In light of appellee's contention that he did not sign the deed, and that if he did, he was induced to do so by fraud, that verdict form and the accompanying instructions, which called for the jury to decide mixed questions of fact and law, were not adequately crafted to elicit a decision on the issues before the court. See Branch v. Maxwell, 203 Ga. App. 553 (5) (f) ( 417 S.E.2d 176) (1992); OCGA § 9-11-49 (a). Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Hunt, C. J., and Carley, J., who concur in the judgment only.
However, Hancock did not submit a specific charge on proximate cause, and she has not alleged any definitional language that should have been submitted to the jury. See Branch v. Maxwell, 203 Ga. App. 553, 555-556 (5) (b) ( 417 S.E.2d 176) (1992). Moreover, the instant case did not involve multiple causes-in-fact of an injury; it was alleged only that defendants' conduct caused Hancock to fall off the bus, and the only question was whether such fall was the cause-in-fact of Hancock's injury. See Gray v. Elias, supra at 802-803.
Accordingly, we find that Gray's failure to request such a charge or object to the charge given constituted a waiver of any right to complain on appeal. OCGA § 5-5-24(a). See generally Branch v. Maxwell, 203 Ga. App. 553, 555-556(5)(b) ( 417 S.E.2d 176) (1992) (affirming verdict in automobile negligence case despite trial court's failure to define proximate cause as part of negligence charge, where charge as a whole adequately informed jury of applicable law). Taft v. Taft, 209 Ga. App. 499 ( 433 S.E.2d 667) (1993) does not require a different result.
In deciding whether to allow intervention under this subsection, the trial court also considers other relevant circumstances, such as the degree to which the intervenor would be affected by the outcome in the underlying case. Branch v. Maxwell, 203 Ga. App. 553, 554 (1) ( 417 S.E.2d 176) (1992). "Whether permissive intervention is granted is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and a decision on this issue will not be reversed unless there is an abuse of discretion. [Cit.
The General Assembly required consent for consolidation of cases involving a common question of law or fact. OCGA § 9-11-42 (a). This case does not involve common questions of law or fact, but similar questions of law and fact, thus, it is distinguishable from Branch v. Maxwell, 203 Ga. App. 553, 554 (1) ( 417 S.E.2d 176) (1992), which involved the right for a third party to intervene in an action. Sound judicial economy may justify these cases being tried together by consent.
Accordingly, we find no error in the giving of the charge [on last clear chance]." Branch v. Maxwell, 203 Ga. App. 553, 556 (5c) ( 417 S.E.2d 176). Judgments affirmed. Beasley, C.J., Birdsong, P. J., Pope, P. J., Blackburn, Smith and Ruffin, JJ., concur.
This does not mean, however, that permissive intervention under OCGA § 9-11-24 (b) (2) would not be appropriate, as the District's claim and the main action clearly have common questions of law and fact. See Branch v. Maxwell, 203 Ga. App. 553 (1) ( 417 S.E.2d 176) (1992). Whether or not to grant a motion for intervention brought under OCGA § 9-11-24 (b) (2) is within the discretion of the trial court, but the trial court should keep in mind the objective of the CPA's liberal joinder rules — to join in all parties needed to resolve the whole matter in one lawsuit if possible.