Branstetter v. Branstetter

7 Citing cases

  1. In re Grimes

    CASE NO. 15-06465-5-DMW (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Jun. 9, 2016)   Cited 3 times
    Looking to the petition date in the context of a lien avoidance action

    There are generally three ways by which a tenancy by the entirety can be severed or terminated: absolute divorce of the marriage; death of one of the spouses; and voluntary conversion. See Martin v. Roberts, 177 N.C. App. 415, 419, 628 S.E.2d 812, 815 (2006) (holding that "upon an absolute divorce, real property held as a tenancy by the entirety immediately is converted by operation of law to a tenancy in common"); Leggett, 273 N.C. at 551, 161 S.E.2d at 26 (holding that "[u]pon the death of husband or wife the survivor becomes the sole owner by virtue of the deed creating the tenancy by the entirety"); Branstetter v. Branstetter, 36.N.C. App. 534-35, 245 S.E.2d 87, 89 (1978) (holding that a "tenancy by the entirety may be terminated by a voluntary partition between the husband and the wife whereby they execute a joint instrument conveying the land to themselves as tenants in common or in severalty"). In each of these instances, "[o]nce the tenancy by the entirety has been dissolved, and the real property has been converted to another form of an estate, a creditor's judgment lien may attach to an individual spouse's interest in the new estate."

  2. Tarr v. Zalaznik

    264 N.C. App. 597 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 3 times

    Each spouse [wa]s entitled to an undivided one-half interest in the property[.]’ " Branstetter v. Branstetter , 36 N.C. App. 532, 536, 245 S.E.2d 87, 90 (1978) (citations omitted). Even upon separation, the expenditures of one spouse to maintain the property prior to divorce could not be recovered by that spouse.

  3. Dietz, Jr. v. Dietz

    17 Va. App. 203 (Va. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 63 times
    Holding that property acquired after separation is not acquired during the marriage and is not marital property unless obtained with marital funds

    The rents were collected before the parties were divorced; therefore, the holding in Gaynor v. Hird may not be controlling. See Gaynor v. Hird, 15 Va. App. at 381, 424 S.E.2d at 242; see also DiTommasi v. DiTommasi, 27 Md. App. 241, 259, 340 A.2d 341, 351 (1975) (allowing contribution between tenants by the entireties); Sirianni v. Sirianni, 14 A.D.2d 432, 437, 221 N.Y.S.2d 693, 698 (1961) (allowing contribution); Branstetter v. Branstetter, 36 N.C. App. 532, 536, 245 S.E.2d 87, 90 (1978) (not allowing contribution). However, we do not address this issue.

  4. Dealer Supply Co. v. Greene

    108 N.C. App. 31 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 4 times

    In this connection, it should be observed that an estate by the entirety is not terminated or dissolved by the acts of the parties which constitute mere grounds for an absolute divorce; there must be a final decree of absolute divorce for this effect to occur. Bransetter v. Bransetter, 36 N.C. App. 532, 534-35, 245 S.E.2d 87, 89-90 (1978), quoting J. Webster, Real Estate Law in North Carolina, 116, p. 136 (1971). Ronald and Vicki Greene were not divorced until 2 November 1987, over eight (8) months following the conveyance of the marital property to Ronald Greene's parents.

  5. Williams v. Williams

    72 N.C. App. 184 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 9 times

    Moreover, regardless of the source of the sixty thousand dollars put into the house, the wife has no special claim to reimbursement for it. The record reflects that the sixty thousand dollars was advanced to both parties, but even if it were not, the law is clear: neither party owning property as a tenant by the entirety prior to divorce is entitled to any reimbursement for payments on the mortgage or for other benefits to the property during the marriage. Branstetter v. Branstetter, 36 N.C. App. 532, 245 S.E.2d 87 (1978). III

  6. Kirstein v. Kirstein

    64 N.C. App. 191 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 4 times
    Holding "to the extent that the [foreign] decree attempt to affect title to property in North Carolina, it is void."

    Upon divorce, the estate is converted into a tenancy in common, each former spouse entitled to an undivided one-half interest in the property. Branstetter v. Branstetter, 36 N.C. App. 532, 245 S.E.2d 87 (1978). Pursuant to such generally accepted principles of law, plaintiff is a co-tenant with defendant, her former husband, and is entitled to a one-half undivided interest in the disputed property.

  7. Asker v. Asker

    8 Mass. App. Ct. 634 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 23 times

    By contrast North Carolina holds that a spouse's contributions during the tenancy by the entirety are not reimbursable and that the resultant tenancy in common is in equal shares as matter of law. See Wall v. Wall, 24 N.C. App. 725, 730, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 264 (1975); Branstetter v. Branstetter, 36 N.C. App. 532, 535-536 (1978). Delaware law seems to be to the same effect.