Opinion
No. 1D21-706
06-29-2021
Paul BRANCH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Paul Branch, pro se, Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Damaris E. Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Paul Branch, pro se, Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Damaris E. Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Rowe, J.
Paul Branch appeals an order denying his motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Branch argues that his sentence is illegal because the trial court failed to orally pronounce the statutory authority for the costs and fines it imposed, failed to explain what the assessments represented, and made no findings about his ability to pay. Because Branch's claims are not cognizable under rule 3.800(a), we affirm.
Rule 3.800(a) allows a defendant to challenge an illegal sentence and provides:
(a) Correction.
(1) Generally. A court may at any time correct an illegal sentence imposed by it, or an incorrect calculation made by it in a sentencing scoresheet, when it is affirmatively alleged that the court records demonstrate on their face an entitlement to that relief, provided that a party may not file a motion to correct an illegal sentence under this subdivision during the time allowed for the filing of a motion under subdivision (b)(1) or during the pendency of a direct appeal.
Branch does not allege that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence, nor does he allege that the trial court made an incorrect calculation in a sentencing scoresheet. Rather, he contends that the trial court failed to orally pronounce the statutory authority for the fines and costs it imposed, failed to explain why it imposed the fines and costs, and did not consider his ability to pay. Branch's challenges to his sentence concern the procedure employed by the court when imposing fines and costs. But they are not challenges to an "illegal sentence" correctable under rule 3.800(a). Rather, a defendant seeking to challenge an error in the procedure used by a trial court to impose costs or fines must do so by filing a motion under rule 3.800(b). See Jackson v. State , 983 So. 2d 562, 574 (Fla. 2008) ("[T]he imposition of costs without statutory authority is a ‘sentencing error’ for purposes of rule 3.800(b)."); Maddox v. State , 760 So. 2d 89, 109 (Fla. 2000) (explaining that " rule 3.800(b) provides defendants with an opportunity to contest the erroneous imposition of costs after receiving notice of the costs in the written judgment").
The other district courts have reached the same conclusion and denied relief to defendants seeking to challenge by motion filed under rule 3.800(a) an error in the process of imposing costs. See Durant v. State , 177 So. 3d 995, 998 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (en banc) (explaining that errors in the imposition of costs do not fall within the definition of an illegal sentence); Lindquist v. State , 155 So. 3d 1193, 1194 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (holding that challenges to the procedure used to impose costs are not cognizable under rule 3.800(a) ); Walden v. State , 112 So. 3d 578, 579 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) ("[T]he unauthorized imposition of costs does not rise to the level of an illegal sentence."). Even so, in reaching the conclusion in its Walden decision, the Fourth District certified conflict with our decision in Benner v. State , 974 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). See 112 So. 3d at 579. The Fourth District described our decision in Benner as approving the use of rule 3.800(a) to strike costs not orally pronounced. Id. at 580. But this was a misreading of Benner .
In Benner , the defendant appealed an order denying his rule 3.800(a) motion. He argued that the trial court improperly sentenced him to drug offender probation. 974 So. 2d at 579. The Benner court reversed the order as it applied to a special condition of probation requiring Benner to complete a substance abuse treatment program at his own expense. Id . This Court reversed because the sentencing court did not orally pronounce that special condition before including the condition in the written probation order. Id. Thus, Benner did not address the issue before this Court—whether a challenge to the procedure used to impose court costs or fines is cognizable under rule 3.800(a). And so, we find no conflict between Benner and the Fourth District's decision in Walden over whether rule 3.800(a) authorizes a defendant to challenge the procedure by which a trial court imposed costs or fines.
This court relied on authority from the Supreme Court holding that a trial court must orally pronounce a special condition of probation to impose such a condition. See Benner , 974 So. 2d at 579 (citing State v. Williams , 712 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1998) ). But after the Supreme Court promulgated rule 3.800(b), it made clear that rule 3.800(b) provides the "procedural mechanism to object to the imposition of special conditions of probation that have not been orally pronounced." See Maddox , 760 So. 2d at 105.
Still, we write to make clear that alleged errors in the assessment of fines or costs in sentencing, even if not orally pronounced at sentencing, are not subject to correction under rule 3.800(a). Instead, a defendant should raise such claims of error under rule 3.800(b). See Maddox , 760 So. 2d at 108–109.
AFFIRMED .
Roberts and Jay, JJ., concur.