Breeling v. Churchill

9 Citing cases

  1. Boyles v. Hausmann

    246 Neb. 181 (Neb. 1994)   Cited 46 times
    Ruling that the language to "change same in whole or in part" did not allow a majority of homeowners to adopt covenants restricting the uses of the relevant property because they were new and different from the existing covenants

    Restrictive covenants are to be construed so as to give effect to the intention of the parties at the time they agreed to the covenants. Breeling v. Churchill, 228 Neb. 596, 423 N.W.2d 469 (1988); Micek, supra. If the language is unambiguous, the covenant shall be enforced according to its plain language, and the covenant shall not be subject to rules of interpretation or construction. Baltes v. Hodges, 207 Neb. 740, 301 N.W.2d 92 (1981); Lakeland Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Larson, 121 Ill. App.3d 805, 459 N.E.2d 1164 (1984). See, also, Knudtson, supra; Ross v. Newman, 206 Neb. 42, 291 N.W.2d 228 (1980).

  2. Elkhorn Ridge Golf v. Mic-Car, Inc.

    17 Neb. App. 578 (Neb. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 1 times

    Where there has been a breach of a restrictive covenant, it is not necessary to prove that the injury will be irreparable in order to obtain injunctive relief. Breeling v. Churchill, 228 Neb. 596, 423 N.W.2d 469 (1988). It is a well-defined exception to the general rule requiring a showing of actual and substantial injury as a basis for entitlement to injunctive relief, that, where one who has entered into a restrictive covenant as to the use of the land commits a distinct breach thereof, he may be enjoined irrespective of the amount of damage caused by his breach, and even if there appears to be no substantial monetary damage.

  3. Hunter v. City of Whittier

    209 Cal.App.3d 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 29 times
    In Hunter, the appellate court struck down a Whittier city ordinance which required a conditional use permit before a satellite dish could be installed by a homeowner.

    1987) 671 F. Supp. 1270, 1272-1274 [prior federal preemption of radio antenna height].Minars v. Rose (1986) 123 A.D.2d 766 [507 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242] [FCC order adopted after trial, remanded to trial court]; L.I.M.A. Partners v. Borough of Northvale (1987) 219 N.J. Super. 512 [ 530 A.2d 839, 843-844] [same]; Brophy v. Town of Castine (Me. 1987) 534 A.2d 663, 665 [no evidence presented that ordinance differentiated between different types of antennas so as to invoke FCC order]; Breeling v. Churchill (1988) 228 Neb. 596 [ 423 N.W.2d 469, 471] [restrictive covenant did not differentiate between types of antennas]; Ross v. Hatfield (D.Kan. 1986) 640 F. Supp. 708, 712 [private restrictive covenant]. The City of Whittier ordinance suffers from a similar generality in the standards for issuance of a conditional use permit, which provide no meaningful legislative standard for the zoning administrator to determine placement and screening requirements and no recognition of the owner's right to receive signals as a factor to be evaluated.

  4. Southwind Homeowners Ass'n v. Burden

    283 Neb. 522 (Neb. 2012)   Cited 11 times
    In Southwind Homeowners Ass'n v. Burden, 283 Neb. 522, 810 N.W.2d 714, 716 (2012), the Nebraska Supreme Court considered whether a home day care violated a restrictive covenant stating that "[e]ach lot shall be used exclusively for single-family residential purposes" and "[n]o business activities of any kind whatsoever shall be conducted on any Lot including home occupations...."

    See, Knudtson v. Trainor, 216 Neb. 653, 345 N.W.2d 4 (1984); Ross v. Newman, 206 Neb. 42, 291 N.W.2d 228 (1980). 7. Breeling v. Churchill, 228 Neb. 596, 423 N.W.2d 469 (1988). While this court has not been presented with the issue of whether a home daycare is a violation of these types of restrictive covenants, this issue has been litigated in other jurisdictions.

  5. State ex Rel. City of Alma v. Furnas Cty. Farms

    266 Neb. 558 (Neb. 2003)   Cited 31 times

    This court has expressly recognized that irreparable harm need not be shown to enjoin a breach of a restrictive covenant properly filed of record. Breeling v. Churchill, 228 Neb. 596, 423 N.W.2d 469 (1988); Wessel v. Hillsdale Estates, Inc., 200 Neb. 792, 266 N.W.2d 62 (1978). See, also, Chestnut Real Estate v. Huber, 148 Md. App. 190, 811 A.2d 389 (2002); Focus Entertainment v. Partridge Greene, 253 Ga. App. 121, 558 S.E.2d 440 (2001); Jack Eckerd v. 17070 Collins A. Shop. C., 563 So. 2d 103 (Fla.App. 1990); DeNina v. Bammel Forest Civic Club, Inc., 712 S.W.2d 195 (Tex.App. 1986); 43A C.J.S. Injunctions § 195 (1978).

  6. Stone Hill Community Ass'n v. Norpel

    492 N.W.2d 409 (Iowa 1992)   Cited 3 times

    We find their contention to be without merit. See Breeling v. Churchill, 423 N.W.2d 469, 470-71 (Neb. 1988). There is nothing in the record to indicate that the restrictive covenants in question prohibit the flying of the flag.

  7. Latera v. Isle Mission Bay Homeowners

    655 So. 2d 144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 2 times

    We conclude that appellants' distinction between satellite dishes and antennas, while perhaps scientifically valid, is a distinction without a difference for our purposes, and find support for our conclusion in the decisions of other jurisdictions that have interpreted similar covenants. In Breeling v. Churchill, 228 Neb. 596, 423 N.W.2d 469, 470 (1988), the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a satellite dish was included within the scope of a covenant prohibiting the installation of "other electronic antenna" on the lots in a residential community, stating: The restrictive covenants . . . read as a whole, not only specifically prohibit all outdoor antenna, they evidence a broad concern for aesthetics and prohibit many uses of the property within the subdivision which would detract from the appearance of the area as a whole.

  8. Woodstream Dev. Co. v. Payak

    93 Ohio App. 3d 25 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 3 times

    Appellant's third and fifth assignments of error are well taken in part. In Breeling v. Churchill (1988), 228 Neb. 596, 423 N.W.2d 469, the covenant construed prohibited "outside radio, television, ham broadcasting, or other electronic antenna[s] or aerial[s]." The clause in DeNina v. Bammel Forest Civic Club (Tex.App. 1986), 712 S.W.2d 195, 198, prohibited "television or other electric antenna[s]."

  9. Grasso v. Thimons

    384 Pa. Super. 593 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)   Cited 9 times
    Concluding that the clear language of the restrictive covenant, stating that "none of the lots shall be used for any purpose other than for residential uses," prohibited the appellants from using their property as both a residence and a professional office for their accounting practice

    This view is consistent with the general rule in other jurisdictions. See,e.g., Marshall v. Adams, 447 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1969); Freehling v.Development Management Group, Inc., 75 Ill.App.3d 243, 30 Ill.Dec. 610, 393 N.E.2d 646 (1979); Dice and Dice v. CentralNatrona County Improvement and Service District, 684 P.2d 815 (Wyo. 1984); Taylor v. Kohler, 507 So.2d 426 (Ala. 1987); Breeling v. Churchill, 228 Neb. 596, 423 N.W.2d 469 (1988); Lakeshore Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Delatte, 524 So.2d 126, 129 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1988).