Even if the argument of plaintiff's counsel was error, which I do not concede under the circumstances here, it was invited by defendant's counsel, and it did not constitute grounds for reversal and a new trial. See MacGregor v. Bradshaw, 193 Va. 787, 795, 71 S.E.2d 361, 365-6 (1952); Brann v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 181 Va. 213, 221-22, 24 S.E.2d 424, 427 (1943). The majority opinion concludes that the argument of counsel influenced the jury in arriving at the amount of its verdict.

The test here to be applied is that of ordinary care under the circumstances, and the determination of what care a reasonably prudent person would use under like circumstances is peculiarly for the jury. Brann v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 181 Va. 213, 219, 24 S.E.2d 424, 426. Several witnesses testifying for the plaintiff stated that the road was wet and slippery and there was ice at numerous points along the highway between Naruna and the point of accident.

Nevertheless, the remarks of counsel for both plaintiff and defendants were, no doubt, provoked by the remarks of the other, and in such cases, the verdict will not ordinarily be set aside. 88 C.J.S., Trial, § 194; Brann v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 181 Va. 213, 24 S.E.2d 424; Diamond Cab Co. v. Jones, 162 Va. 412, 174 S.E. 675. However, during the closing argument by counsel for the plaintiff, he said that if the plaintiff lost his job at the service station, he knew, and the jury knew, industry would not hire a man who had received and suffered the same kind of an injury as that of the plaintiff.

The first question to be decided is whether the court erred in setting aside the first verdict as being inadequate, and on that question we look to the evidence on the first trial alone as it related to the plaintiff's injuries and their consequences. Bostic v. Whited, 198 Va. 237, 238, 93 S.E.2d 334, 335; Brann v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 181 Va. 213, 216, 24 S.E.2d 424, 425. The evidence offered by the plaintiff material to the present issue came from the plaintiff and his wife and two medical doctors and was to the following effect:

Neither of the statements was made the basis of a motion for a mistrial nor assigned as ground for setting aside the verdict. Cf. Brann v. Woolworth Co., 181 Va. 213, 24 S.E.2d 424; Mich. Jur., Argument and Conduct of Counsel, Sec. 22 at p. 84. While we disapprove of the assistant Commonwealth's attorney's remarks, yet they do not cast doubt upon the fairness of defendant's trial and were not of such moment as to require a reversal of this case. We find no prejudicial error and the judgment below is

This is done without looking into subsequent proceedings. Jones v. Old Dominion Cotton Mills, 82 Va. 140, 3 Ann. St. Reports 92. Thus if it is discovered that the court erred in setting aside the verdict in the first trial either because of the mistaken belief that the verdict was contrary to the evidence or for some other supposed error committed, the appellate court will annul the proceedings subsequent to the first verdict and enter judgment on it. 1 M.J., Appeal and Error, Sec. 282, pp. 714, 715; Burks Pleading and Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 427, pp. 834, 835; Brann v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 181 Va. 213, 24 S.E.2d 424." Judge v. Burton, 198 Va. 664, 666, 96 S.E.2d 120.

The decision of the trial court on the question of improper argument of counsel is within its sound judicial discretion and its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless the record shows an abuse of that discretion. Cape Chas. Flying Ser. v. Nottingham, 187 Va. 444, 47 S.E.2d 540, and authorities there cited. If objection is made during the argument, the judge has an opportunity to stop improper argument and make a timely and effective ruling thereon. Except under unusual circumstances, objection to improper argument must be timely made and if not made until after the case has been submitted to the jury, it comes too late. Brann v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 181 Va. 213, 24 S.E.2d 424; Cooke v. Griggs, 183 Va. 851, 33 S.E.2d 764; Piccolo v. Woodford, 184 Va. 432, 35 S.E.2d 393; P. Lorillard Co. v. Clay, 127 Va. 734, 104 S.E. 384; Southern Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 151 Va. 345, 146 S.E. 363; Armstrong v. Rose, 170 Va. 190, 196 S.E. 613; Bloxom v. McCoy, 178 Va. 343, 17 S.E.2d 401; Chesapeake 0. Ry. Co. v. Folkes, 179 Va. 60, 18 S.E.2d 309. The verdict of the jury is supported by the preponderance of the evidence.

This is done without looking into subsequent proceedings. Jones v. Old Dominion Cotton Mills, 82 Va. 140, 3 Am. St. Reports 92. Thus if it is discovered that the court erred in setting aside the verdict in the first trial either because of the mistaken belief that the verdict was contrary to the evidence or for some other supposed error committed, the appellate court will annul the proceedings subsequent to the first verdict and enter judgment on it. I M. J., Appeal and Error, Sec. 282, pp. 714, 715; Burks Pleading and Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 427, pp. 834, 835; Brann v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 181 Va. 213, 24 S.E.2d 424."

This is done without looking into subsequent proceedings. Jones v. Old Dominion Cotton Mills, 82 Va. 140, 3 Am. St. Reports 92. Thus if it is discovered that the court erred in setting aside the verdict in the first trial either because of the mistaken belief that the verdict was contrary to the evidence or for some other supposed error committed, the appellate court will annul the proceedings subsequent to the first verdict and enter judgment on it. 1 M. J., Appeal and Error, Sec. 282, pp. 714, 715; Burks Pleading and Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 427, pp. 834, 835; Brann v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 181 Va. 213, 24 S.E.2d 424. Applying this rule of decision we are required to review the proceedings of the first trial.

Assuming, but not deciding, that the argument of counsel for the plaintiff, to which exception was taken, was improper, it was provoked and invited by the like argument of counsel for the defendants, and hence the defendants are in no position to complain. Brann v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 181 Va. 213, 221, 24 S.E.2d 424, 427. Moreover, the court promptly told the jury to disregard the argument of both counsel as to what effect the verdict would have upon any of the parties and render a verdict according to the evidence in the case.