Restrictive covenants are to be construed so as to give effect to the intention of the parties at the time they agreed to the covenants. Breeling v. Churchill, 228 Neb. 596, 423 N.W.2d 469 (1988); Micek, supra. If the language is unambiguous, the covenant shall be enforced according to its plain language, and the covenant shall not be subject to rules of interpretation or construction. Baltes v. Hodges, 207 Neb. 740, 301 N.W.2d 92 (1981); Lakeland Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Larson, 121 Ill. App.3d 805, 459 N.E.2d 1164 (1984). See, also, Knudtson, supra; Ross v. Newman, 206 Neb. 42, 291 N.W.2d 228 (1980).
Where there has been a breach of a restrictive covenant, it is not necessary to prove that the injury will be irreparable in order to obtain injunctive relief. Breeling v. Churchill, 228 Neb. 596, 423 N.W.2d 469 (1988). It is a well-defined exception to the general rule requiring a showing of actual and substantial injury as a basis for entitlement to injunctive relief, that, where one who has entered into a restrictive covenant as to the use of the land commits a distinct breach thereof, he may be enjoined irrespective of the amount of damage caused by his breach, and even if there appears to be no substantial monetary damage.
1987) 671 F. Supp. 1270, 1272-1274 [prior federal preemption of radio antenna height].Minars v. Rose (1986) 123 A.D.2d 766 [507 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242] [FCC order adopted after trial, remanded to trial court]; L.I.M.A. Partners v. Borough of Northvale (1987) 219 N.J. Super. 512 [ 530 A.2d 839, 843-844] [same]; Brophy v. Town of Castine (Me. 1987) 534 A.2d 663, 665 [no evidence presented that ordinance differentiated between different types of antennas so as to invoke FCC order]; Breeling v. Churchill (1988) 228 Neb. 596 [ 423 N.W.2d 469, 471] [restrictive covenant did not differentiate between types of antennas]; Ross v. Hatfield (D.Kan. 1986) 640 F. Supp. 708, 712 [private restrictive covenant]. The City of Whittier ordinance suffers from a similar generality in the standards for issuance of a conditional use permit, which provide no meaningful legislative standard for the zoning administrator to determine placement and screening requirements and no recognition of the owner's right to receive signals as a factor to be evaluated.
See, Knudtson v. Trainor, 216 Neb. 653, 345 N.W.2d 4 (1984); Ross v. Newman, 206 Neb. 42, 291 N.W.2d 228 (1980). 7. Breeling v. Churchill, 228 Neb. 596, 423 N.W.2d 469 (1988). While this court has not been presented with the issue of whether a home daycare is a violation of these types of restrictive covenants, this issue has been litigated in other jurisdictions.
This court has expressly recognized that irreparable harm need not be shown to enjoin a breach of a restrictive covenant properly filed of record. Breeling v. Churchill, 228 Neb. 596, 423 N.W.2d 469 (1988); Wessel v. Hillsdale Estates, Inc., 200 Neb. 792, 266 N.W.2d 62 (1978). See, also, Chestnut Real Estate v. Huber, 148 Md. App. 190, 811 A.2d 389 (2002); Focus Entertainment v. Partridge Greene, 253 Ga. App. 121, 558 S.E.2d 440 (2001); Jack Eckerd v. 17070 Collins A. Shop. C., 563 So. 2d 103 (Fla.App. 1990); DeNina v. Bammel Forest Civic Club, Inc., 712 S.W.2d 195 (Tex.App. 1986); 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 195 (1978).
We find their contention to be without merit. See Breeling v. Churchill, 423 N.W.2d 469, 470-71 (Neb. 1988). There is nothing in the record to indicate that the restrictive covenants in question prohibit the flying of the flag.
We conclude that appellants' distinction between satellite dishes and antennas, while perhaps scientifically valid, is a distinction without a difference for our purposes, and find support for our conclusion in the decisions of other jurisdictions that have interpreted similar covenants. In Breeling v. Churchill, 228 Neb. 596, 423 N.W.2d 469, 470 (1988), the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a satellite dish was included within the scope of a covenant prohibiting the installation of "other electronic antenna" on the lots in a residential community, stating: The restrictive covenants . . . read as a whole, not only specifically prohibit all outdoor antenna, they evidence a broad concern for aesthetics and prohibit many uses of the property within the subdivision which would detract from the appearance of the area as a whole.
Appellant's third and fifth assignments of error are well taken in part. In Breeling v. Churchill (1988), 228 Neb. 596, 423 N.W.2d 469, the covenant construed prohibited "outside radio, television, ham broadcasting, or other electronic antenna[s] or aerial[s]." The clause in DeNina v. Bammel Forest Civic Club (Tex.App. 1986), 712 S.W.2d 195, 198, prohibited "television or other electric antenna[s]."
This view is consistent with the general rule in other jurisdictions. See,e.g., Marshall v. Adams, 447 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1969); Freehling v.Development Management Group, Inc., 75 Ill.App.3d 243, 30 Ill.Dec. 610, 393 N.E.2d 646 (1979); Dice and Dice v. CentralNatrona County Improvement and Service District, 684 P.2d 815 (Wyo. 1984); Taylor v. Kohler, 507 So.2d 426 (Ala. 1987); Breeling v. Churchill, 228 Neb. 596, 423 N.W.2d 469 (1988); Lakeshore Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Delatte, 524 So.2d 126, 129 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1988).