We recognize that the theory of the Lincoln case prevailed also in Pitts v. Hamrick (1955), 228 F.2d 486, and in In re Peters Will (1949), 88 N.Y.S.2d 142. It is urged that in our recent opinion in Bragdon, Trustee v. Worthley et al., 155 Me. 284, we recognized a rule of equitable apportionment and contribution broad enough in scope to exonerate this widow from federal estate tax burden. It is true that Bragdon recognizes that equitable principles require contribution under certain circumstances.

[¶ 26] The doctrine of equitable contribution requires that when parties assume a common obligation, those parties must share equally that obligation and burden. See Bragdon v. Worthley, 155 Me. 284, 288-89, 153 A.2d 627, 629-30 (1959). Indemnity is appropriate "to do justice within the law so that one guilty of an active or affirmative act of negligence or intentional act will not escape liability, while another whose fault was only technical or passive assumes complete liability."

It is thus the joint and several obligation of the donee of the inter vivos gift as well as of the executors. Bragdon v. Worthley, 155 Maine 284, 153 A.2d 627, 633; Carpenter v. Carpenter, supra, 364 Mo. 782, 267 S.W.2d 632, 642; Myers v. Sinkler, supra, 235 S.C. 162, 110 S.E.2d 241, 246. [18] That the executors may be required to pay the tax initially does not determine ultimate liability therefor as between the two parts of the taxable estate, nor negative their right to reimbursement for the part of the tax attributable to the nonprobate assets included therein.

The doctrine of equitable contribution has long been recognized in the state of Maine. Bragdon v. Worthley , 155 Me. 284, 153 A.2d 627, 631 (1959). It requires that "when parties assume a common obligation, those parties must share equally that obligation and burden."

These counts, like Count I, relate to whether Defendant is obligated to pay for any portion of the Tree Clearance Work. Analysis of these causes of action will require an inquiry into the reasonableness of Plaintiff's expectation that Defendant bear some of this expense. See Smith v. Cannell, 723 A.2d 876, 880 (Me. 1999) (quantum meruit); Landry v. Landry, 697 A.2d 843, 845 (Me. 1997) (unjust enrichment); Bragdon v. Worthley, 155 Me. 284, 288-89, 153 A.2d 627 (Me. 1959) (equitable contribution). This in turn will be distilled, at least in part, by reference to the provisions of the Joint Pole Agreement, which governs the parties' joint ownership and occupancy of the utility poles.

Id. For other decisions expressly recognizing that the apportionment of estate taxes is an application of equitable contribution, see Pearcy v. Citizens Bank Trust Co., 121 Ind. App. 136, 96 N.E.2d 918 (1951); Succession of Ratcliff, 212 La. 563, 33 So.2d 114 (1947); Bragdon v. Worthley, 155 Me. 284, 153 A.2d 627 (1959); In re Mellon's Estate, 347 Pa. 520, 32 A.2d 749 (1943); In re Jones' Estate, 54 Pa. D. C. 364 (Orphans' Ct., Montgomery Co., 1945); and United States v. Goodson, 253 F.2d 900, 906 (8th Cir. 1958) (dicta). For cases apportioning estate taxes without any statutory foundation for apportionment, see Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 194 Ga. 255, 21 S.E.2d 691 (1942); McDougall v. Central Nat'l Bank of Cleveland, 157 Ohio St. 45, 104 N.E.2d 441 (1952); and Industrial Trust Co. v. Budlong, 77 R.I. 428, 76 A.2d 600 (1950).

Whatever may have been the brother's right under either 36 M.R.S.A. § 559 (Supp. 1988) or the doctrine of equitable contribution to recoup one half of the taxes from the sister, see Bragdon v. Worthley, 155 Me. 284, 153 A.2d 627 (1959), the Superior Court was justified in concluding that any such right had been intentionally waived by the brother for each of the tax years 1976 through 1987. Since, as the Superior Court implicitly found with adequate support in the record, the brother possessed the necessary donative intent at the time he paid each of the annual tax bills during the period of friendly relations between the siblings, he completed a gift to his sister at each of those times. A change of mind by the donor in 1988 cannot undo those completed gifts.

A testor may provide that inheritance taxes are to be paid out of the estate itself, effectively shifiting the burden of the tax to the residuary legatees, but such an intention must be clearly expressed. Bragdon v. Worthtley, 155 Me. 284, 299, 153 A.2d 627, 635 (1959). On the face, the introductory clause in the Dickinson will could hardly be clearer in expressing the testator's intent to charge his estate rather than his specific legatees, with the inheritance tax.

The equity power granted by 14 M.R.S.A. § 6051(7) extends "to adjust[ing] all matters . . . between such part owners." In distributing the sales proceeds, any amounts a co-owner has expended in repairs or improvements, Williams v. Coombs, supra 88 Me. at 186, 33 A. at 1076, or paid on a joint and several debt, cf. Bragdon v. Worthley, 155 Me. 284, 153 A.2d 627 (1959), may be taken into account along with all other relevant equitable considerations. On the facts of the case at bar, however, the finding we must assume was made by the Superior Court justice, namely, that the equities were evenly balanced between the parties, is amply supported against a "clearly erroneous" attack.

Had this issue been one appropriate for decision in this case, we would be mindful of the analogy found in the decisions of several jurisdictions and recognized by the Supreme Court which hold generally that the rules of descent and distribution of property are subjects belonging exclusively to the jurisdiction of the states. See In Re Estate of McBride, 110 Ill. App.2d 200, 249 N.E.2d 266 (1969); Bragdon, Trustee v. Worthley, 155 Me. 284, 153 A.2d 627 (1959); Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95, 63 S.Ct. 109, 87 L.Ed. 106 (1942); Petition of Worcester County Nat. Bank, 263 Mass. 444, 162 N.E. 217 (1928); People v. Brady, 271 Ill. 100, 110 N.E. 864 (1915). The entry is