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Branch v. Junior

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Oct 23, 2019
281 So. 3d 1280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019)

Summary

holding that the petitioner was not "in custody" for purposes of rule 3.134 where the petitioner was on house arrest

Summary of this case from Richard v. Reyes

Opinion

No. 3D18-2552

10-23-2019

Adom BRANCH, Petitioner, v. Daniel JUNIOR, Director, Miami-Dade Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, et al., Respondents.

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Andrew Stanton, Assistant Public Defender, for petitioner. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Gabrielle Raemy Charest-Turken, Assistant Attorney General; Abigail Price-Williams, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and Benjamin D. Simon, Assistant County Attorney, for respondents.


Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Andrew Stanton, Assistant Public Defender, for petitioner.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Gabrielle Raemy Charest-Turken, Assistant Attorney General; Abigail Price-Williams, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and Benjamin D. Simon, Assistant County Attorney, for respondents.

Before EMAS, C.J., and SALTER, and FERNANDEZ, JJ.

FERNANDEZ, J. Petitioner Adom Branch filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus asking this Court to review the trial court's denial of his request to be released on his own recognizance (ROR). We previously denied his petition concluding that Branch was on pretrial release and was not in the physical custody of the State, as would be required to qualify for ROR pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.134.

Police arrested Branch on November 13, 2018 alleging that he had sold marijuana and cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school. On December 17, 2018, thirty-four days after his initial arrest, the State informed the trial court that it was not ready to bring charges against Branch. Defense argued that Branch should be released on his own recognizance under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.134. The trial court denied the motion on the basis that Branch was on house arrest, a form of pretrial release, meaning he was not in custody as rule 3.134 requires. The trial court then reset the case for report on December 24, 2018, forty-one days after Branch's arrest.

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.134 states, "The state shall file formal charges on defendants in custody ... within 30 days from the date on which the defendants are arrested .... In no event shall any defendants remain in custody beyond 40 days unless they have been formally charged with a crime." (Emphasis added). The plain language of the rule requires that a defendant be in actual physical custody in order to qualify for ROR.

Our ruling does not conflict with our prior ruling in Simmons v. Guevara, 184 So. 3d 655 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). In Simmons, the defendant, who was held without bond pending the filing of charges, was placed on house arrest when the State failed to file charges after the 33rd day. Id. As the defendant was in actual physical custody, being held without bond, Rule 3.134 entitled the defendant to ROR. Id. Thus, we granted the petition for writ of habeas corpus and ordered immediate ROR. Id. at 656.

This statutory construction is further supported by rule 3.133(a)(2), a similar rule pertaining to pretrial probable cause determinations, that contains the following provision not included in rule 3.134 :

A defendant who has been released from custody before a probable cause determination has been made and who is able to establish that the pretrial release conditions are a significant restraint on his or her liberty may file a written motion for a nonadversary probable cause determination setting forth with specificity the items of significant restraint that a finding of no probable cause would eliminate.

(Emphasis added). This provision clearly distinguishes between a "release from custody" and an additional "restraint on liberty," as a result of pretrial release, and provides a remedy from the latter. Rule 3.134 does not provide such a remedy. If the Florida Supreme Court wanted rule 3.134 to require ROR not only for defendants in actual physical custody but also for defendants on pretrial release, it would have imported this "restraint on liberty" language from Rule 3.133. Without this additional language, the plain language of the statute controls, limiting ROR to defendants in actual physical custody.

Because Branch does not meet the physical custody requirement of rule 3.134, the trial court properly denied his request for ROR. Accordingly, we denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Petition is denied.


Summaries of

Branch v. Junior

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Oct 23, 2019
281 So. 3d 1280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019)

holding that the petitioner was not "in custody" for purposes of rule 3.134 where the petitioner was on house arrest

Summary of this case from Richard v. Reyes
Case details for

Branch v. Junior

Case Details

Full title:Adom Branch, Petitioner, v. Daniel Junior, Director, Miami-Dade Dept. of…

Court:Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Date published: Oct 23, 2019

Citations

281 So. 3d 1280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019)

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