However, Hancock did not submit a specific charge on proximate cause, and she has not alleged any definitional language that should have been submitted to the jury. See Branch v. Maxwell, 203 Ga. App. 553, 555-556 (5) (b) ( 417 S.E.2d 176) (1992). Moreover, the instant case did not involve multiple causes-in-fact of an injury; it was alleged only that defendants' conduct caused Hancock to fall off the bus, and the only question was whether such fall was the cause-in-fact of Hancock's injury. See Gray v. Elias, supra at 802-803.
Accordingly, we find that Gray's failure to request such a charge or object to the charge given constituted a waiver of any right to complain on appeal. OCGA ยง 5-5-24(a). See generally Branch v. Maxwell, 203 Ga. App. 553, 555-556(5)(b) ( 417 S.E.2d 176) (1992) (affirming verdict in automobile negligence case despite trial court's failure to define proximate cause as part of negligence charge, where charge as a whole adequately informed jury of applicable law). Taft v. Taft, 209 Ga. App. 499 ( 433 S.E.2d 667) (1993) does not require a different result.
Accordingly, we find no error in the giving of the charge [on last clear chance]." Branch v. Maxwell, 203 Ga. App. 553, 556 (5c) ( 417 S.E.2d 176). Judgments affirmed. Beasley, C.J., Birdsong, P. J., Pope, P. J., Blackburn, Smith and Ruffin, JJ., concur.