Opinion
HHDCV085022030S.
12-14-2012
Kathleen BRADY v. STAR OF THE SEA CHURCH CORPORATION OF UNIONVILLE, Connecticut.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PECK, J.
On July 30, 2006, the plaintiff entered the Saint Mary's Star of the Sea Church of Unionville (St. Mary's Church), operated by the defendant Star of the Sea Church Corporation, wherein she sought to light a votive candle located near the altar. The candles were organized in rows on a candle stand, some lighted and some unlighted. A set of stairs with loose pads on them for kneeling was arranged in front of the candle stand. All the candles in the lower rows were already lighted. When the plaintiff stepped on the stairs to attempt to reach and light a candle with the lighting stick provided for that purpose, the loose pad slid off, causing the plaintiff to lurch forward and fall on the candles igniting her blouse and causing her injury.
In her one-count complaint, filed on August 11, 2008, the plaintiff alleges that she was a business invitee on the defendant's premises and that the defendant failed to keep the property reasonably safe by failing to keep lighted candles from igniting her clothing and injuring her. She further alleges that the defendant was negligent in the placement of the candle stand in that the candle stand was too high and far from the floor; it contained rows of lighted candles in front of unlighted candles forcing people to reach over and across lighted candles in order to light other candles; that it placed the candle stand in front of stairs with loose pads on them thereby creating a risk that the loose pads would move underneath people standing on them; and that the defendant knew or should have known that the area was unsafe due to loose pads on the stairs and lighted candles in the front rows of the votive candle stand. The plaintiff also alleges that the defendant failed to discover or warn of the foregoing defect or dangerous condition, or to correct it, or provide proper ameliorative safeguards, such as a fire extinguisher that may have lessened the extent of the plaintiff's injuries.
On January 31, 2012, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss with a memorandum of law arguing that adjudication of this case would require the court to review and interpret religious doctrines and practices thereby running afoul of the free exercise clause of the first amendment the United States Constitution, the comparable provisions of the Connecticut Constitution contained in its first and seventh articles, and Connecticut's freedom of religion statute, General Statute § 52-571b. The issues have been fully briefed and were argued at short calendar on August 20, 2012.
" A motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 274, 21 A.3d 759 (2011). " A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 301 Conn. 759, 774, 23 A.3d 1192 (2012).
" Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction ." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). Because the question of whether the court must impermissibly interpret ecclesiastical teachings in order to adjudicate a claim is one of subject matter jurisdiction, a motion to dismiss is the proper procedural vehicle to raise such an argument. See Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, supra, 301 Conn. at 759; Bellman v. West Hartford, 96 Conn.App. 387, 392, 900 A.2d 82 (2006).
" [T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n. 12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003). " [I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor ... clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 303 Conn. 402, 413-14, 35 A.3d 188 (2012). " [T]he well established notion [is] that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, supra, 301 Conn. at 759.
" Trial courts addressing motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 10-31(a)(1) may encounter different situations, depending on the status of the record in the case ... [L]ack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts ... Different rules and procedures will apply, depending on the state of the record at the time the motion is filed." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 650-51, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).
" [I]f the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss ... other types of undisputed evidence ... and/or public records of which judicial notice may be taken ... the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint ... Rather, those allegations are tempered by the light shed on them by the [supplementary undisputed facts] ... If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant's motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counter affidavits ... or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings ... If, however, the defendant submits either no proof to rebut the plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations ... or only evidence that fails to call those allegations into question ... the plaintiff need not supply counter affidavits or other evidence to support the complaint, but may rest on the jurisdictional allegations therein." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, supra, 292 Conn. at 651-52.
In support of its motion to dismiss, the defendant submitted an affidavit of the pastor of St. Mary's Church describing the lighting of the candles as a religious exercise " in remembrance that our prayers are rising to God ..." The pastor further states that the church provided votive candles for parishioners to light prior to Mass. The defendant also submitted excerpts of the Code of Canon Law, which address aspects of church liturgy and the role of diocesan bishops. The defendant argues that judicial resolution of this case requires interpretation of ecclesiastical law. The defendant further argues that the incident occurred in the context of a prayer ritual, and therefore, the court is barred by the first amendment, relevant provisions of the Connecticut Constitution, and General Statutes § 52-571b from reviewing the plaintiff's claim. For similar reasons, the defendant argues that the placement of the kneeling pads and candles are a matter within the church's discretion in interpreting their religious law, and, as such, the court cannot delve into whether such placement violated the applicable standard of care.
The affidavit of Reverend John Golas, the pastor of St. Mary Star of the Sea Church of Unionville, was filed on September 12, 2012, after oral argument on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff filed an objection to the late filing of the affidavit to which the defendant filed a reply. The objection is hereby overruled.
General Statutes § 52-571b provides, in relevant part, as follows:
In response, the plaintiff replies that her claim does not pertain to religious matters, but rather, that it is fundamentally a premises liability claim. The plaintiff points out that she is not claiming that the candles cannot be lit in church or that the defendant cannot have a votive candle stand in the church building. The plaintiff is simply claiming that the defendant owed her a duty as an invitee to safely locate the candle stand away from defective kneeling pads, and this determination can be made under generally applicable state law.
The plaintiff also submitted her own affidavit, which, in addition to restating certain allegations of the complaint, states: " There was no religious ceremony being performed as the time of the accident. I was simply trying to light a candle in the votive candle stand. No priest or church employee was present." The plaintiff also submits, as Exhibit B, an excerpt of the St. Mary's church bulletin reminding parishioners to light candles " from the top rows-DOWN, to avoid the risk of injury which can be caused by placing your arm over a lighted votive." (Emphasis in original.)
" ‘ [N]ot every civil court decision ... jeopardizes values protected by the [f]irst [a]mendment.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thibodeau v. American Baptist Churches of Connecticut ... 120 Conn.App. [666] ... 673, 994 A.2d 212. ‘ If a court can resolve the dispute by applying only neutral principles of law ... judicial review may be permissible.’ Id. ‘ [S]tate judicial intervention is justified when it can be accomplished by resort to neutral principles of law ... that eschew consideration of doctrinal matters such as the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith." New York Annual Conference v. Fisher, supra, 182 Conn.... at [272] 281, 438 A.2d 62. ‘ The central question ... is whether the disputes require the court to interpret and to apply religious doctrine and practices or whether the dispute is simply a controversy that involves church officials but to which neutral principles of secular law can be applied without need to inquire into ecclesiastical matters.’ " Thibodeau v. American Baptist Churches of Connecticut, supra, at 675, 994 A.2d 212; see, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979) (applying ordinary principles of property law in case involving church officials without delving into ecclesiastical matters)." Kubala v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 52 Conn.Supp. 218, 229, 41 A.3d 351 (2011) aff'd 134 Conn.App. 459, 38 A.3d 1252 (2012) (per curiam).
According to the undisputed facts supported by the submitted affidavits and as presented by counsel for both parties at oral argument, the church was open for the lighting of votive candles, prior to Mass; the lighting of the candles was invited, but not required, and was outside the context of an organized religious service as there was no religious ceremony taking place at the time.
The affidavit of the pastor of the parish confirms that the lighting of votive candles is not required and is not part of the Mass.
This factual difference distinguishes this case from Kubala v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 52 Conn.Supp. 218, 41 A.3d 351 (2011). In Kubala, the plaintiff was participating in a healing mass at a Catholic church. As part of the ceremony, the plaintiff approached the altar to be prayed over and to " rest in the spirit" by falling backwards into the arms of a " catcher." Unfortunately for the plaintiff, no one caught her, and she struck her head on the floor, sustaining injury. The plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the defendants failed to exercise the requisite degree of care ordinarily and customarily used by Catholic priests performing Catholic Charismatic Renewal services, including healing masses. The court held that the plaintiff's allegations sounded in " clergy malpractice" and related to the performance of a religious healing ritual which involved an impermissible inquiry by the secular court into the conduct of a religious ceremony.
While the underlying factual allegations in Kubala invited a determination that the conduct of a particular religious ceremony was unlawful, a finding which would plainly infringe on the free exercise of religion without a compelling state interest, the instant case is notably distinguishable. Here, the court need not find that the church, as a matter of law, must change the manner in which a religious ceremony is conducted. Indeed, in the present case, it is undisputed that the injury alleged did not occur in the context of a ceremony. The fact that a person may recite a prayer during the process of lighting a votive candle does not alter this conclusion.
In fact, the excerpts from the Code of Canon Law, submitted by the defendant, suggest that the plaintiff's activity was a private action, not a liturgical one, in that it did not entail " a common celebration." Nor does the court accept the defendant's suggestion that because it is the role of the bishop to establish liturgical norms in parish churches, that his role, as defined by canon law, confers a blanket immunity from liability for injuries to invitees occurring on church property due to a dangerous or defective condition. In addition, the affidavit of the pastor of the parish stating that the lighting of a candle is a " religious exercise, " that " [a] burning candle is a religious symbol, and that kneeling pads are placed near the votive candle arrangement so parishioners can " kneel in prayer in conjunction with lighting a candle, " does not draw this case closer to Kubala. A disposition of the case favorable to the plaintiff would not prevent parishioners from engaging in the act of lighting votive candles in church, or change this tradition in any meaningful way.
For the foregoing reasons the court finds that the plaintiff's claims can be resolved by the court applying only neutral principles of law that do not intrude on religious decisions within the church sanctuary. On the record submitted to the court, the court cannot conclude that the plaintiff's claims implicating the safe placement of candles and kneeling pads involve " inquiry into the religious practices established and governed by the Roman Catholic Church, rules and regulations promulgated by the United States Conferences of Bishops and/or local interpretations and practices established by the Archbishop for the Archdiocese of Hartford or other Roman Catholic ordinaries."
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 13. As previously noted, the parish pastor's affidavit states that the lighting of votive candles are voluntary and not a Mass. obligation. Although the act itself may be an exercise of an individual's faith, it is not a religious " ceremony" as suggested by the arguments of defendant's counsel.
As to the question of whether the layout of the votive candles or the lighting instructions are of religious importance, the court reaches a similar conclusion. The plaintiff submits Exhibit B, a copy of the church bulletin from November 2007, well over a year after the underlying incident, in which parishioners are reminded to light the candles from the top down, " to avoid the risk of injury which can be caused by placing your arm over a lighted votive." While evidence of subsequent remedial measures is not admissible on the issue of negligence in connection with the plaintiff's injury; nonetheless, it is admissible for purposes of the motion to dismiss to the extent that this warning/instruction in the bulletin highlights the feasibility of lighting the votive candles in a safer way. It demonstrates that neither the arrangement of the candles nor the manner of lighting of the candles is dictated by church canon and have no religious significance.
Finally, the defendant argues that, in enacting General Statutes § 52-571b via Public Act 93-252, the legislature clearly intended to protect lighting candles in church as a form of religious expression that is not to be burdened. There is no question that the legislature intended to protect the lighting of candles in church but not in the way argued by the defendant. The defendant cites the remarks of Representative Richard D. Tulisano made on the House floor to support this assertion. Representative Tulisano stated: " All we're talking about here is that in fact when the state tries to limit activities, such as candles in a church, receiving wine at Holy Communion, wearing a yarmulke in court, in order to restrict that activity, which is otherwise religiously allowed, that there must be a compelling State reason in order to do it." 36 H.R. Proc ., Pt. 25, 1993 Sess., p. 4923.
General Statutes § 52-571b is the most protective source of law argued by the defendant in connection with the motion to dismiss. However, even § 52-571b provides for a strict scrutiny standard of review by the court when the state burdens the exercise of religion. That is, burdening the exercise of religion is not prohibited outright by this statute provided there is a compelling state interest. However, as the court has previously noted in this memorandum of decision, in allowing this matter to proceed, the state would not be burdening the exercise of religion in any form because, unlike Kubala, the resolution of this case would not involve or require a change in any religious ceremonial act.
Taken out of context, these remarks arguably suggest that a compelling interest must be shown in order to limit candle-lighting in a church. However, when taken in context, it is quite clear that in passing the foregoing provision, the legislature was concerned with outright prohibition of candle lighting in church without specifically addressing the state's power to place reasonable limits on candle lighting under appropriate circumstances.
The court need not address whether the adjudication of tort claims qualifies as " compelling" under this standard.
CONCLUSION
For all foregoing reasons, the litigation of the plaintiff's complaint does not require the court to review or interpret the religious doctrine of the defendant church or otherwise impact its religious practices or decisions. Rather, neutral legal principles of the common law of premises liability will dictate the outcome of the case. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.
(a) The state or any political subdivision of the state shall not burden a person's exercise of religion under section 3 of article first of the constitution of the state even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) The state or any political subdivision of the state may burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
(c) A person whose exercise of religion has been burdened in violation of the provisions of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against the state or any political subdivision of the state.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the state or any political subdivision of the state to burden any religious belief.
(a) [E]vidence of measures taken after an event, which if taken before the event would have made injury or damage less likely to result, is inadmissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. Evidence of those measures is admissible when offered to prove controverted issues such as ownership, control or feasibility of precautionary measures.