Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Milliken and Co., 857 F.2d 979, 981 (4th Cir. 1988). See also Braswell v. Faircloth, 300 S.C. 338, 387 S.E.2d 707, 710-11 (1989) (citing Milliken with approval). We may well have been without authority, in the context of the single contractual dispute at issue in Milliken, to so define the term "damages" for all contracts in futuro, as each contract is to be interpreted according to the intent of the parties.

All such loss shall be deemed to occur at the time of the "occurrence" that caused it. Auto-Owners contends the circuit court erred in failing to apply the principles of Braswell v. Faircloth, 300 S.C. 338, 387 S.E.2d 707 (Ct.App. 1989) to this case. In Braswell, an insured lessee left hazardous waste on the lessor's property when it vacated the premises.

We have uncovered no case with facts exactly like those now before us. In Braswell v. Faircloth, 387 S.E.2d 707 (S.C.App. 1989), a chemical spill much like the spills in this case was held to be an "occurrence" resulting in "property damage" as described in a policy like those at issue here. The insurer was held to be liable to indemnify the lessee of the land for damages assessed against the lessor-owner by environmental agencies.

1990); Broadwell Realty Servs., Inc. v. Fidelity Cas. Co. of New York, 218 N.J. Super. 516, 526, 528 A.2d 76, 81 (1987); Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Env't Protection, 138 N.J. Super. 275, 284, 350 A.2d 520, 525 (1975), aff'd, 145 N.J. Super. 433, 368 A.2d 363 (1976), cert. denied, 73 N.J. 57, 372 A.2d 322 (1977); Kutsher's Country Club Corp. v. Lincoln Ins. Co., 119 Misc.2d 889, 893, 465 N.Y.S.2d 136, 139-40 (1983); C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Industrial Crankshaft Eng'g Co., 326 N.C. 133, 152-53, 388 S.E.2d 557, 568-69 (1990); Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 113 Wn.2d 869, 888, 784 P.2d 507, 516 (1990); Compass Ins. Co. v. Cravens, Dargan Co., 748 P.2d 724, 730 (Wyo. 1988). Contra Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16, 18-19 (Me. 1990); Troy Mills, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., No. 86-E-054, slip op. (N.H. Super. Ct. June 20, 1989), appeal vacated and decision below summarily aff'd, No. 89-311, slip op. (N.H.Sup.Ct. Feb. 13, 1990); Braswell v. Faircloth, 300 S.C. 338, 344, 387 S.E.2d 707, 710 (S.C.App. 1989). Some of these decisions deal with costs of reimbursing the government or third parties for their costs in remedying and mitigating environmental damage.

If there is no ambiguity, the insurance policy's terms must be interpreted and enforced according to their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning. South Carolina Ins. Co. v. White, 301 S.C. 133, 390 S.E.2d 471 (Ct.App. 1990); Braswell v.Faircloth, 300 S.C. 338, 387 S.E.2d 707 (Ct.App. 1989). An ambiguity may not be created in an insurance policy by singling out a sentence or a clause.

Where there is no ambiguity, the terms of an insurance policy must be interpreted and enforced according to their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning. South Carolina Ins. Co. v.White, 301 S.C. 133, 390 S.E.2d 471 (Ct.App. 1990); Braswellv. Faircloth, 300 S.C. 338, 387 S.E.2d 707 (Ct.App. 1989). Ambiguity may not be created in an insurance policy by singling out a sentence or a clause.

However, if there is no ambiguity, the terms of an insurance policy must be interpreted and enforced according to their plain, ordinary and popular meaning. South Carolina Ins. Co. v. White, 301 S.C. 133, 390 S.E.2d 471 (Ct.App. 1990); Braswell v. Faircloth, 300 S.C. 338, 387 S.E.2d 707 (Ct.App. 1989). Ambiguity may not be created in an insurance contract by pointing out only a single sentence or clause.

We have found none, and on the contrary think that since a state tort action for property damage from contamination (like the Roshto lawsuit) does not appear to depend on violating DHEC regulations, neither does the injury-in-fact trigger for insurance coverage. Cf. Braswell v. Faircloth, 387 S.E.2d 707, 710 (Ct.App.S.C. 1989) (stating that chemical spill caused "physical injury to the land," and not tying this conclusion to DHEC regulations); Neal v. Darby, 318 S.E.2d 18, 23 (Ct.App.S.C. 1984) (stating that South Carolina Hazardous Waste Management Act does not preempt state common law nuisance actions). But the burden of proof is on Spartan.

Sept. 13, 1989); Hayes v. Maryland Casualty Co., 688 F.Supp. 1513, 1515 (N.D.Fla. 1988); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ross Elec. of Washington, Inc., 685 F.Supp. 742, 745 (W.D.Wash. 1988); Lido Co. of New England v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 574 A.2d 299, 301 (Me. 1990); Braswell v. Faircloth, 300 S.C. 338, 387 S.E.2d 707, 710-11 (1989). Had the record revealed that Independent Petrochemical intended to be bound by the technical meaning of "damages," the common and ordinary understanding of that term would not control. Krombach, 785 S.W.2d at 731.

“An insurance contract is ambiguous only when it may fairly be understood in more than one way.” Braswell v. Faircloth, 387 S.E.2d 707, 709 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989).