Whether or not such cases are correct under common-law limits need not concern us now, although it is noted that in Holmes v. Clisby, 118 Ga. 820, 822 ( 45 S.E. 684) it is held that while a publication which has the tendency to injure the reputation of the person against whom it is directed and expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule is actionable generally, one which has the effect merely of disparaging a tradesman's goods is not actionable without an allegation of special damages. We know of no other exceptions where in libel special damages are necessary to sustain the cause of action, but the case under consideration if it alleges a cause of action does so on the theory that it shows the plaintiff suffered an injury to his reputation, for which right of action no special damages are necessary. As stated in Brandon v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co., 64 Ga. App. 139, 146 ( 12 S.E.2d 414): "A libelous charge is just as effectively harmful, and therefore actionable per se, i.e., without proof of special damages, whether the harmful effect results from words which directly and unequivocally make the charge, or whether it results from words which do so indirectly or by inference. It is the harmful effect of the defamatory language which renders it actionable per se, and not its directness or unequivocal nature." That this is in conformity both with the common-law rule, the present English rule, and the view of the American Law Institute, see Restatement of the Law, Torts, Sec. 569, "Liability without proof of special harm, when imposed — libel.

"A libelous charge is actionable per se, whether the words directly or indirectly, by intimation or innuendo contain libel." Brandon v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co., 64 Ga.App. 139, 12 S.E.2d 414 (1940); Southland Corp. v. Garren, 138 Ga.App. 246, 225 S.E.2d 920 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 237 Ga. 484, 228 S.E.2d 870 (1976).

`Words harmless in themselves may become libelous when the circumstances under which they are published are such as to convey a covert meaning to the reader reflecting injuriously upon the reputation of the person to whom they refer.'" Brandon v. Arkansas Fuel-Oil Co., 64 Ga. App. 139, 144 ( 12 S.E.2d 414) (1940). The office of innuendo is explained in Reece v. Grissom, 154 Ga. App. 194, 195 (1) ( 267 S.E.2d 839) (1980).

Frank Roberts admitted that he posted three "mailgrams" to Lane's attorney and Lane testified that his attorney turned the correspondence over to him for examination. This testimony is circumstantial evidence that the defamatory correspondence was published to a party other than Lane and is sufficient to sustain the verdicts against Frank Roberts. See Brandon v. Ark. Fuel-Oil Co., 64 Ga. App. 139, 146 ( 12 S.E.2d 414) (1940). 3. Recognizing that the judgment against Barbara Roberts may be reversed, Frank Roberts contends he is entitled to a new trial because of the jury's joint and several award of punitive damages and attorney fees.

It is the harmful effect of defamatory language as it is understood which renders it actionable per se, and not its directness or unequivocal nature. Brandon v. Arkansas Fuel-Oil Co., 64 Ga. App. 139, 146 ( 12 S.E.2d 414). Ordinarily such a situation presents a question for the jury to decide.

It is the harmful effect of defamatory language as it is understood which renders it actionable per se, and not its directness or unequivocal nature. Brandon v. Arkansas Fuel-Oil Co., 64 Ga. App. 139, 146 ( 12 S.E.2d 414). Ordinarily such a situation presents a question for the jury to decide.

Horton v. Georgian Co., 175 Ga. 261 (2), supra; Whitley v. Newman, 9 Ga. App. 89 (1) ( 70 S.E. 686); McIntosh v. Williams, 160 Ga. 461 ( 128 S.E. 672). "Where the language of a publication is reasonably susceptible of the construction that it makes a libelous charge, it becomes libelous when it conveys that charge and would be so understood by the person to whom the writing might be communicated." Brandon v. Arkansas Fuel-Oil Co., 64 Ga. App. 139, 144 ( 12 S.E.2d 414). "Whenever a publication is susceptible of two constructions, one of which would make it libelous and the other not, it is for the jury to say whether the words are in fact libelous. . . The plaintiff cannot by innuendo draw from a writing a conclusion not justified by the language used; but it is competent for the plaintiff to explain in this way an ambiguous publication, to point out the intention of the author, and to show wherein the effect of the language was to injure his reputation. . . And the rule is that a publication must be construed in the light of all the attending circumstances, the cause and occasion of the publication, and all other extraneous matters which will tend to explain the allusion or point out the person in question." Holmes v. Clisby, 118 Ga. 820, 823, supra.

, nor was he charged with any dishonest or immoral act. There is, therefore, no allegation contained in the petition and, in fact, no contention that the publications were libelous per se. "`A publication claimed to be defamatory must be read and construed in the sense in which the readers to whom it is addressed would ordinarily understand it. . . When thus read, if its meaning is so unambiguous as to reasonably bear but one interpretation, it is for the judge to say whether that signification is defamatory or not. If, upon the other hand, it is capable of two meanings, one of which would be libelous and actionable and the other not, it is for the jury to say, under all the circumstances surrounding its publication, including extraneous facts admissible in evidence, which of the two meanings would be attributed to it by those to whom it is addressed or by whom it may be read.' Washington Post Co. v. Chaloner, 250 U.S. 290 ( 39 SC 448, 63 LE 987). This rule was quoted and applied in Brandon v. Arkansas Fuel-Oil Co., 64 Ga. App. 139, 145 ( 12 S.E.2d 414). The language of an alleged libel `is to be taken in its plain and natural meaning, and to be understood by courts and juries as other people would understand it, and according to the sense in which it appears to have been used and the ideas it is adapted to convey to those who read it.' Lancour v. Herald Globe Association, 111 Vt. 371 ( 17 A.2d 253, 132 ALR 486). `The office of an innuendo is to explain that which is of doubtful or ambiguous meaning in the language of the publication, but cannot enlarge the meaning of words plainly expressed therein.' Park v. Piedmont c. Ins. Co., 51 Ga. 510; Holmes v. Clisby, 118 Ga. 820 ( 45 S.E. 684); Spence v. Johnson, 142 Ga. 267 ( 82 S.E. 646, AC 1916A, 1195); Paschal v. Georgian Co., 43 Ga. App. 195 ( 158 S.E. 372). `If the words are incapable of the meaning ascribed to them by the innuendo, and are prima facie not actionable, the judge at the trial will stop the case.' Odgers' Libel and Slander (5th Ed.), p. 116." Aiken v. C

So, we reach the conclusion that where a newspaper item is libelous, publication of the libel for the purpose of venue may occur in any place where the newspaper is distributed or circulated, Baker v. State, 97 Ga. 452 (6), supra, Leavy v. State, 45 Ga. App. 574 (7), supra, and is exhibited to, and read by, third persons. Brandon v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co., 64 Ga. App. 139 (2) ( 12 S.E.2d 414). The publication of the libel constitutes the origination of the tort and the cause of action thereon and the place of publication controls the venue in a suit against a domestic corporation based thereon under Code § 22-1102, which provides that, as against a corporation chartered under the laws of this State, "Suits for damages because of torts . . . may be brought in the county where the cause of action originated," where there is also an agent upon whom service may be had at the place of publication.

A demurrer to a petition for defamation should not be sustained unless the alleged defamatory words are incapable of defamatory meaning, and the test is whether, in the circumstances, the words discredit a person in the minds of the community. Holmes v. Clisby, 121 Ga. 241 ( 48 S.E. 934, 104 ASR 103); Weatherholt v. Howard, 143 Ga. 41 ( 84 S.E. 119); Brandon v. Arkansas Fuel-Oil Co., 64 Ga. App. 139 ( 12 S.E.2d 414); Jones v. Poole, 62 Ga. App. 309, 311 ( 8 S.E.2d 532); Muchnick v. Post Pub. Co., 332 Mass. 304 ( 125 N.E.2d 137, 138); Prosser, Torts (2d Ed.) 581, § 92; Restatement, Torts 304, § 614.