Opinion
No. 541-1999.
Submitted: January 24, 2000.
Decided: March 8, 2000.
Appeal from Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County, C.A. No. 99C-07-014, -015, and -016.
AFFIRMED.
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, and BERGER, Justices.
ORDER
This 8th day of March 2000, it appears to the Court that:
The appellant, Sonja L. Bray, filed this appeal from a Superior Court decision dated October 22, 1999. Bray had filed three complaints against the defendant-appellee, L.D. Caulk Dentsply International ("Caulk"), alleging libel, defamation, and breach of contract. Bray, a former Caulk employee, alleged that Caulk had maintained incorrect criminal history information in Bray's personnel file. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to Caulk on all three claims. Caulk has filed a motion to affirm the Superior Court's judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Bray's opening brief that the appeal is without merit under the criteria set forth in Supreme Court Rule 25(a).
On January 24, 2000, Bray filed a document entitled, "Appellant's Reply Brief and Motion to Strike the Appellee's Motion to Affirm," which apparently is a response to Caulk's motion. A response to a motion to affirm is not permitted unless requested by the Court. See Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). Accordingly, because the Court did not request a response, Bray's document is hereby stricken pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 34.
This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision granting summary judgment. We have reviewed the trial court record as well as Bray's opening brief and Caulk's motion to affirm. Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Bray, it is clear from this record that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that Caulk was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all three claims.
Abb. Flakt, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA., Del. Supr., 731 A.2d 811, 816 (1999).
Id.
To sustain a claim for defamation, Bray was required to show that Caulk had made a false and defamatory statement of fact about her in an unprivileged publication to a third party. Libel has been defined as "written defamation." It is undisputed on this record that the allegedly defamatory information contained in Bray's personnel file was never published to a third party. Accordingly, the Superior Court did not err in granting summary judgment to Caulk on Bray's claims for libel and defamation.
Spence v. Funk, Del. Supr., 396 A.2d 967, 970 (1978).
Furthermore, the Superior Court did not err in granting summary judgment to Caulk on Bray's claim for breach of contract. Bray contended that Caulk breached its contract with her when it deviated from procedures set forth in Caulk's employee handbook. The law is well settled, however, that an employee handbook, which does not set forth terms, conditions, or duration of employment, does not constitute a contract between an employer and employee.
See Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Del. Supr., 446 A.2d 1095, 1097 (1982).
Accordingly, we conclude that this matter should be affirmed for the reasons stated in the Superior Court's well-reasoned decision dated October 22, 1999.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Caulk's motion to affirm is GRANTED. The judgment of the Superior Court is hereby AFFIRMED.