216 Ga. App. 93, 95 (7) ( 453 S.E.2d 35) (1994). See Brantley v. State, 226 Ga. App. 872, 873 (1) ( 487 S.E.2d 412) (1997) ("when an officer sees a traffic offense occur, a resulting traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment"); State v. Diamond, 223 Ga. App. 164, 166 ( 477 S.E.2d 320) (1996) (driver weaving in and out of lane is reasonable grounds for stop); Huff v. State, 205 Ga. App. 557 ( 422 S.E.2d 664) (1992) (same). 156 Ga. App. 404 ( 274 S.E.2d 770) (1980) (defendant was only seen weaving within his lane).

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. See also Brantley v. State, 226 Ga. App. 872, 874 (2) (b) ( 487 SE2d 412) (1997). Contrary to Williams's assertion, the subjective opinion of the officer concerning whether the suspect's detention constituted a custodial arrest is not controlling.

Moreover, the state constitutional question, although raised in the written motion, was not explicitly ruled on below, which also precludes review. 226 Ga. App. 872, 873 (1) ( 487 S.E.2d 412) (1997). See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 ( 116 SC 1769, 135 L.E.2d 89) (1996) (pretextual stops are not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment where police observe traffic violation).

It is well established that an appellate court, when reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, must accept the implicit as well as the explicit findings of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous. Brantley v. State, 226 Ga.App. 872, 873(2)(a), 487 S.E.2d 412 (1997); Garcia v. State, 207 Ga.App. 653, 654(1)(a), 428 S.E.2d 666 (1993). See also State v. Davis, 261 Ga. 225, 226, 404 S.E.2d 100 (1991).

" Defense counsel agreed that his objection was the same as the one that was already ruled on by the court, and referred the trial court to his earlier arguments made in the suppression hearing and a post-hearing letter brief — none of which raised the Miranda issue enumerated here. Because the specific argument raised here was not argued to or ruled upon by the trial court, it has not been preserved for review. See Williams v. State, 270 Ga. App. 480, 481-482 ( 606 SE2d 671) (2004); Brantley v. State, 226 Ga. App. 872, 873 (1) ( 487 SE2d 412) (1997). 3. Gonzalez contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to strike for cause a prospective juror who lacked English language proficiency.

We agree that under the totality of the circumstances the officers had probable cause to search Andrade's car. When the arresting officer observed a traffic violation, he was authorized to initiate a traffic stop. Chang v. State, 270 Ga. App. 814, 816 ( 608 SE2d 283) (2004); Brantley v. State, 226 Ga. App. 872, 873 (1) ( 487 SE2d 412) (1997). There is no evidence in this case that the arresting officer unreasonably detained Menezes beyond the time required to issue Andrade a traffic citation.

Ruffin, C.J., and Barnes, J., concur. See Martinez, supra; Brantley v. State, 226 Ga. App. 872, 873-874 (2) (a) ( 487 SE2d 412) (1997); Ramsey v. State, 183 Ga. App. 48, 50 (1) ( 357 SE2d 869) (1987). JOHNSON, Presiding Judge.

Larocca's initial approach to and conversation with Underwood were permissible. This court gives great deference to trial courts' rulings on motions to suppress unless they are clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Brantley v. State, 226 Ga. App. 872, 873(2)(a) ( 487 S.E.2d 412) (1997). In this case we must conclude that the trial court clearly erred in granting Underwood's motion on the ground that an illegal stop occurred.

(Citation omitted.) Brantley v. State, 226 Ga. App. 872, 874 (2) (b) ( 487 S.E.2d 412) (1997). "Although the officer told defendant he was not under arrest at that time, we conclude that he was; a reasonable suspect, knowing that the officer had found the [gun], would not believe that he was free to leave or that his detention was only going to be temporary."

Chiasson v. State, 250 Ga. App. 63, 64 (1) ( 549 S.E.2d 503) (2001); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 ( 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889) (1968). See Cotton v. State, 237 Ga. App. 18 ( 513 S.E.2d 763) (1999); Brantley v. State, 226 Ga. App. 872, 873 (1) ( 487 S.E.2d 412) (1997); Freeland v. State, 223 Ga. App. 326, 327 (1) ( 477 S.E.2d 633) (1996). Because the officer saw Dorsch violate a traffic law, the resulting traffic stop was permissible.