Opinion
No. 99-CV-74634-DT
March 9, 2001
OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
This Section 1983/negligence action against the City of Detroit and a several individual Detroit Police Officers is presently before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs have responded to Defendants' Motion. The Court heard oral argument on Defendants' Motion on November 8, 2000.
At the close of the hearing, the Court directed the parties to submit copies of transcripts of all depositions taken in this case for the Court's review and consideration, and took this matter under advisement. In compliance with the Court's directive, counsel submitted the transcripts of the depositions of Desiree Battle's husband, Ned Battle; her children, Andre Sanders, Gerald Sanders, Todd Sanders, and Kimberly Sanders; her mother, Johnnie Sanders; Trosa Green; Police Officers James Metiva, Tracy Hogan and Phillip Cook; and the Affidavit and Preliminary Complaint Record of Officer Aaron Shorts. The Court has reviewed and considered these depositions and affidavits, as well as the parties' briefs and other supporting documents, and is now prepared to rule on this matter. This Opinion and Order sets forth the Court's ruling.
II. PERTINENT FACTS
On June 17, 1998, at approximately 8:25 p.m., Detroit Police Officers Chet Gardner and Phillip Cook responded to a domestic violence call at a residence located at 8400 Rosemont in Detroit. The call for police assistance was made by Plaintiff Ned Battle. When the officers arrived at the residence, Ned Battle informed them his wife, Desiree Battle, had attempted to stab their daughter, Kimberly Sanders. Mr. Battle and his daughter told the officers that Desiree Battle picked up a knife from the kitchen and followed Kim Sanders into her bedroom saying "I'll kill you," and she attempted to stab her. Mr. Battles stated that Desiree drinks a lot and has mental problems.
Based upon the statements from Mr. Battle and his daughter, Kimberly, the officers placed Desiree Battle under arrest, handcuffed her, and took her in a squad car, without incident to the Sixth Precinct where she was detained.
All parties are in agreement that Ms. Battle was not physically injured nor were did she show any signs of injury or illness prior to arriving at the police station the evening of June 17, 1998. Further, both Mr. Battle and the Battles' minor son, Aaron, testified in their depositions that Ms. Battle never told the police while they were at their house that she was injured or ill.
Upon arrival at the Sixth Precinct, Ms. Battle was fingerprinted by Officer James Metiva, the prisoner detention officer (also referred to as the "turnkey") on duty at the time. Officer Metiva testified that Desiree did not give him any trouble while he was processing her, however, she did appear to be intoxicated. When her fingerprinting was completed, Officer Metiva placed Ms. Battle in a cell by herself Officer Metiva further testified that Ms. Battle never appeared to be in distress nor did she say anything to him about being in distress or otherwise having physical problems, or that she needed to see a doctor for any reason. Officer Cook, the arresting officer, also testified that Ms. Battle appeared to be intoxicated but that she did not appear to be in any physical distress.
Trosa Green, another female detainee who later shared a cell with Ms. Battle, also testified that she smelled alcohol on Ms. Battle when she was moved into the cell with her.
Ms. Battle's son, Aaron Sanders, testified, however, that shortly after arriving at the police station, his mother called him and asked that he bring her prescription medication because her head was hurting. Aaron said that his mother told him that she had told the officers at the desk when she was brought to the station that she needed her pills but that they ignored her request. [Aaron Sanders Dep. pp. 38-39.] So, when she got her free phone call, she called home and asked Aaron to please bring her pills to the station. Id. at 39. She also asked for her jacket. Id. Aaron said he then got his older brother, Gerald (who has a car), handed him the phone to talk to their mother, and left it to Gerald to take the pills and jacket to her. Id. This is corroborated by Aaron and Gerald's brother, Todd Sanders. [Todd Sanders Dep. p. 25.]
Aaron explained that two years earlier, Ned Battle had hit Desiree in the head with a shotgun. Aaron Sanders Dep. pp. 18-19, 35-36]. Apparently, this resulted in a closed-head injury and Desiree had been taking the medication ever since to keep the pain and swelling down. Id. at 36. This was confirmed by Aaron's older brother, Gerald.
Gerald Sanders, however, did not say anything about his mother requesting her pills; he only said that when he spoke to his mother on the phone, all that she said was that she was a little cold and needed a cigarette. [Gerald Sanders Dep. pp. 27-28.]
Trosa Green, another female detainee who was in another cell at the Sixth Precinct, also testified that she heard Ms. Battle ask for her medications. [Trosa Green Dep. p. 9.] Ms. Green said she heard Ms. Battle ask for her medication and for a phone call. Id. She said Plaintiff did make the phone call, but that she was told by the turnkey that she would have to wait to talk to the sergeant about her medication. Id. at p. 10.
All of the officers who had contact with Ms. Battle, however, have stated that no such request for "medication" was ever made to them. [See Metiva Dep. pp. 26, 29. See also, Phillip Cook Dep., p. 24.]
The next afternoon, June 18, 1998, Officer Metiva moved Desiree into the same cell as Trosa Green. Metiva testified that he moved Desiree out of the cell he had originally placed her in because that cell was "out of [his] filed of view" and as a consequence, he "would have to walk over ther and physically check on her every time I needed to." [Metiva Dep. p. 10.] The cell in which Trosa Green had been placed, however, was "right in front of [Metiva's] work station and [he] could always observe them." Id.
After Ms. Battle was moved into the cell with Ms. Green, Ms. Green noted that Ms. Battle had urinated on herself Green further related in her deposition that once Ms. Battle was settled in as her cellmate, she complained of a headache and once again made a request for medication. Id. at p. 12, 19. According to Ms. Green, the turnkey reiterated that she would have to ask the sergeant about her medication. Id. at 19.
These statements of Trosa Green are corroborated by the Complaint Report made by Officer Tracy Hogan. See Plaintiffs' Ex. B.
After being in the cell with Trosa Green for approximately three hours, both Ms. Battle and Ms. Green laid down on their bunks to go to sleep. Ms. Green was awakened by a thud on the floor. She found that Desiree Battle had apparently fallen off her bunk (which was approximately 18 inches off the floor) and was having a seizure. Ms. Green called for help. Officer Tracy Hogan answered that call and found Ms. Battle unconscious on the floor. [ See Plaintiffs' Ex. B.] She sought additional help and Officer Metiva and Officer Aaron Shorts, who was working the precinct reports desk, came to her assistance. When they could get no response from Ms. Battle, Officer Hogan notified Desk Sergeant Blair about what had taken place in the cell block and Sergeant Blair called 911. An EMS unit responded and took Ms. Battle from the Sixth Precinct to Grace Hospital.
Ms. Battle remained alive but in a comatose state for approximately 15 hours. She died in the hospital on June 19, 1998. The cause of death determined by an autopsy was listed as "craniocerebral (head) injury." [ See Plaintiffs' Ex. D.]
On August 24, 1999, Plaintiffs instituted the instant action by filing a three-count Complaint in Wayne County Circuit Court alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, gross negligence, and loss of consortium (by Plaintiff Ned Battle), and naming as Defendants the City of Detroit, Chief of Police Bennie Napoleon, and two of the Officers who had contact with Desiree Battle while she was detained at the Sixth Precinct on June 17-18, 1998, Officer James Metiva and Officer Aaron Shorts. Defendants timely removed the action to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.
Although Plaintiffs' Complaint is actually divided into four counts, Count I contains only factual allegations. Plaintiffs' three causes of action are set forth in Counts II through IV, Count II setting forth Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim, Count III containing Plaintiffs' gross negligence claim, and Count IV containing Plaintiff Ned Battle's claim for loss of consortium.
On September 28, 2000, the Court entered an Opinion and Order granting the City of Detroit's and Chief Napoleon's Motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed all of Plaintiffs' state common law tort claims against these two defendants on governmental immunity grounds. Thus, only Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims, and their common law claims against individual Defendants Metiva and Shorts remain for adjudication. Defendants now seek summary judgment on these claims.
III. DISCUSSION
A. STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO MOTIONS FOR SUM0MARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is proper "`if the pleadings, depositions, answer to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
Three 1986 Supreme Court cases — Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986); and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986) — ushered in a "new era" in the standards of review for a summary judgment motion. These cases, in the aggregate, lowered the movant's burden on a summary judgment motion. According to the Celotex Court,
"Taken together the three cases signal to the lower courts that summary judgment can be relied upon more so than in the past to weed out frivolous lawsuits and avoid wasteful trials." 10A C. Wright, A. Miller, M. Kane, Federal Practice Procedure. § 2727, at 35 (1996 Supp.).
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof.Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
After reviewing the above trilogy, the Sixth Circuit established a series of principles to be applied to motions for summary judgment. They are summarized as follows:
* Cases involving state of mind issues are not necessarily inappropriate for summary judgment.
* The movant must meet the initial burden of showing "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact" as to an essential element of the non-movant's case. This burden may be met by pointing out to the court that the respondent, having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of his or her case.
* The respondent cannot rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact, but must "present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment."
* The trial court no longer has the duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.
* The trial court has more discretion than in the "old era" in evaluating the respondent's evidence. The respondent must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Further, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find" for the respondent, the motion should be granted. The trial court has at least some discretion to determine whether the respondent's claim is plausible.Betkerur v. Aultman Hospital Association, 78 F.3d 1070, 1087 (6th Cir. 1996). See also, Street v. J.C. Bradford Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court will apply the foregoing standards in deciding Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in this case.
B. PLAINTIFFS' SECTION 1983 CLAIMS ARE ALLEGED AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS POLICE OFFICERS ONLY42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory of the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . .
However, a state official sued in his official capacity is not a "person" within the meaning of§ 1983. Whittington v. Milby, 928 F.2d 188, 193 (6th Cir. 1991); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591 (6th Cir. 1990).
It is well-settled in this Circuit that, absent a clear indication that Section 1983 defendants are being in their individual capacities, courts must assume that they are being sued in their official capacities, only. See Whittington v. Milby, supra; Wells v. Brown, supra. As the Wells court explained,
[T]he face of a complaint must indicate whether a plaintiff seeks to recover damages from the defendants directly. . . . See Nix [v. Norman]. 879 F.2d [429,] 431 [(8th Cir. 1989)] (individual capacity suits must be clear enough to notify defendant of the personal nature of the suit). Although modern pleading is less rigid than in an earlier day, see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), we have not let down all pleading barriers. It is not too much to ask that if a person or entity is to be subject to suit, the person or entity should be properly named and clearly notified of the potential for payment of damages individually. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 474, 105 S.Ct. 873, 879, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment).891 F.2d at 593.
In this case, Plaintiffs did not designate in the caption of their Complaint in what capacity they are suing Defendants Napoleon, Metiva and Shorts. Further, there is no indication in the text of his Complaint that he is suing these Defendants in their individual capacity. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim against Defendants Napoleon, Metiva and Shorts must be evaluated under the standards applicable to the public entity they represent, i.e., the City of Detroit.
For municipalities to be subject to liability under Section 1983, certain specific legal requisites must be fulfilled. Section 1983 actions against municipalities require demonstrating (1) that the City pursued an official custom or policy of failing to adequately train, supervise, or discipline its officers in a particular matter, and (2) that such official policy or custom was adopted by the official makers of policy with `deliberate indifference' towards the constitutional rights of persons affected by the policy or custom. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387-88, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (emphasis added). See also, Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120-24, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992); Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-95, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Haverstick Enterprises v. Financial Federal Credit, 32 F.3d 989, 996 n. 8 (6th Cir. 1994); Mumford v. Basinski, 105 F.3d 264, 267 (6th Cir. 1997). Further, when an action is brought against a supervisory official in his official capacity (as is the case here with respect to Chief Benny Napoleon) the actions of that official are equated with the actions of the municipality itself. As a consequence, an official policy or custom can be established by showing that the supervisory official encouraged or ratified a pattern and practice of conduct. See Marchese v. Lucas, 758 F.2d 181, 188 (6th Cir. 1985). cert. denied, 480 U.S. 916 (1987): Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1248 (6th Cir. 1989). If it is established in an official capacity action for failure to supervise, control or train an offending individual that the supervisor "either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it," liability may be imposed upon the official, as well as the municipality. See, Poe v. Hayden, 853 F.2d 418, 429 (6th Cir. 1988).
In their Complaint in this action, Plaintiffs allege that
17. Defendant City of Detroit Police Department, acting under color of state law, authorized, tolerated, ratified, promoted, or acquiesced in the treatment and violation of Constitutional rights afforded to Plaintiff decedent under federal and state constitutions.
The Court notes that the City of Detroit Police Department is not named in the caption of the Complaint as a party-defendant in this action. The Department is merely an arm of the City and the Sixth Circuit has held that "[a] suit against a city police department in Michigan is one against the City itself because the city is the real party in interest." Haverstick Enterprises, Inc. v. Financial Federal Credit, Inc., 32 F.3d 989, 992 n. 1 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Moomey v. City of Holland, 490 F. Supp. 188, 190 (W.D. Mich. 1980). Therefore, the Court will treat the references to the City of Detroit Police Department in Paragraph 17 of Plaintiffs' Complaint as referring to the City of Detroit.
Complaint, ¶ 17.
While this allegation might have been sufficient to withstand a pre-discovery motion to dismiss or motion for judgment on the pleadings, at the summary judgment stage, Plaintiffs can no longer rely on the allegations in their Complaint; rather, they must "present affirmative evidence" supporting their allegations in order to withstand summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. Plaintiffs have not met this burden. They have, in fact, presented no evidence whatsoever that the City of Detroit or Police Chief Benny Napoleon "authorized, tolerated, ratified, promoted or acquiesced in" the treatment they allege that Desiree Battle was afforded (or not afforded) by Defendants Metiva and Shorts. Without such affirmative evidence, Plaintiffs cannot withstand Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, Count II of Plaintiffs' Complaint will be dismissed.
Although Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint in its entirety, Defendants have not presented any arguments for dismissal of Plaintiffs' state law "gross negligence" claim (and Plaintiff Ned Battle's derivative "loss of consortium" claim) which remain against Defendants Metiva and Shorts. The Court has, nonetheless, independently reviewed Plaintiffs' gross negligence claim and the evidence of record bearing thereon and finds that Plaintiffs have presented evidence demonstrating that material issues of fact exist precluding summary judgment on this claim. Specifically, Plaintiffs have presented evidence showing that Desiree Battle made more than one request for her "medication" while she was incarcerated on June 17-18, 1998. Both Ms. Battle's cellmate, Trosa Green and Ms. Green's son, Aaron Sanders, testified in their depositions that Ms. Battle made several requests for her medication.
As indicated above, these claims as asserted against Defendant Napoleon and the City of Detroit were dismissed on September 28, 2000 on the Motion of these two Defendants for Partial Summary Judgment on the Pleadings.
Defendants on the other hand, have presented contradictory evidence disputing that Ms. Battle made such requests for her medicine. Defendant Metiva testified that he walked around the cell block and monitored the various people in the cells every half hour while he was on duty June 17-18, 1998. He testified that Ms. Battle never requested any medication and never requested any medical care or treatment. Id. at 29.
Whether Ms. Battle requested her medication and whether such requests were ignored are issues of material fact bearing directly on Plaintiffs' claim of gross negligence. Therefore, the Court will not enter summary judgment on Plaintiffs' state law claims against Defendants Metiva and Shorts. Therefore, Defendants' Motion on this claim and the derivative claim of Plaintiff Ned Battle for loss of consortium will be denied.
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons stated above in this Opinion and Order,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part. Defendants' Motion is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims in Count II of their Complaint. These Section 1983 claims will, accordingly be, DISMISSED. Summary Judgment is DENIED with respect to Plaintiffs' state law claims in Counts III and IV against Defendants Metiva and Shorts.
All of the claims over which the Court had subject matter jurisdiction having been dismissed, and these remaining claims in Counts III and IV against Defendants Metiva and Shorts being purely state law claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. Therefore,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' claims in Counts III and IV against Defendants Metiva and Shorts are hereby REMANDED to the Wayne County Circuit Court.