Opinion
23A-CR-2626
06-19-2024
Chas Layne Brashears, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT R. PATRICK MAGRATH ALCORN SAGE SCHWARTZ & MAGRATH, LLP MADISON, INDIANA ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL MEGAN SMITH DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Switzerland Circuit Court The Honorable W. Gregory Coy, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 78C01-1910-F4-433
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT R. PATRICK MAGRATH ALCORN SAGE SCHWARTZ & MAGRATH, LLP MADISON, INDIANA
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL MEGAN SMITH DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Crone, Judge
Case Summary
[¶1] Chas Layne Brashears appeals his sentence following a guilty plea to level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine. Because Brashears waived his right to appeal his sentence in his plea agreement, we dismiss.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] In October 2019, the State charged Brashears with level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine (later reduced to a level 5 felony), level 6 felony possession of a syringe, and class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana. In August 2023, Brashears signed a plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to the level 5 felony in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges and a three-year cap on any executed time. The agreement included the following provision:
The sentencing range for a level 5 felony is between one and six years, with an advisory sentence of three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b).
16. I acknowledge that I may have the right to challenge this agreement and the resulting conviction and sentence. By entering into this plea agreement I hereby waive any right to appeal the conviction and/or sentence in this cause by direct appeal so long as the Judge sentences me within the terms of my plea agreement.Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 96 (emphasis added).
[¶3] At the plea hearing, Brashears affirmed that he discussed the plea agreement with his counsel before he signed it and was "offering to plead guilty voluntarily[.]" Tr. Vol. 2 at 19. The trial court took the plea under advisement. At a subsequent hearing, the court accepted Brashears's guilty plea, imposed a three-year executed sentence, and stated that Brashears "does have the right to appeal the sentence here[.]" Id. at 48.
[¶4] Brashears filed a notice of appeal and a brief in which he challenged the appropriateness of his sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). The State filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that Brashears waived his right to appeal his sentence in his plea agreement. Brashears filed a response, arguing that the waiver provision was ambiguous. A majority of this Court's motions panel voted to hold the State's motion in abeyance for the writing panel. The dissenting member, Senior Judge Shepard, voted to grant the State's motion pursuant to our supreme court's opinion in Davis v. State, 217 N.E.3d 1229 (Ind. 2023). The State filed a brief in which it responded to Brashears's sentencing argument and renewed its request to dismiss this appeal.
Discussion and Decision
[¶5] We agree with Senior Judge Shepard that this appeal should be dismissed. As the court explained in Davis, "Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to appeal their sentences, but they may waive that right so long as their waiver is knowing and voluntary[.]" Id. at 1232 (citations omitted).
For example, defendants often plead guilty and agree (among other things) to waive their right to appeal their sentence in exchange for a more lenient sentence. These plea agreements are contracts between the defendant and the State, and once the trial court approves the agreements, they are binding on the defendant, the State, and the trial court. Because plea agreements are contracts, contract law principles generally apply.Id. (citation omitted). One such principle is that we construe any ambiguity in the agreement "against the State as the agreement's drafter." Id. at 1233.
[¶6] Brashears argues that the waiver provision in his plea agreement is ambiguous because of its use of "and/or." We disagree. Although the term may be "imprecise" in certain contexts, in this case it was clearly used "to signify 'A or B, or both.'" Dunn v. State, 230 N.E.3d 910, 916 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Ira Robbins, "And/Or" and the Proper Use of Legal Language, 77 Md. L. Rev. 311, 314 (2018)). In other words, the plea agreement plainly stated that Brashears waived his right to appeal either his conviction or his sentence, or both, on direct appeal so long as the trial court sentenced him within the terms of the agreement, which it did. Put even more simply, Brashears may not appeal either his conviction or his sentence.
We note that "a defendant may not challenge his conviction based upon a guilty plea in a direct appeal" in any event. Alvey v. State, 911 N.E.2d 1248, 1249 (Ind. 2009).
[¶7] Brashears observes that the trial court advised him that he could appeal his sentence, but that is irrelevant for purposes of this appeal. If Brashears believes that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because the trial court's improper advisement misled him about which rights he was waiving, his only avenue for relief is a post-conviction proceeding. Davis, 217 N.E.3d at 1236.Consequently, we dismiss.
Brashears would face an uphill battle in obtaining post-conviction relief. See Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73, 77 (Ind. 2008) ("By the time the trial court erroneously advised Creech of the possibility of appeal, Creech had already pled guilty and received the benefit of his bargain. Being told at the close of the hearing that he could appeal presumably had no effect on that transaction.").
[¶8] Dismissed.
Bradford, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.