Conflicts, misunderstandings, or other differences do not implicate any impropriety by the attorney; thus Plasse's discharge is without cause. Klein v. Eubank, 87 NY2d at 464; Costello v. Kiaer, 278 AD2d 50; Braider v. 194 Riverside Owners Corp., 237 AD2d 147 (1st Dep't 1997). Because the order also required Plasse to release his file of plaintiff's case to her, however, his entitlement to a retaining lien on the file is moot.

The Court recognizes that there is some authority suggesting that a court may "substitut[e] the statutory charging lien for the retaining lien with respect to the amount of that fee." See Security Credit Sys., Inc. v. Perfetto, 242 A.D.2d 871, 871-72 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Braider v. 194 Riverside Owners Corp., 237 A.D.2d 147, 147 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Moore v. Ackerman, 876 N.Y.S.2d 831, 834 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2009). This, however, only makes sense if the charging lien adequately protects Wagner Davis' interest in payment, which in the Court's view, it does not. Indeed, a charging lien does not "constitute[] security for the relinquishment of a retaining lien[.

“Where there are conflicting claims as to ... whether an outgoing attorney was discharged with or without cause, a hearing is necessary to resolve such dispute” (Byrne v. Leblond, 25 A.D.3d 640, 642, 811 N.Y.S.2d 681; see Teichner v. W & J Holsteins, 64 N.Y.2d 977, 979, 489 N.Y.S.2d 36, 478 N.E.2d 177; Schultz v. Hughes, 109 A.D.3d at 897, 971 N.Y.S.2d 536; cf. Braider v. 194 Riverside Owners Corp., 237 A.D.2d 147, 654 N.Y.S.2d 755; Hawkins v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 138 A.D.2d 572, 526 N.Y.S.2d 153).

onment by the attorney, the attorney maintains his or her right to enforce the statutory lien” (Lansky v. Easow, 304 A.D.2d 533, 534, 756 N.Y.S.2d 885 ; see Judiciary Law § 475 ; Klein v. Eubank, 87 N.Y.2d 459, 462, 640 N.Y.S.2d 443, 663 N.E.2d 599 ). In contrast, “[a]n attorney who is discharged for cause ... is not entitled to compensation or a lien” (Callaghan v. Callaghan, 48 A.D.3d 500, 501, 852 N.Y.S.2d 273 ; see Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 76 N.Y.2d at 44, 556 N.Y.S.2d 239, 555 N.E.2d 611 ; Schultz v. Hughes, 109 A.D.3d at 897, 971 N.Y.S.2d 536 ; Coccia v. Liotti, 70 A.D.3d at 757, 896 N.Y.S.2d 90 ). “Where there are conflicting claims as to whether an outgoing attorney was discharged with or without cause, a hearing is necessary to resolve such dispute” (Byrne v. Leblond, 25 A.D.3d 640, 642, 811 N.Y.S.2d 681 ; see Teichner v. W & J Holsteins, 64 N.Y.2d 977, 979, 489 N.Y.S.2d 36, 478 N.E.2d 177 ; Schultz v. Hughes, 109 A.D.3d at 897, 971 N.Y.S.2d 536 ; cf. Braider v. 194 Riverside Owners Corp., 237 A.D.2d 147, 654 N.Y.S.2d 755 ; Hawkins v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 138 A.D.2d 572, 526 N.Y.S.2d 153 ).On his motion to quash Wilson's charging lien, Romero submitted evidence in support of his contention that the plaintiff had discharged Wilson for cause.

Thus, the determination of the amount of the appellant's fee, in the event of a recovery, is deferred to a hearing to be held by the trial court at the conclusion of the action. "Such lien adequately protects outgoing counsel's interests" otherwise secured by its retaining lien, and the appellant is directed to transfer the plaintiff's file to incoming counsel upon payment of its outstanding disbursements (Braider v. 194 Riverside Owners Corp., 237 A.D.2d 147; see Turner v. Steve Brody Inc., 24 A.D.2d 904). PRUDENTI, P.J., KRAUSMAN, GOLDSTEIN and SCHMIDT, JJ., concur.

Present — Denman, P.J., Green, Lawton, Wisner and Balio, JJ. Supreme Court erred in directing defendant to surrender possession of client files before being reimbursed by plaintiff for his disbursements ( see, Braider v. 194 Riverside Owners Corp., 237 A.D.2d 147; Steves v. Serlin, 125 A.D.2d 780, 781-782; Cohen v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 56 A.D.2d 860). Absent proof of discharge for cause, an attorney is entitled to a retaining lien on the files of a client that are in the attorney's possession until the attorney has been reimbursed for expenses and, as a general rule, the attorney's fee has been determined on a quantum meruit basis and either paid or secured ( Lai Ling Cheng v. Modansky Leasing Co., 73 N.Y.2d 454, 457-459; Hom v. Hom, 210 A.D.2d 296, 298; Andreiev v. Keller, 168 A.D.2d 528). Whether to direct that the fee be paid before the client files are turned over or secured by a lien on the proceeds of any recovery is a matter within the court's discretion ( Hom v. Hom, supra, at 298; Theroux v. Theroux, 145 A.D.2d 625, 626). Plaintiff submitted no proof that defendant was discharged for cause.

( Casper v. Lew Lieberbaum & Co, Inc., 182 F. Supp. 2. 342 [2002]). However, where the dispute is between plaintiff's current and former counsel, the former counsel has the option of receiving the "reasonable value" of his services or a contingent percentage fee based on the proportionate share of the work he performed on the whole case ( Braider v. 194 Riverside Owners Corp., 237 A.D. 2d 147, 654 N.Y.S. 2d 755 [1. Dept. 1997];Smerda v. City of New York, 7 A.D. 3d 511, 776 N.Y.S. 2d 86 [2. Dept. 2004]; Tutarashvili v. Barzilay, 39 A.D. 3d 851, 832 N.Y.S. 2d 810 [2. Dept. 2007; Russo v. New York, 48 A.D. 3d 540, 853 N.Y.S. 2d 87 [2. Dept. 2008]). The dispute herein does not arise between Petitioner and the Client, but between the Client's current and former attorneys. Prior to Petitioner turning over the file to the Client and his current counsel they acknowledged that there were disbursements owed and that Petitioner would retain a "charging lien...to be determined by the court at the conclusion of the case...on the gross legal fees..."[see Petition Exhibit B ]. Petitioner is not foreclosed from electing as its fee a contingent percentage on the proportionate share of the work he performed.

(Casper v. Lew Lieberbaum & Co, Inc., 182 F.Supp. 2nd. 342 [2002] ). However, where the dispute is between plaintiff's current and former counsel, the former counsel has the option of receiving the “reasonable value” of his services or a contingent percentage fee based on the proportionate share of the work he performed on the whole case (Braider v. 194 Riverside Owners Corp., 237 A.D.2d 147, 654 N.Y.S.2d 755 [1st. Dept.1997]; Smerda v. City of New York, 7 AD3d 511, 776 N.Y.S.2d 86 [2nd. Dept.2004]; Tutarashvili v. Barzilay, 39 AD3d 851, 832 N.Y.S.2d 810 [2nd. Dept.2007; Russo v. New York, 48 AD3d 540, 853 N.Y.S.2d 87 [2nd. Dept.2008] ). The dispute herein does not arise between Petitioner and the Client, but between the Client's current and former attorneys. Prior to Petitioner turning over the file to the Client and his current counsel they acknowledged that there were disbursements owed and that Petitioner would retain a “charging lien ... to be determined by the court at the conclusion of the case ... on the gross legal fees ...”[ see Petition Exhibit B]. Petitioner is not foreclosed from electing as its fee a contingent percentage on the proportionate share of the work he performed.

Therefore, in cases where the determination can be made based upon the papers, a hearing is not necessary to making a determination of whether the attorney was discharged with or without cause. See Braider v 194 Riverside Owners Corp., 237 A.D.2d 147 (1st Dept 1997); Hawkins, 138 A.D.2d at 572.