La. 2017), affirmed, 734 Fed.Appx. 302 (5th Cir. 2018).
Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:901(D), sometimes referred to as the "slayer statute," provides, in pertinent part:
D. (1) No beneficiary, assignee, or other payee under any personal insurance contract shall receive from the insurer any benefits under the contract accruing upon the death, disablement, or injury of the individual insured when the beneficiary, assignee, or other payee is either:
(a) Held by a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction to be criminally responsible for the death, disablement, or injury of the individual insured.
(b) Judicially determined to have participated in the intentional, unjustified killing of the individual insured.
(2) Where such a disqualification exists, the policy proceeds shall be payable to the secondary or contingent beneficiary, unless similarly disqualified, or, if no secondary or contingent beneficiary exists, to the estate of the insured. ...
On June 27, 2017, Kacie filed a peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata in the wrongful death action, as well as a motion for attorney fees, court costs, and expenses pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2800.19(B). She argued the issue of whether she killed the decedent in a lawful act of self-defense was previously litigated in the federal proceeding and, therefore, re-litigation of the issue in the wrongful death action was barred by res judicata. Further, Kacie maintained that under La. R.S. 9:2800.19(A) and (B), she was entitled to an award of attorney fees, court costs, and expenses since the federal interpleader judgment rendered her immune from suit for the decedent's alleged wrongful death.
The trial court originally overruled Kacie's June 2017 exception and denied her motion based on La. R.S. 9:2800.19 on the basis of prematurity, since the federal interpleader judgment was still subject to appeal. Thereafter, Kacie filed a supplemental exception of res judicata and motion for attorney fees, court costs, and expenses, which were again overruled/denied by the trial court. After the U.S. Fifth Circuit affirmed the interpleader judgment, Kacie filed a second supplemental peremptory exception raising the objection ofres judicata and a motion for attorney fees, court costs, and expenses pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2800.19(B).
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court changed its prior conclusion that res judicata did not bar the plaintiffs' wrongful death claim and sustained Kacie1 s second supplemental exception of res judicata. Further concluding that Kacie was immune from a wrongful death suit under La. R.S. 9:2800.19(A), the trial court also ordered that a contradictory hearing be set at a later date on her motion for attorney fees, court costs, and expenses. Aaron appealed that judgment. This court dismissed that appeal due to the judgment's lack of proper decretal language and finality. See Dunbar v. Breen, 19-1687 (La.App. 1st Cir. 11/6/20) (unpublished), 2020 WL 6536426.
Following another hearing on Kacie's exception and motion, the trial court signed a judgment on April 30, 2021, sustaining Kacie's second supplemental exception of res judicata and dismissing the plaintiffs'' wrongful death suit with prejudice. The trial court also granted Kacie's motion for attorney fees, court costs, and expenses based on its finding that she was entitled to civil immunity from suit under La. R.S. 9:2800.19, and it designated that portion of the judgment as final pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B).
Sean and Aaron each appealed the trial court's judgment, arguing in identical assignments of error that the trial court erred in dismissing their wrongful death suit on an exception of res judicata, in finding Aaron was in privity with the parties in the federal interpleader action, and in finding La. R.S. 9:2800.19 was applicable when there has not been a judicial determination that Kacie is immune from tort liability.
RES JUDICATA
In her exception of res judicata, Kacie asserted that the issue of whether the decedent's death resulted from an unjustified killing had already been litigated in the federal interpleader action and could not be relitigated in the wrongful death action due to res judicata. In the federal proceeding, even though Kacie was the named beneficiary on two insurance policies on the decedent's life, the insurance company invoked a federal interpleader due to the claims of the adult Breen children that Kacie was disqualified under La. R.S. 22:901(D) (the "slayer statute") from receiving the insurance proceeds. The slayer statute bars a beneficiary from receiving any life insurance proceeds if the beneficiary is judicially determined to have participated in the "intentional, unjustified killing" of the insured. La. R.S. 22:901 (D)(1)(b). Thus, the dispositive issue in the interpleader action was whether Kacie's killing of the decedent was an intentional, unjustified killing. The federal court concluded the adult Breen children failed to prove Kacie participated in the intentional, unjustified killing of her husband. Pruco, 289 F.Supp.3d at 798-99.
In determining the res judicata effect of a prior federal court judgment, Louisiana courts apply the federal law of res judicata. Pilie & Pilie v. Metz, 547 So.2d 1305, 1309 (La.1989). The res judicata effect of a prior judgment is reviewed de novo by appellate courts. Raj v. Louisiana State University, 14-0140 (La.App. 1st Cir. 4/24/15), 167 So.3d 1023, 1029. Under federal law, the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars the relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessarily decided in an earlier case between the same parties. Webb v. Morella, 16-1153 (La.App. 1st Cir. 6/21/17), 224 So.3d 406, 410. Under issue preclusion, once an issue of ultimate fact is actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation. Samour v. Louisiana Casino Cruises, Inc., 01-0831 (La.App. 1st Cir. 2/27/02), 818 So.2d 171, 175.
Federal res judicata law is applicable regardless of whether the federal court rendered judgment under its diversity jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction. See B.A. Kelly Land Co., LLC v. Aethon United BR LP, 54,115 (La.App. 2d Cir. 9/22/21), 327 So.3d 1071, 1077, writ denied. 21-01828 (La. 2/8/22), 332 So.3d 671 (federal court exercised diversity jurisdiction); Raj, 167 So.3d at 1029 (federal court exercised federal question jurisdiction).
The application of res judicata under federal law has four elements: (1) the parties are identical or in privity; (2) the judgment in the prior action was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the prior action was concluded by a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the same claim or cause of action was involved in both actions. Houston Professional Towing Association v. City of Houston, 812 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 2016). In this case, it is undisputed that a federal court of competent jurisdiction (second element) rendered a final judgment on the merits in the prior interpleader action (third element).
In determining whether the fourth element of res judicata is satisfied, federal courts apply a "transactional test," which requires the two actions be based on the same nucleus of operative facts. Thus, the claim is defined by the nucleus of operative facts, rather than the type of relief requested, substantive theories advanced, or types of rights asserted. Houston Professional Towing Association, 812 F.3d at 447. In the federal interpleader action and in the instant wrongful death action, the facts surrounding Kacie's killing of the decedent were the nucleus of operative facts forming the bases of both actions. The identical facts and identical issue of whether Kacie acted in justifiable self-defense in killing the decedent were at issue in both actions, since Kacie admitted she intentionally shot the decedent. Therefore, we find the fourth element ofres judicata is also satisfied.
We find no merit in the plaintiffs' contentions that res judicata does not bar their wrongful death action because it includes allegations of negligence that were not at issue in the federal interpleader. The facts forming the bases of the plaintiffs' claims of negligence, which basically consist of allegations that Kacie's actions prior to the shooting provoked the decedent, that she should have retreated, and that she should not have used lethal force, were presented to and considered by the federal court in reaching its determination that the burden of proving Kacie had participated in an intentional, unjustified killing was not met. We likewise find no merit in the plaintiffs' argument that the federal court applied a different standard of proof in the interpleader action than the standard of proof applicable in this wrongful death action. Although the interpleader action was handled in federal court, it dealt with the application of a Louisiana statute. In Louisiana, the general standard of proof applicable to civil proceedings is a preponderance of the evidence. State Board of Ethics v. Ourso, 06-1467 (La.App. 1st Cir. 6/8/07), 964 So.2d 1059, 1066, writ denied, 07-1387 (La. 10/5/07), 964 So.2d 941. The plaintiffs presented no evidence to support their claim that the federal court applied a different burden of proof in the federal interpleader action.
The only remaining element is identity of parties (first element). Because there is no question Sean and Kacie were both parties to the prior interpleader action, the trial court did not err in sustaining the exception of res judicata with respect to Sean, as all four elements of res judicata were satisfied as to him. However, the same cannot be said with respect to Aaron, who was not a party to the federal interpleader action. In fact, Aaron's attempt to intervene in the interpleader action was rejected. Moreover, Aaron argues he was not in privity with any of the parties in the interpleader action.
The preclusive effect of res judicata may bind nonparties who are deemed to be "privies" of the named parties under certain circumstances, such as: (1) the nonparty is a successor in interest to a named party; (2) the nonparty controlled the prior litigation; or (3) the nonparty's interests were adequately represented by a party to the original litigation whose interests are so closely aligned to the nonparty that they may be deemed the nonparty's virtual representative. The concepts of control and virtual representation must be narrowly construed. It is not sufficient to merely show that the party and the nonparty have common or parallel interests in the factual and legal issues presented in the respective actions. Slaughter v. Atkins, 305 F.Supp.3d 697, 709 (M.D. La. 2018), affirmed, 742 Fed.Appx. 24 (5th Cir. 2018). Privity is a legal conclusion that the relationship between a named party to an action and a nonparty is sufficiently close to afford application of the principle of preclusion. Vines v. University of Louisiana at Monroe, 398 F.3d 700, 706 (5th Cir. 2005), cert, denied, 546 U.S. 1089, 126 S.Ct. 1019, 163 L.Ed.2d 852 (2006); Slaughter, 305 F.Supp.3d at 709.
Because the doctrine of res judicata is stricti juris, any doubt as to any element must be resolved against the application of the doctrine. Morales v. Wilder, 20-0861 (La.App. 1st Cir. 3/16/22) (unpublished), 2022 WL 804294, at *3. In the present case, the only evidence Kacie introduced to establish that Aaron was in privity with the adult Breen children or any other named party in the prior action were some pleadings and excerpts from the record in the interpleader action. The pleadings and record excerpts alone are insufficient to establish the relationship between Aaron and the adult Breen children was sufficiently close to permit the preclusive effect of the interpleader judgment being applied to Aaron, who was not a party to the interpleader action and had no control over the prior federal litigation. See Chastant v. Chastant, 13-1402 (La.App. 3d Cir. 4/23/14), 138 So.3d 801, 807, writ denied, 14-1508 (La. 10/24/14), 151 So.3d605 (reversing a summary judgment dismissing a wrongful death action due to an unresolved issue concerning whether the relationship between the plaintiffs [nonparties in the prior litigation] and their uncle [a named party in the prior litigation] was sufficient to establish privity for purposes of res judicata). Based on our review, we conclude the trial court erred in sustaining Katie's exception of res judicata with respect to Aaron. Under federal law, res judicata does not apply unless the party sought to be barred had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim in the prior action. Morales, 2022 WL 804294, at *3. Kacie failed to establish Aaron had such an opportunity in this case due to privity with the adult Breen children in the interpleader action.
The facts in Chastant bear striking similarities to those in the instant matter. After Dr. Chastant was murdered, his widow (who was the primary beneficiary under his retirement plans and insurance policies) filed suit to obtain the proceeds of her husband's retirement plans and policies. Based on diversity jurisdiction, the suit was transferred to federal court. The defendants were the decedent's brother, Paul (in his capacity as trustee of the decedent's testamentary trust) and the companies administering the decedent's retirement plans and life insurance policies. The defendants challenged the widow's right to receive the proceeds by alleging she was a co-conspirator in the decedent's murder, A jury rejected those claims, and she prevailed in federal court. Thereafter, the decedent's adult children from prior marriages, who were not parties in the federal litigation, filed a wrongful death suit against the widow. She responded by filing a motion for summary judgment asserting collateral estoppel barred the plaintiffs from relitigating the issue of whether she participated in the decedent's murder. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the widow and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. Chastant, 138 So.3d at 801-04. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the summary judgment, finding an issue of fact existed regarding privity, i.e., whether the relationship between the plaintiffs and their uncle, Paul, was sufficient to establish privity. Chastant, 138 So.3d at 807.
APPLICATION OF LA. R.S. 9:2800.19
The plaintiffs further argue La. R.S. 9.2800.19(A) is inapplicable in this case because there has been no judicial determination that Kacie is immune from tort liability. This provision extends tort immunity to a defendant in a civil action who used "reasonable and apparently necessary or deadly force or violence" in preventing a forcible offense against the person or property in accordance with La. R.S. 14:20 (justifiable homicide). Thus, under La. R.S. 9.2800.19(A), when the use of force results in a homicide, La. R.S. 14:20 should be utilized in determining whether a defendant in a civil case used reasonable force in defense of a person or property. A homicide is justifiable under La. R.S. 14:20(A) when it is committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger. Additionally, if the trial court finds a defendant is entitled to immunity, the "court shall award the defendant reasonable attorney fees, court costs, ... and all expenses." La. R.S. 9:2800.19(B).
Kacie has consistently maintained the shooting of the decedent was an act of self-defense committed while she was being violently attacked by him and in reasonable fear for her life. Based on the trial court's finding regarding the res judicata effect of the judgment in the interpleader matter, where the issue of whether Kacie participated in an intentional, unjustified killing of the decedent was previously litigated, the trial court held Kacie was immune from civil suit for the decedent's death under La. R.S. 9:2800.19(A). Because it concluded Kacie was immune from suit, the trial court further found she was entitled to an award of attorney fees, court costs, and expenses under La. R.S. 9.2800.19(B).
The plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in finding Kacie was entitled to (1) tort immunity and (2) an award for attorney fees, court costs, and expenses pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2800.19. Before we address the specific arguments raised by Sean, we note that having found the trial court erred in sustaining the exception of res judicata with respect to Aaron, we likewise find the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees, court costs, and expenses against Aaron since that award was based on the res judicata effect of the interpleader judgment barring relitigation of the issue of justified homicide. Thus, the portion of the trial court judgment ordering Aaron to pay Kacie attorney fees, court costs, and expenses will be reversed.
As to Sean, he argues La. R.S. 9:2800.19 is vague and ambiguous, making it impossible to determine how and when it applies. He contends the legislative history of this statute indicates it was intended for situations involving attempted home or car break-ins when lethal force is used to repel an intruder. He further maintains the cross-reference in La. R.S. 9:2800.19 to criminal code articles suggests a defendant in a wrongful death action is entitled to immunity only when he has already proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial that the homicide was justified. We conclude Sean's contentions lack merit. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2800.19 provides:
A. A person who uses reasonable and apparently necessary or deadly force or violence for the purpose of preventing a forcible offense against the person or his property in accordance with R.S. 14:19 [non-homicide cases] or 20 [homicide cases] is immune from civil action for the use of reasonable and apparently necessary or deadly force or violence.
B. The court shall award reasonable attorney fees, court costs, compensation for loss of income, and all expenses to the defendant in any civil action if the court finds that the defendant is immune from suit in accordance with Subsection A of this Section.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:20 provides, in pertinent part:
A. A homicide is justifiable:
(1) When committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger.
C. A person who is not engaged in unlawful activity and who is in a place where he or she has a right to be shall have no duty to retreat before using deadly force as provided for in this Section, and may stand his or her ground and meet force with force.
D. No finder of fact shall be permitted to consider the possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether or not the person who used deadly force had a reasonable belief that deadly force was reasonable and apparently necessary to prevent a violent or forcible felony involving life or great bodily harm or to prevent the unlawful entry.
We find no ambiguity in the language of these provisions. Reading La. R.S. 9:2800.19 and La. R.S. 14:20 in pari materia, as specifically instructed, gives clear guidance on when a defendant in a civil action is entitled to tort immunity. Because the language of La. R.S. 9:2800.19 is unambiguous, we do not consider Sean's argument that the legislature intended this provision to apply only in limited situations involving attempted or actual home or vehicle break-ins. The provision contains no such restrictive language. When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the legislature's intent. In re Clegg, 10-0323 (La. 7/6/10), 41 So.3d 1141, 1154.
Further, despite the cross-reference to the criminal code articles in La. R.S. 9:2800.19, Sean's argument that a defendant must first prove justified homicide beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial before being entitled to immunity lacks any support. No such requirement is imposed by the clear language of La. R.S. 9:2800.19. Likewise, we are unaware of any support for Sean's argument that a beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof is applicable to determining entitlement to immunity under La. R.S. 9:2800.19. While immunity hinges upon a homicide being justified within the meaning of La. R.S. 14:20, the provision gives no indication the burden of proof utilized in criminal cases should also be applied to civil cases in which La. R.S. 9:2800.19 may be applicable.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the April 30, 2021 judgment in favor of defendant, Kacie M Breen, is reversed in its entirety with respect to Aaron Dylan Knapp. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects. The costs of these appeals are to be split equally between Kacie M, Breen and Sean Michael Breen.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.
McClendon, J., concurs for reasons assigned.
I agree with the result reached by the majority based on the exceptional facts of this case. It is undisputed that Aaron had no right to the insurance proceeds at issue in the federal interpleader action. Yet, perhaps to avoid the issue before this court, he sought to intervene in said suit. That attempt, which was opposed by Kacie, was unsuccessful. Additionally, Aaron's half-siblings, who the trial court found would adequately represent Aaron's interests, were not allowed to present their expert's testimony due either to a failure to timely name said expert or to timely file the expert's report. Given these unique facts, denying Aaron his day in court would not serve the interests of justice or the notion of fair play, which are the foundation of our judicial system.
As noted in the companion appeal, Aaron asserts that he was not recognized as Dr. Breen's biological child until February 13, 2017, when a consent judgment was rendered in the filiation action filed by Aaron. See Succession of Wayne Edmond Breen c/w Doctors for Women Medical Center, L.L.C. v. Breen, 2021-0806 c/w 2021-0807.
It is notable that Aaron has no privity of contact with the attorney representing his half-siblings.
GUIDRY, C.J., dissents in part and assigns reasons.
GUIDRY, C.J., dissenting.
1 respectfully dissent from the majority opinion to the extent that it reverses the portion of the trial court's judgment sustaining the exception raising the objection of res judicata filed by Kacie Breen as it relates to Aaron Dylan Knapp and reverses the portion of the trial court's judgment ordering Aaron to pay Kacie attorney fees, court costs, and expenses pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2800.19.
With regard to the exception raising the objection of res judicata, because there is no question Sean and Kacie were both parties to the prior federal interpleader action, the trial court did not err in sustaining the exception raising the objection of res judicata with respect to Sean, as all four elements of res judicata are satisfied as to him.
With regard to Aaron, who was not a party to the federal interpleader action, the law provides that the preclusive effect of res judicata may bind nonparties who are deemed to be "privies" of the named parties under certain circumstances: (1) the nonparty is a successor in interest to a named party; (2) the nonparty controlled the prior litigation; or (3) the nonparty's interests were adequately represented by a party to the original litigation whose interests are so closely aligned to the nonparty that they may be deemed the nonparty's virtual representative. Forum for Equality PAC v. McKeithen, 04-2551, p. 10 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So.2d 738, 745. Privity is a legal conclusion that the relationship between a named party to an action and a non-party is sufficiently close to afford application of the principle of preclusion. Vines v. University of Louisiana at Monroe, 398 F.3d 700, 706 (5th Cir. 2005), cert, denied, 546 U.S. 1089, 126 S.Ct. 1019, 163 L.Ed.2d 852 (2006); Slaughter v. Atkins, 305 F.Supp.3d 697, 709 (M.D. La. 2018).
In the instant case, it is undisputed that Aaron's half-siblings and heirs of decedent's estate as well as the administratrix of decedent's estate were parties to the federal interpleader action. In that action, these parties attempted to establish that Kacie "participated in the intentional, unjustified killing of the individual insured, i.e. her husband" so as to have Kacie disqualified as a beneficiary under two life insurance policies. While Aaron may not have had an interest in the life insurance proceeds that were at issue in the federal interpleader action, he did have an interest in proving the facts integral to that action, i.e. that Kacie participated in the intentional, unjustified killing of the decedent. Aaron's interest is evidenced by his attempted intervention in the federal interpleader action, which the federal district court denied based on untimeliness and its finding that the adult Breen children adequately represented Aaron's interest. Aaron did not appeal the federal district court's ruling. Accordingly, because the adult Breen children, the administratrix of Dr. Breen's estate, and Aaron all had an interest in proving Kacie participated in the intentional, unjustified killing of decedent, Aaron's interest was adequately represented by his half-siblings and the administratrix in the federal interpleader action and therefore, he is in privity with those named parties for purpose of establishing identity of parties. As such, I would find no error in the trial court's judgment sustaining Kacie's exception raising the objection ofres judicata and dismissing plaintiffs' wrongful death claims.
Furthermore, because I find no error in the trial court's judgment sustaining Kacie's exception raising the objection of res judicata as to Aaron, I would likewise find no error in the portion of the trial court's judgment ordering Aaron to pay Kacie attorney fees, court costs, and expenses pursuant to La. R.S. 9:2800.19.