Opinion
E063388
06-20-2018
BARBARA BRATTON, Cross-complainant and Appellant, v. SALVADOR GUEVARA, Cross-defendant and Respondent.
Barbara Bratton, in pro. per., and Zulu A. Ali for Cross-complainant and Appellant. Fidelity National Law Group and Teresa Y. Hillery for Salvador Guevara.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. CIVRS1302392) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Keith D. Davis, Judge. Affirmed. Barbara Bratton, in pro. per., and Zulu A. Ali for Cross-complainant and Appellant. Fidelity National Law Group and Teresa Y. Hillery for Salvador Guevara.
Cross-complainant and appellant Barbara Bratton, who represented herself in propria persona in this matter until counsel substituted in to conduct oral argument on appeal, lost a property to nonjudicial foreclosure in March 2012. Cross-defendant and respondent Salvador Guevara purchased the property in November 2012. Bratton contends that the foreclosure was wrongful and void, and that she remains the true owner. On that basis, among others, she contends that the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Guevara was erroneous, and should be reversed. She also contends the trial court erred by denying her request for a continuance of the hearing on Guevara's motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h). We find no error, and affirm the judgment.
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Bratton acquired sole legal title to the property at issue, located in Ontario, California, in March 2005. She had an ownership interest in the property before that date; she is one of two grantors on the March 2005 grant deed, as well as the only grantee. She first acquired an ownership interest in the property in 1987, and asserts that she began residing at the property in 1974, when her parents purchased it.
In June 2005, Bratton executed a deed of trust to secure a loan of $340,000 against the property; the deed of trust was recorded on July 19, 2005. In March 2012, after nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings, the property was sold at a trustee's sale to U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-FF9 (U.S. Bank), and a Trustee's Deed Upon Sale was recorded. Guevara purchased the property from U.S. Bank in November 2012.
In February 2012, Bratton filed suit in federal district court against U.S. Bank, among others, challenging the foreclosure and alleging various "Claims for Relief," including: (1) violations of the Home Ownership Equity Protection Act; (2) violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act; (3) violations of the Federal Truth in Lending Act; (4) violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act; (5) fraudulent misrepresentation; (6) breach of fiduciary duty; (7) unjust enrichment; (8) civil conspiracy; (9) "Civil RICO"; (10) "Set Aside Illegal Trustee Sale"; (11) quiet title; (12) violation of Business and Professions Code § 17200; (13) wrongful foreclosure; (14) usury; (15) "Predatory Lending,"; (16) unfair debt collection practices; and (17) slander of title. The suit did not survive the defendants' motions to dismiss, and judgment was entered in favor of the defendants on January 10, 2013. Bratton filed a notice of appeal, but the appeal was ultimately dismissed after Bratton failed to perfect the appeal.
In April 2013, Guevara initiated the present action, filing a "Complaint to Quiet Title and For Declaratory and Injunctive Relief" (complaint). The complaint alleges that on March 4, 2013, Bratton filed an unlawful detainer action in San Bernardino County Superior Court regarding the property, naming as the defendant the real estate agent who had handled the sale of the property for U.S. Bank. The unlawful detainer complaint alleged that the agent had acquired possession of the property on or about January 6, 2013, even though Guevara was in possession of the property on that date. It further alleged that a notice to quit had been delivered to the agent, and that a notice to quit had been posted on the premises, even though neither of those things were true. Bratton obtained a default judgment against the agent. Guevara learned of the unlawful detainer action when the San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department served workers at the property, hired by Guevara, with the notice to vacate pursuant to the default judgment against the agent. The complaint also cites Bratton's federal lawsuit, and specifically her claim seeking to quiet title in the property.
In September 2013, Bratton filed her "First Amended Cross Complaint of Counterclaim for Quiet Title and for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief" (cross-complaint), seeking to establish that she is the legal owner of property, and that Guevara is not.
Guevara filed his motion for summary judgment on Bratton's cross-complaint, together with supporting documents, in October 2014. After initially being set for January 2015, the hearing on the motion was continued to February 27, 2015.
On February 26, 2015, Bratton filed an ex parte motion, seeking a further continuance of the hearing. Her moving papers do not appear in our record, except as a notation in the register of actions, but the matter is discussed on the record at the February 27, 2015, hearing. The trial court acknowledged the receipt of Bratton's motion, and inquired about the basis for the requested continuance. Bratton stated that she had been arrested in connection with her efforts to "save" her "home of 40 years," and that her public defender was "sending out some subpoenas that are very essential to what occurred in the—that caused this whole incident to take place." Specifically, the subpoenas were seeking transcripts from certain depositions taken in connection with Bratton's federal lawsuit. Guevara opposed the motion for continuance on grounds of timeliness and relevance.
The trial court denied Bratton's request for continuance, and the hearing on Guevara's motion for summary judgment proceeded. After hearing argument of the parties, and ruling on various evidentiary issues, the trial court granted the motion, finding that Bratton had failed to raise any triable issues of material fact regarding Guevara's ownership of the property.
Judgment on Bratton's cross-complaint was entered in favor of Guevara on March 18, 2015. The judgment declares that Bratton "lacks ownership and/or interest in the subject property," declares void certain documents Bratton had recorded with respect to the property in 2013, and awards Guevara his costs. Guevara's complaint was subsequently dismissed without prejudice, on his request; the issues raised in the complaint had been resolved by the summary judgment on Bratton's cross-complaint.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review.
Under section 437c, subdivision (c), a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A defendant meets its burden on summary judgment by showing that the plaintiff cannot prove its causes of action, or by establishing a complete defense to the plaintiff's causes of action. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show a triable issue of fact material to the causes of action or defense. (Ibid.) Claims and theories not supported by admissible evidence do not raise a triable issue. (§ 437c, subd. (b)(3).)
We evaluate a summary judgment ruling de novo, independently reviewing the record to determine whether there are any triable issues of material fact. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 767.) "In practical effect, we assume the role of a trial court and apply the same rules and standards that govern a trial court's determination of a motion for summary judgment." (Distefano v. Forester (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1258.) In general, we give no deference to the trial court's ruling or reasoning, and only decide whether the right result was reached. (Carnes v. Superior Court (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 688, 694.)
B. Analysis.
1. Summary Judgment Was Properly Granted in Favor of Guevara on Bratton's Cross-complaint.
a. Noncompliance with section 437c requirements.
When responding to a motion for summary judgment, under section 437c, subdivision (b)(3), "[t]he opposition papers shall include a separate statement that responds to each of the material facts contended by the moving party to be undisputed, indicating whether the opposing party agrees or disagrees that those facts are undisputed. The statement shall set forth plainly and concisely any other material facts the opposing party contends are disputed. Each material fact contended by the opposing party to be disputed shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence. Failure to comply with this requirement of a separate statement may constitute a sufficient ground, in the court's discretion, for granting the motion."
The California Rules of Court elaborate on these statutory requirements. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350.) As explained in rule 3.1350(f): "(1) Each material fact claimed by the moving party to be undisputed must be set out verbatim on the left side of the page, below which must be set out the evidence said by the moving party to establish that fact, complete with the moving party's references to exhibits. [¶] (2) On the right side of the page, directly opposite the recitation of the moving party's statement of material facts and supporting evidence, the response must unequivocally state whether that fact is 'disputed' or 'undisputed.' An opposing party who contends that a fact is disputed must state, on the right side of the page directly opposite the fact in dispute, the nature of the dispute and describe the evidence that supports the position that the fact is controverted. Citation to the evidence in support of the position that a fact is controverted must include reference to the exhibit, title, page, and line numbers. . . ."
Further undesignated "rule" references are to the California Rules of Court. --------
Bratton's opposition to Guevara's motion for summary judgment does not comply with the requisites for successfully opposing summary judgment set forth in section 437c and rule 3.1350. She does not unequivocally state whether each material fact claimed by Guevara is "disputed" or "undisputed," as required by rule 3.1350, instead stating an objection with brief, often cryptic commentary, or indicating the facts are "true" (or, in one instance, both). Her separate statement largely fails to describe the evidence she contends supports her position that any particular fact is controverted, and it is devoid of any citations to the evidence by exhibit, title, page, and line numbers.
For example, Guevara's 3rd material fact, supported by citations to record evidence, is the following: "The loan became in default, and the Property was subsequently sold in 2012 at a Trustee's Sale to U.S. Bank National Association, As Trustee For First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-FF9 (hereinafter 'U.S. Bank')." Bratton's entire response, unsupported by any citation to evidence, is the following: "Object. No contract. No."
Similarly, Guevara's 15th material fact, supported by citations to evidence, is the following: "The Property was conveyed from U.S. Bank to Guevara via a Grant Deed that was recorded in the Official Records, County of San Bernardino, on November 7, 2012, as Doc # 2012-0462392." Bratton's response, in full, reads as follows: "Object. Fraud cannot convey title. See Object. Fraud upon the court."
"The separate statement is not merely a technical requirement, it is an indispensable part of the summary judgment or adjudication process. 'Separate statements are required not to satisfy a sadistic urge to torment lawyers [or self-represented parties], but rather to afford due process to opposing parties and to permit trial courts to expeditiously review complex motions for . . . summary judgment to determine quickly and efficiently whether material facts are disputed.'" (Whitehead v. Habig (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 896, 902.) Bratton's opposing separate statement is useless in assisting the court in determining whether there is any specific evidence raising a triable issue of material fact. The trial court would have been well within the scope of its discretion to grant summary judgment to Guevara on the basis of Bratton's failure to comply with the separate statement requirements. (§ 437c, subd. (b)(3).)
b. Failure to raise triable issue of material fact.
The trial court did not err in ruling on the merits that Bratton had failed to raise any triable issues of material fact. Guevara presented evidence that title in the property had passed to Bratton, then after foreclosure to U.S. Bank, and then to Guevara. In opposing the motion, Bratton failed to present any admissible evidence showing that she retained an interest in the property. The trial court was therefore correct to conclude that Guevara had demonstrated that Bratton could not prove an essential element of her claims, namely, that she has an interest in the property.
The gravamen of Bratton's opposition was that the foreclosure on the property was invalid because of purported irregularities in the assignment of the deed of trust and defects in the process by which her loan was securitized. In her view, these purported defects left the foreclosing entities without title to the property and without authority to foreclose, and rendered the subsequent purchases by U.S. Bank and then Guevara void. The evidence Bratton submitted with her opposition, however, does not support her contentions. This evidence consists of a copy of the Substitution of Trustee, recorded in advance of the foreclosure on the property; a document entitled "Certificate of No Record," issued by the California Secretary of State, relating to records described as "LPS/ASAP"; a copy of a portion of Civil Code section 1812.600; various documents relating to the notary who witnessed the signatures on the March 2012 trustee's deed upon sale, and a copy of that deed; a brochure regarding the "Role of the Corporate Trustee" from U.S. Bank Global Corporate Trust Services; and a December 2014 email exchange between Bratton and someone who is apparently an attorney representing one of the parties involved with the foreclosure, regarding the identity of the entities involved in the foreclosure. These documents, whether taken individually or collectively, do not raise any triable issue of fact regarding Guevara's ownership of the property.
In addition to the evidentiary deficiencies of her opposition, Bratton's legal arguments are unpersuasive. In particular, Bratton's reliance on Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919 (Yvanova) is misplaced. By the California Supreme Court's own characterization, its holding in Yvanova is a "narrow" one: "We hold only that a borrower who has suffered a nonjudicial foreclosure does not lack standing to sue for wrongful foreclosure based on an allegedly void assignment merely because he or she was in default on the loan and was not a party to the challenged assignment." (Id. at p. 924.) Bratton has not asserted and cannot assert a claim of wrongful foreclosure against Guevara; he is not the party who foreclosed on the property. Yvanova is simply inapposite. And Bratton cites to no other authority that supports her contention that her evidence undermines Guevara's claim of ownership to the property.
Bratton dedicates a substantial portion of her briefing on appeal to arguing that the trial court judge is biased against self-represented litigants in general, and her in particular. The record demonstrates that Bratton took offense to the trial court's advice—which it explicitly stated it gave to all litigants who come before it representing themselves—that she seek the advice of an attorney, and its advisements that if she disagreed with the court's rulings, she had the right to appeal. Having reviewed the record, we find nothing about the trial court's comments that is improper or demonstrates bias against Bratton, or other self-represented litigants.
Bratton's briefing on appeal includes various arguments that were not presented as part of her opposition in the trial court, or rely on evidence that was not submitted in support of her opposition, or which are unsupported by citations to the record or applicable legal authority, or some combination of the above. We decline to discuss these arguments in detail, but only observe that they would be unsuccessful, even if they had been properly presented. Similarly, we need not discuss in detail certain arguments presented at oral argument by Bratton's counsel that were not adequately raised in her briefing. (See Sunset Drive Corp. v. City of Redlands (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 215, 226 ["Absent a sufficient showing of justification for the failure to raise an issue in a timely fashion, we need not consider any issue which, although raised at oral argument, was not adequately raised in the briefs."].) It suffices for present purposes to note that we did not find the new arguments persuasive.
In short; Guevara made an adequate showing that he is the owner of the property at issue, and Bratton failed to produce evidence rebutting that showing. As such, summary judgment in Guevara's favor was appropriate.
2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying Bratton's Request for a Continuance.
Bratton contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her request for a continuance so that "discovery from her criminal case" could be completed. We find no abuse of discretion.
Section 437c, subdivision (h), provides as follows: "If it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment . . . that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be presented, the court shall deny the motion, or order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had, or may make any other order as may be just. The application to continue the motion to obtain necessary discovery may also be made by ex parte motion at any time on or before the date the opposition response to the motion is due." "'"'Generally, [the] power to determine when a continuance should be granted is within the discretion of the court, and there is no right to a continuance as a matter of law. [Citation.]'"' [Citation.] An exception is created by Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h), which mandates that the court grant a continuance of a hearing on a motion for summary judgment '"'upon a good faith showing by affidavit that a continuance is needed to obtain facts essential to justify opposition to the motion.'" [Citations.]'" (Mahoney v. Southland Mental Health Associates Medical Group (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 167, 170.) "Subdivision (h) was added to section 437c '"to mitigate summary judgment's harshness"'" as to "'an opposing party who has not had an opportunity to marshal the evidence.'" (Cooksey v. Alexakis (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 246, 253.)
Bratton's request for a continuance failed to meet the requirements of section 437c, subdivision (h). Our record contains no affidavit in support of the request, and apparently none was submitted. The request was not filed on or before the date her opposition was due, but rather after all briefing was completed, the day before the hearing on the motion. Bratton represented orally that the discovery she sought included "deposition transcripts . . . from the foreclosing party . . . dealing with [her] wrongful foreclosure case . . . that was dismissed by the federal court." She failed to explain, however, why such discovery might be relevant to Guevara's motion for summary judgment. And she made no showing that she could not have obtained such discovery without a continuance through exercise of due diligence, since it relates to a case that had been dismissed more than two years earlier. Section 437c, subdivision (h) does not mandate the grant of a continuance in such circumstances, and the trial court acted within the scope of its discretion by denying Bratton's request.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Guevara shall recover his costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J. We concur: MILLER
Acting P. J. FIELDS
J.