Count One of the First Amended Complaint, therefore, fails to state a claim. See Brandon Apparel Group, Inc. v. Quitman Mfg. Co., Inc., 52 F. Supp.2d 913, 921 (N.D.Ill. 1999) (where plaintiff did not allege a specific threat of repetition, that predicate acts were a part of enterprise's way of conducting business, or that the enterprise operated a long-term association existing for criminal purposes, complaint was dismissed). Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to meet the factors set forth in Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986)).

Thus it is crucial that Plaintiffs establish a "pattern of racketeering activity" by the Individual defendants. See Brandon Apparel Group, Inc. v. Quitman Mfg. Co., Inc., 52 F. Supp.2d 913, 917 (N.D. Ill. 1999). Plaintiffs' theory of the case is that the Individual defendants, who directed the activities of Santanna, lured customers to Santanna by falsely promising to supply natural gas at a lower, fixed rate for the entire term of their agreement, when they knew that they would not honor the contract rate if natural gas prices rose. Plaintiffs identify the alleged racketeering activity as mail and wire fraud.

Plaintiffs allege only six predicate acts, which is a relatively small number. See Brandon Apparel Grp., Inc. v. Quitman Mfg. Co., 52 F.Supp.2d 913, 919 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (describing three alleged predicate acts as a “minimal amount.”); see also Juergensmeyer v. Behme, No. 06-3088, 2007 WL 4233135, at *4 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2007) (finding that the “number and variety of predicate acts” fails to support Plaintiff's “position because only three predicate acts occurred and all of those related to mail and wire fraud”).

The occurrence of distinct injuries is the occurrence of different types of injuries, not multiple instances of the same injury. Id. at 1269 (finding that identical economic injuries suffered over the course of two years stemming from a single contract were not the type of injuries Congress intended to compensate under RICO); Brandon Apparel Group, Inc. v. Quitman Mfg. Co., 52 F.Supp. 2d 913, 917 (N.D.Ill. 1999) (finding that multiple instances of fraud led only to one injury of nonpayment for goods). In the present case, CIB alleges ten repeated instances of the same fraudulent act, which, under the above-cited precedents, are properly considered only one distinct injury of improperly used loan funds.

This is not surprising, given that "[i]nsufficiently pleading the `crucial' element of pattern of racketeering activity `rings the death knell' for RICO claims under § 1962." Brandon Apparel Group, Inc. v. Quitman Mfg. Co., 52 F. Supp.2d 913, 917 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (citing J.D. Marshall Int'l, Inc. v. Redstart, Inc., 935 F.2d 815, 820 (7th Cir. 1991)). Whitehead premises her RICO claim on defendants' commission of numerous "predicate acts" of title forgery in violation of 625 ILCS 5/4-105, financial institution fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341.

(1) a false statement of material fact; (2) the party making the statement knew or believed it to be untrue; (3) the party to whom the statement was made had a right to rely on the statement; (4) the party to whom the statement was made did rely on the statement; (5) the statement was made for the purpose of inducing the other party to act; and (6) the reliance by the person to whom the statement was made led to that person's injury.Brandon Apparel Group, Inc. v. Quitman Mfg. Co., Inc., 52 F. Supp.2d 913, 921 (N.D. Ill. 1999), (citing Siegel v. Levy Org. Dev. Co., 607 N.E.2d 194, 198 (Ill. 1992)). Shapiro-Olefsky adequately pled each of the six elements of fraud, First, Shapiro-Olefsky's complaint states that Cohen affirmed that the Non-Compete Agreement was still in "full force and effect," which Shapiro-Olefsky claims was both material and false.

Corley, 142 F.3d at 1049 (considering "the number and variety of predicate acts" as factor determining continuity) (emphasis added). Cf. Brandon Apparel Group, Inc. v. Quitman Mfg. Co., 52 F. Supp.2d 913, 919 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (concluding that only three acts, two of which were wire fraud, weighed against finding a pattern). Second, the acts charged are alleged to have occurred during a seven-year period between 1995 and 2001 — a time period sufficient to invoke RICO. Cf. Vicom, 20 F.3d at 780 (holding that nine-month period not sufficient to weigh in favor of finding closed-ended continuity); Midwest Grinding Co., Inc. v. Spitz, 976 F.2d 1016, 1024 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); J.D.Marshall Int'l v. Redstart, Inc., 935 F.2d 815, 821 (7th Cir. 1991) (same over thirteen-month period).