ANALYSIS ¶5 Burson asserts that the statutory provision providing for the payment of full wages to municipal police officers during temporary disability due to work-related injury, 11 O.S. 2011 § 50-116.1, is fundamentally at odds with the AWCA provision allowing reimbursement of advance payment of wages by an employer during a temporary disability period in the event of a permanent disability award, 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 § 89. ¶6 We firstly acknowledge this case's similarities to a recent Oklahoma Supreme Court case, Braitsch v. City of Tulsa , 2018 OK 100, 436 P.3d 14. In Braitsch , a claimant was injured while on the job and was paid her full salary in lieu of TTD payments, pursuant to the terms of her collective bargaining agreement.
Odom v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., supra note 26, 2018 OK 23, ¶ 14, 415 P.3d at 527 ("The plain language of 85A O.S.Supp.2013 § 5 unambiguously abrogates the dual-capacity doctrine with regard to employers as defined by the AWCA."). Braitsch v. City of Tulsa, 2018 OK 100, n.5, 436 P.3d 14, 21 (the Oklahoma Administrative Workers' Compensation Act, OAWCA, repealed and replaced the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Code effective February 1, 2014). Cattlemen's Steakhouse, Inc. v. Waldenville, 2013 OK 95, ¶15, 318 P.3d 1105, 1110
. Braitsch v. City of Tulsa, 2018 OK 100, ¶9, 436 P.3d 14, 20. Glasco v. State ex rel. Okla. Dep't of Corr., 2008 OK 65, ¶20, 188 P.3d 177, 184.
Andrew v. Depani-Sparkes , 2017 OK 42, ¶ 38 & n. 54, 396 P.3d at 224, citing Tucker v. Cochran Firm--Criminal Defense Birmingham L.L.C. , 2014 OK 112, n. 63, 341 P.3d 673, 688.Braitsch v. City of Tulsa , 2018 OK 100, ¶ 6, 436 P.3d 14, 18.In re Adoption of K.P.M.A. , 2014 OK 85, ¶ 12, n. 3, 341 P.3d 38, 42-43, citing Pierce v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety , 2014 OK 37, ¶ 7, 327 P.3d 530 ; In re A.M. & R.W. , 2000 OK 82, ¶ 6, 13 P.3d 484, 486-487.
Shamblin v. Beasley , 1998 OK 88, n. 25, 967 P.2d 1200, 1208 ("Other jurisdictions, much like Oklahoma, do not differentiate—for summary judgment purposes—between equity suits and actions at law."); Board of County Com'rs of Marshall County v. Snellgrove , 1967 OK 108, 428 P.2d 272 (mandamus is a special proceeding addressing itself to the equity powers and conscience of the court or judge, and a judgment of the trial court will be set aside if it is clearly against the weight of the evidence); Chandler U.S.A., Inc. v. Tyree , 2004 OK 16, ¶ 31, 87 P.3d 598 (discussing the Oklahoma Discovery Code and stating issues in a mandamus proceeding are tried as in a civil action).Braitsch v. City of Tulsa , 2018 OK 100, ¶ 2, 436 P.3d 14, 17. See also Christian v. Christian , 2018 OK 91, ¶ 5, 434 P.3d 941, 942 ("when this Court is faced with a question of statutory interpretation, we apply a de novo standard of review").
Weber v. Armco, Inc. , 1983 OK 53, 663 P.2d 1221, 1225 (The dual-capacity doctrine applied to former workers' compensation statutes stated an employer who was generally immune from tort liability might become liable to its employee as a third-party tortfeasor; if the employer possessed, in addition to its capacity as an employer, a second capacity that conferred upon the employer legal obligations independent of those imposed upon the employer as an employer.).Odom v. Penske Truck Leasing Co. , 2018 OK 23, ¶ 14, 415 P.3d 521, 527 ("The plain language of 85A O.S.Supp.2013 § 5 unambiguously abrogates the dual-capacity doctrine with regard to employers as defined by the AWCA."); Braitsch v. City of Tulsa , 2018 OK 100, n. 5, 436 P.3d 14, 21 (the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act, AWCA, repealed and replaced the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Code effective February 1, 2014); Lind v. Barnes Tag Agency, Inc. , 2018 OK 35, n. 5, 418 P.3d 698, 706 (Wyrick, J., concurring) (dual-capacity doctrine was superseded by statute, 85 A O.S.Supp.2013 § 5(A), as recognized in Odom ). As explained herein our opinions have historically held a workers' compensation order awarding a benefit for an injury acts to preclude or bar a subsequent District Court tort action for the same injury.
The arguments by both mother and father on the application and construction of these statutes present issues of law reviewed de novo by this Court.Braitsch v. City of Tulsa , 2018 OK 100, ¶ 2, 436 P.3d 14,17. See also Christian v. Christian , 2018 OK 91, ¶ 5, 434 P.3d 941, 942 ("when this Court is faced with a question of statutory interpretation, we apply a de novo standard of review").
¶ 4 Oklahoma's Constitution doesn't prohibit all local and special laws, only those which concern certain enumerated subjects. Braitsch v. City of Tulsa , 2018 OK 100, ¶ 9, 436 P.3d 14, 20 ; Okla. Const. art. 5, § 46. The majority claims § 61.2 creates an impermissible class because "it singles out for different treatment less than the entire class of similarly situated persons who may sue to recover for bodily injury."
The applicable analysis is sometimes described as "requir[ing] an adjudication of whether the legislation is rationally related to a legitimate government interest and if the challenged legislation reasonably advances that interest." Braitsch v. City of Tulsa , 2018 OK 100, ¶ 7, 436 P.3d 14 (citation omitted). ¶28 In an effort to demonstrate a substantive due process violation, Employer asserts that a lack of a more specific finding regarding the nature and extent of the injury, either in the present case or, presumably, in any case before the Commission involving a compensable injury, prevents Employer from "be[ing] able to assert a valid § 50(A) defense to ... recommended medical treatment."
Nothing in the collective bargaining agreement precludes the application of § 89. See also Braitsch v. City of Tulsa , 2018 OK 100, n.5, 436 P.3d 14, 21 (finding, in examining a presumptively similar collective bargaining agreement, that "[t]here are no provisions in the CBA concerning PPD benefits that would conflict with § 89.") ¶10 Home-rule argument.