( Athletic Assn. of University of Illinois v. Industrial Com., 384 Ill. 208 [ 51 N.E.2d 157]. See, also, Brannaman v. Richlow Mfg. Co., 106 Colo. 317 [ 104 P.2d 897, 898]; Harris v. Seiavitch, 336 Pa. 294 [ 9 A.2d 375]; Smith v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 144 Or. 480 [ 23 P.2d 904, 25 P.2d 1119]; cf. Powell v. Twin Drilling Co., 300 Mich. 566 [ 2 N.W.2d 505].)

The refund was ordered by the state District Court and affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court of Colorado. Brannaman v. Richlow Mfg. Co., 106 Colo. 317, 104 P.2d 897. In the opinion of the Supreme Court the question is stated as follows: "The first question presented is whether, in computing the number of persons employed by the company, its non-compensated corporate secretary, whose duties were limited to the performance of the formal functions required by the statutes and the company's by-laws and who performed no other service for it, properly should be included?

In the past, coordination between the federal and state unemployment compensation acts has not always been viewed as necessary or even desirable by this court. See Brannaman v. Richlow Manufacturing Co., 106 Colo. 317, 104 P.2d 897 (1940); Park Floral Co. v. Industrial Commission, 104 Colo. 350, 91 P.2d 492 (1939); Industrial Commission v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 103 Colo. 550, 88 P.2d 560 (1939). Nevertheless, this court has recently recognized that modern state and federal unemployment compensation programs are "complementary."

While there was conflicting testimony, the finding was directly supported by that of the manager of Spirits, Inc. We cannot hold, upon the basis of this conflicting evidence, that the court erred in refusing to correct the finding to show that Rose Bennett performed services for Spirits, Inc. For a somewhat similar claim of gratuitous service without contract of hire, see Brannaman v. Richlow Mfg. Co., 106 Colo. 317, 318, 104 P.2d 897. We do not need to discuss the disputed status of Edward Rich, for, even if he should be found to be an employee within the provisions of the act, there would not be the required four employees.

The court stated that the acts performed by her as president were purely of a ceremonial or formal nature required only for the maintenance of the corporate organization, and that she was not a person in the "employment" of the company. In Brannaman v. Richlow Mfg. Co., 106 Colo. 317, 104 P.2d 897 (1940), it was held that a non-compensated secretary of a corporation need not be treated as an "employee" in computing the number of persons employed for the purpose of a state unemployment compensation act, because of a provision in that act that "employer" means any employing unit which becomes an employer subject to the provisions of the Social Security Act, which act specifies that "the term `employe' includes an officer of a corporation" where the state act itself contained a definition of "employment." 26 U.S.C.A., Int. Rev. Code, sec. 1607 (i).

He was notified by defendant that he would be considered an employer and subject to the tax by reason of his succeeding to the ownership of the corporation, and, under date of March 18, 1940, was requested to make a report. The matter was further considered in conference and by correspondence, and reference was made to the case then pending in this court ( Brannaman v. Richlow Mfg. Co., 106 Colo. 317, 104 P. [2] 897, decided July 1, 1940, rehearing denied on July 24, 1940) in which we held that the noncompensated officer of a company was not to be counted as an employee in computing the number of employees of an employing unit. Apparently as a result of our ruling in that case, an assistant attorney general, under date of September 17, 1940, acting for defendant, wrote plaintiff inquiring whether he desired to remain under the law by voluntary election or, in the alternative, make claim for refund. Plaintiff thereupon replied that he did not have the required number of employees to bring him under the act; that he did not desire to remain under it voluntarily, and that he felt that either he or the corporation were entitled to a refund.

That the Iowa legislature may determine what shall constitute employment subject to taxation without regard to existing definitions or categories and that it is not required to conform in every respect to the national ideology upon the subject as expressed in the Acts of Congress, is well settled. Unemployment Compensation Com. v. National L. Ins. Co., 219 N.C. 576, 14 S.E.2d 689; Brannaman v. Richlow Mfg. Co., 106 Colo. 317, 104 P.2d 897. And in the language of the trial court, which we approve, the court should not "write into the previously existing Iowa statute the congressional enactment of 1939.

" In Brannaman v. Richlow Mfg. Co. 106 Colo. 317, 104 P.2d 897, the question was whether a noncompensated corporate secretary, whose duties were limited to the performance of formal functions required by the statutes and the company's by-laws, and, who performed no other services, should be included as an employee within the terms of the employment compensation statute of Colorado. That statute contained the same definition of "employment" as the North Dakota act. The court held that she was not in the employment of the company and that her election and assumption of office did not constitute a contract of hire. The supreme court of Oklahoma reached the same conclusion in another case involving a non-compensated corporate secretary.

See Industrial Commission v. Board of County Commissioners, 690 P.2d 839 (Colo. 1984); cf. Brannaman v. Richlow Manufacturing Co., 106 Colo. 317, 104 P.2d 897 (1940). Here, Gant presented evidence tending to show that securities brokers are subject to regulation by federal and state agencies in a manner similar to that imposed by the Colorado Real Estate Commission upon real estate salesmen and agents.

In interpreting the statute, the word "service" should be given its ordinary meaning. Section 2-4-101, C.R.S. 1973 (1980 Repl. Vol. 1B); Brannaman v. Richlow Manufacturing Co., 106 Colo. 317, 104 P.2d 897 (1940). Webster's Third International Dictionary 2075, defines service as "an act done for the benefit or at the command of another."