On appeal to the district court reliance was centered upon the question of undue influence, and that court, over caveator's objection, granted proponent's motion for a directed verdict based upon the ground of insufficient evidence and entered judgment admitting the will to probate. As appears from our opinion in Brantner v. Papish, 109 Colo. 437, 126 P.2d 1032, we reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for a new trial on the principal ground that evidence offered by caveator tending to show undue influence had been improperly excluded, and which, if it could be presented as detailed in the offer, was sufficient to warrant a submission of the cause to a jury. Following the remand, a subsequent trial resulted in a verdict in favor of the caveator followed by a setting aside of the verdict by the trial judge — not the same judge who presided in the previous district court trial — and the entering of a judgment for proponent.
These provisions were clear and unambiguous. Young v. Burke, 139 Colo. 305, 338 P.2d 284 (1959); Brantner v. Papish, 109 Colo. 437, 126 P.2d 1032 (1942). They concerned the competency of witnesses.
In thus holding this court adopted a minority rule but stated that it felt compelled to do so because Illinois case law interpreting a similar statute was also to such effect. The Shapter rule has been adhered to by this court in Eder v. Methodist Ass'n., 94 Colo. 173, 29 P.2d 631, and Brantner v. Papish, 109 Colo. 437, 126 P.2d 1032. Under these circumstances we are accordingly disinclined to overrule a line of cases which clearly represent the well established law on this subject in this state as of the time the instant proceeding was commenced and tried.
In Prewitt v. Lambert, 19 Colo. 7, 34 P. 684 (1893), the court commented that the rule must be judiciously applied, "or it may work great wrong and injury." See also Risbry v. Swan, 124 Colo. 567, 239 P.2d 600 (1951); Brantner v. Papish, 109 Colo. 437, 126 P.2d 1032 (1942); National State Bank v. Brayman, 30 Colo. App. 554, 497 P.2d 710 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 180 Colo. 304, 505 P.2d 11 (1973). See generally, Comment, The Colorado Dead Man's Statute, 43 Den.L.J. 349 (1966).