Bragg v. Clarke

4 Citing cases

  1. Brown v. United States

    Civil Case No. 7:21-cv-00026 (W.D. Va. Jan. 26, 2021)   Cited 2 times

    "All of Title 37.1 of the Virginia Code was repealed in 2005 and has since become § 37.2-900." Bragg v. Clarke, No. 2:12-cv-161, 2013 WL 3087263, at *10 n.6 (E.D. Va. June 17, 2013); Smith v. Commonwealth, 694 S.E.2d 578, 579 (Va. 2010) (noting same). For these reasons, the factual premise of Brown's argument—that these statutes are criminal in nature, as opposed to civil—has been rejected by court decisions binding on this court.

  2. Barr v. Director

    Civil Action No. 3:13CV785 (E.D. Va. Mar. 2, 2015)

    The Carroll case . . . extended this jurisdiction to include cases that might affect the duration of a prisoner's confinement but would not necessarily result in his immediate release from custody." Bragg v. Clarke, No. 2:12-cv-161, 2013 WL 3087263, at *4 (E.D. Va. June 17, 2013). Specifically, the Supreme Court of Virginia stated:

  3. Stephenson v. Clarke

    Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-00457-JAG (E.D. Va. Oct. 23, 2014)   Cited 1 times
    Noting that Section 2254(b)(B) provides "exception" to the exhaustion requirement

    Recent federal cases reflect the Virginia Supreme Court's repeated summary dismissals of habeas petitions challenging parole denials. See, e.g., Bragg v. Clarke, No. 2:12CV161, 2013 WL 3087263, at *4 (E.D. Va. June 17, 2013); Perry v. Clarke, No. 7:12CV245, 2012 WL 6738164, at *1 n.2 (W.D. Va. Dec. 28, 2012); Doxie v. Clarke, No. 2:10CV379, 2011 WL 1930666, at *1 (E.D. Va. April 22, 2011); Williamson v. Clarke, No. 2:10CV522, 2011 WL 2790263, at *1 (E.D. Va. 2011); Barr v. Virginia, No. 7:10CV485, 2011 WL 2669149, at *1 (W.D. Va. July 6, 2011). Ruling on this question of exhaustion, however, is not necessary for reaching a decision on this motion to dismiss.

  4. Wright v. Muse

    CASE NO. 7:13CV00344 (W.D. Va. Oct. 22, 2013)

    Federal courts have considered and rejected due process claims remarkably similar to Wright's current complaints about parole suitability under Virginia law. See, e.g., Burnette v. Fahey, 687 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2012); Bragg v. Clarke, No. 2:12-cv-161, 2013 WL 3087263 (E.D. Va. June 17, 2013) (slip copy). Under Virginia's discretionary parole scheme, a parole-eligible inmate has a protectable liberty interest in being considered for parole at a specified time, but such an inmate receives constitutionally adequate procedural protection if the Board provides him "a statement of its reasons for denial of parole."