) Not surprisingly, the deletion of these provisions was regarded as signifying a change in the law. (See Carden v. Otto (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 887, 893 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 749]; Fuchs v. WesternOil Fields Supply (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 728, 736 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 74]; Moreno v. Venturini (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 286, 290 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 551]; Johnson v. L.D.S. Trucking Co. (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 496, 499 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 501]; Branscum v. StateComp. Ins. Fund (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 352, 356 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 682].) Ordinarily: "By deleting an express provision from an existing statute, a presumption arises that the Legislature intended a substantial change in the law."
( Save Our Forest Ranchlands v. County of San Diego, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1770, italics added.) Besides Simmons and Colborn, which we have already discussed, the court in Save Our Forest cited two other cases, Branscum v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 352 and Freeman v. Goldberg (1961) 55 Cal.2d 622. Neither of these cases supports the proposition that an adversary's opposition to a motion causes the six-month period in section 473 to commence.
Rather, consistent with the reasoning articulated in Estate of Simmons, the courts have consistently found that action against a party which may be relieved under the statute occurs, and the six-month period in which a trial court is empowered to act commences to run, when a procedural time limit is raised as an objection by an adversary or is in some manner enforced by the trial court. (See, e.g., Branscum v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 352, 355 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 682]; Freeman v. Goldberg (1961) 55 Cal.2d 622, 625 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 668, 361 P.2d 244].) Here the earliest point at which it might be said that action against SOF was taken under rule 870.2(b) occurred when county relied upon the rule in its September 28, 1994, opposition to SOF's fee motion.
Finally, the statutory scheme for distribution of the recovery requires the employee, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, to bear the cost of attorney's fees awarded for efforts expended on behalf of the employer. (Lab. Code, § 3856; Fuchs v. Western Oil Fields Supply, 25 Cal.App.3d 728 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 74]; Moreno v. Venturini, 1 Cal.App.3d 286 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 551]; Branscum v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 232 Cal.App.2d 352 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 682].) A graphic example of the result of this scheme is to be found in the case at bar.
The carrier's lien is to be satisfied only after such payment. (Lab. Code, § 3856, subd. (b); and see Branscum v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 232 Cal.App.2d 352 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 682]). Like provision is made for allowance and priority of fees of the employer's attorney if the action is prosecuted by the employer alone (Lab. Code, § 3856, subd. (a)).
The [workers' compensation] carrier's lien is to be satisfied only after such payment. (Lab. Code, § 3856, subd. (b), and see Branscum v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 232 Cal.App.2d 352, 42 Cal.Rptr. 682.) Like provision is made for allowance and priority of fees of the employer's attorney if the action is prosecuted by the employer alone (Lab. Code, § 3856, subd. (a)).