Brady v. State

6 Citing cases

  1. Daniels v. State

    411 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 5 times

    Though the search occurred only a few hours after she moved in, the Fourth District Court of Appeals held that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises which she was, in effect, sharing with her friend. 394 So.2d 1073 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Similarly, this case is distinguishable from this court's decision in Shade v. State. There, the evidence showed appellant, Shade, was a temporary resident in his family's home.

  2. Rollison v. State

    453 So. 2d 447 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

    This ruling, in my view, was clearly erroneous. See DeLaPaz v. State, 453 So.2d 445 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Walker v. State, 433 So.2d 644 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Shade v. State, 400 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Brady v. State, 394 So.2d 1073 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). The search uncovered a rifle, bank bags and money; all of which were introduced at trial.

  3. Walker v. State

    433 So. 2d 644 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 9 times

    He had sole use and right of occupancy to the room. No one, not even Manion, had permission to enter his room. He therefore had a reasonable expectation of privacy and legal standing within the contemplation of United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980); State v. Mallory, 409 So.2d 1222 (Fla. 2d DCA), petition for review denied, 418 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 1982); Brady v. State, 394 So.2d 1073 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Once Walker established he had standing and that a warrantless intrusion into his room had occurred which, in turn, resulted in a warrantless arrest, search and seizure, the burden shifted to the state to demonstrate that the police officers had acted within a recognized exception to section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (1981), or that there were exigent circumstances to obviate compliance with that section.

  4. People v. Wagner

    114 Mich. App. 541 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 16 times
    In Wagner, we concluded that the police reasonably could not have believed that the consenting third party had a sufficient relationship to the premises to consent to the entry since, when police asked the third party whether he lived in the house, he indicated only that the defendant's girlfriend rented the house.

    It held that defendant was more than a "casual visitor" who arrived on the scene just prior to the search. In Brady v State, 394 So.2d 1073 (Fla App, 1981), another overnight guest was found to have standing to challenge a search. Brady apparently was indigent.

  5. State v. Mallory

    409 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 10 times
    Holding that defendant who had a permanent residence and was merely a visitor in a third party's home did not have standing to challenge the search of the home even though the defendant kept some clothing there, was free to come and go with the use of a hidden key, and spent occasional nights there as a guest

    We relinquished jurisdiction in this case with directions to the trial court to determine the issue of appellee Mallory's reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. After hearing, the court entered an order holding that Mallory had a reasonable expectation of privacy and thus had legal standing within the contemplation of U.S. v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980), and Brady v. State, 394 So.2d 1073 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Upon review of the record in this cause, which includes a transcript of the hearing on remand, we reverse and hold that Mallory did not demonstrate the requisite expectation of privacy in order to maintain standing. Thus, the trial court erred in granting Mallory's motion to suppress evidence.

  6. Shade v. State

    400 So. 2d 850 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 10 times

    There was sufficient evidence in this case to establish appellant's privacy interest in the house where he had stayed the past week, even assuming that appellant's stay was temporary. See Brady v. State, 394 So.2d 1073, 1981 FLW 535 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). The trial court's failure to exclude the wallet and its contents must be considered to be harmless error, however, in light of the strong evidence of guilt, not the least of which were appellant's inculpatory statements which were properly admitted.