Id. at 364. In contending he has shown reversible error, appellant relies upon Brandon v. State, 599 S.W.2d 567 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 453 U.S. 902, 101 S.Ct. 3134, 69 L.Ed.2d 988 (1981); Von January v. State, 576 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978); Herrera v. State, 665 S.W.2d 497 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1983, pet. ref'd), and other cases of like ilk. These cases stand for the principle that when a juror has failed to respond to inquiries that would have revealed bias, prejudice, or animus toward a given defendant, and the defendant relied upon that silence in good faith, then the defendant was deprived of the opportunity to make a knowing and intelligent use of his jury strikes.

There was no request or effort made to inquire of the juror at the time the above statement was made or at any stage of the proceedings, to determine whether the juror was in fact biased, and if so, the nature and extent of such bias. Appellant relies upon Brandon v. State, 599 S.W.2d 567, 572 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980) and Salazar v. State, 562 S.W.2d 480 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978) for the proposition that a venireman who has expressed bias and prejudice against an accused can almost never be rehabilitated. Furthermore, appellant urges that Von January v. State, 576 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978) is applicable; the Court in that case held that when a partial, biased or prejudiced juror is selected without fault or lack of diligence on the part of defense counsel, who has acted in good faith upon answers given to him on voir dire not knowing them to be incorrect, good ground exists for new trial.

We have consistently held, with respect to oral questions asked during voir dire, that error occurs where "a prejudiced or biased juror is selected without fault or lack of diligence on the part of defense counsel, such counsel acting in good faith on the juror's responses and having no knowledge of their inaccuracy."Brandon v. State, 599 S.W.2d 567, 577 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979) (emphasis added) (citing Salazar v. State, 562 S.W.2d 480 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978); Norwood v. State, 58 S.W.2d 100 (Tex.Crim.App. 1933); and Adams v. State, 243 S.W. 474 (1921)), vacated on other grounds, 101 S.Ct. 3134 (1981). Thus, we have long insisted that counsel be diligent in eliciting pertinent information from prospective jurors during voir dire in an effort to uncover potential prejudice or bias:

"When stating the abstract proposition of law in a charge, it should be stated in the conjunctive, but when the law is specifically applied to the accused it should be stated in the disjunctive." Brandon v. State, 599 S.W.2d 567 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979). "When a penal statute contains several ways of committing a crime, it will list them in the disjunctive.

This Court has repeatedly held that the failure to object to the improper exclusion of veniremen waives that right and such exclusion cannot be considered on appeal. White v. State, 610 S.W.2d 504; Brandon v. State, 599 S.W.2d 567; Russell v. State, 598 S.W.2d 238; Esquivel v. State, 595 S.W.2d 516; Burks v. State, 583 S.W.2d 389. Appellant's failure to object to the alleged improper exclusion of the seven veniremen waives the error the amicus curiae seeks to present. In his seventh ground of error, the amicus curiae challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict from the punishment phase.

=2.0rs=WLW5.05 The mere fact that a juror knows, has an intimate or causal acquaintance with, or has friendly relations with the defendant, or, as here, the complainant, is not a sufficient basis for disqualification of a juror. See id. at 853. Furthermore, with respect to oral questions asked during voir dire, error occurs where "a prejudiced or biased juror is selected without fault or lack of diligence on the part of defense counsel, such counsel acting in good faith on the juror's responses and having no knowledge of their inaccuracy." Gonzales v. State, 3 S.W.3d 915, 916-17 (Tex. 1999). Defense counsel must be diligent in eliciting pertinent information from prospective jurors during voir dire to uncover potential prejudice or bias. Id. at 917. Defense counsel has an obligation to ask specific questions as well as follow-up questions to bring out information, which might be said to indicate a juror's inability to be impartial, truthful, and the like. See, e.g., Brandon v. State, 599 S.W.2d 567, 578 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979) (holding no error where counsel failed to ask follow-up questions after potential juror stated that he was acquainted with the complainant). Unless defense counsel asks such questions, we must hold that, "the purportedly material information which a juror fails to disclose is not really 'withheld' so as to constitute misconduct which would warrant a reversal." Gonzalez, 3 S.W.3d at 917 (citing Sneed v. State, 670 S.W.2d 262, 266 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984)). Here, outside the presence of the other venire members, the trial court questioned Thompson about the encounter. Thompson stated that she did not realize Kopycinski was the complainant in the case because she only knew Kopycinski as "Sissy Thompson." Thompson further explained that, when she saw Kopycinski get off of the elevator, she recognized her because Thompson's daughter and Kopycinski's son had previously dated. Finally, Thompson advised the trial court that her relationship with Kopycinski would not affect any decision she might

The court of criminal appeals restated its previous holdings that counsel must be without fault or lack of diligence in seeking out a prejudiced or biased juror. Id. at 916-17 (citing Brandon v. State, 599 S.W.2d 567, 577 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979), cert. denied, judgment vacated on other grounds, 453 U.S. 902 (1981)). With respect to oral inquiries, counsel must ask specific questions and may not rely on broad ones.

" The court denied Gonzalez' motion for mistrial. On appeal, Gonzalez cites Brandon v. State, 599 S.W.2d 567, 572 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979), for the proposition that a prospective juror who expresses bias and prejudice against an accused can almost never be rehabilitated and should be excused as matter of law. He argues that, "when it comes to the law, the Court should have questioned [Boon] sua sponte to remove any doubt." In Brandon, the defendant was charged with murdering a Waco police officer. Brandon v. State, 599 S.W.2d 567, Sh9 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979).

However, not every mention of the crime itself will necessitate reversal. Brandon v. State, 599 S.W.2d 567, 580 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979) (Opinion after abatement); McBride v. State, 655 S.W.2d 280, 284 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no pet.). The statements or evidence of the crime must be of such a nature as to deny the accused a fair and impartial determination of his competency.

If the trial court determines that the report(s) or other evidence related thereto which existed before trial support a finding of incompetency to stand trial, a jury shall be impaneled to determine appellant's competency (at the time of the instant trial) to stand trial. Brandon v. State, 599 S.W.2d 567, 573 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979). At the conclusion of such hearing, the trial court was ordered to reduce to writing its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.