" Ga. Code Ann. § 114-102, supra. Finally, the plaintiff might have argued that the Act does not cover purely emotional harm. E.g. Brady v. Royal Mfg. Co., 117 Ga. App. 312, 160 S.E.2d 424 (1968). The Court observes that plaintiff alleges combined emotional and physical harm such as "hypertension, high levels of cholesterol, high blood pressure, developed emotional instability, and . . . anxiety neurosis."

Hanson Buick v. Chatham, 163 Ga. App. 127, 129 ( 295 S.E.2d 846) (1982). See also Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Loftis, 103 Ga. App. 749 (1) ( 120 S.E.2d 655) (1961) (a mental disability is compensable if brought on by an accident and physical injury); Brady v. Royal Mfg. Co., 117 Ga. App. 312 ( 160 S.E.2d 424) (1968) (psychic disability must have its origin in injury); Sawyer v. Pacific Indem. Co., 141 Ga. App. 298 ( 233 S.E.2d 227) (1977) (psychic disability resulting from physical injury is compensable); Williams v. ARA Environmental Svcs., 175 Ga. App. 661 ( 334 S.E.2d 192) (1985) (psychic disability resulting from purely psychological injury is not compensable); Howard v. Superior Contractors, 180 Ga. App. 68 ( 348 S.E.2d 563) (1986) (post-traumatic stress syndrome arising from a physical injury is compensable); W. W. Fowler Oil Co. v. Hamby, 192 Ga. App. 422 ( 385 S.E.2d 106) (1989) (psychic trauma must arise naturally and unavoidably from some discernable, physical injury). The claimant herein suffered a discernible physical "injury" as that term is defined in OCGA § 34-9-1 (4).

Based upon that finding, the superior court correctly affirmed the denial of appellant's claim for workers' compensation benefits. Hanson Buick, supra; Brady v. Royal Mfg. Co., 117 Ga. App. 312 ( 160 S.E.2d 424) (1968). The ruling in Ga. Bureau of Investigation v. Worthington, 149 Ga. App. 628 ( 255 S.E.2d 99) (1979), upon which appellant relies, does not require a different result in the case now before us.

The cases cited by appellants are distinguishable and do not require a different decision. In W. W. Fowler Oil Co. v. Hamby, 192 Ga. App. 422 ( 385 S.E.2d 106) (1989), Williams v. ARA Environmental Svcs., 175 Ga. App. 661 ( 334 S.E.2d 192) (1985), Hanson Buick, v. Chatham, 163 Ga. App. 127 ( 292 S.E.2d 428) (1982), and Brady v. Royal Mfg. Co., 117 Ga. App. 312 ( 160 S.E.2d 424) (1968), the claimants' psychological disorders were not connected to a prior physical injury. In contrast, evidence in the record indicates that Wilson initially suffered "a muscular strain of his back muscles," at which point his psychological disorder began and continued to worsen.

Chatham, supra. Brady v. Royal Mfg. Co., 117 Ga. App. 312 ( 160 S.E.2d 424) (1968), and Sawyer v. Pacific Indem. Co., 141 Ga. App. 298, 300 (2) ( 233 S.E.2d 227) (1977), were cited as precedent for denying compensation for psychic trauma precipitated by psychic stimuli. Id.

The impact from the vehicle accident there was irrelevant to our decision. See Williams v. ARA Environmental Svcs., 175 Ga. App. 661, 662 ( 334 S.E.2d 192) (1985), and also Brady v. Royal Mfg. Co., 117 Ga. App. 312 ( 160 S.E.2d 424) (1968). We should have followed the latter cited case, which held on page 314, that while mental illness "is as real as pneumonia, like pneumonia it is an illness.

The claimant did not suffer any physical injury during the course of his employment at Hanson Buick. Held: The administrative law judge and the Board relied on Brady v. Royal Mfg. Co., 117 Ga. App. 312 ( 160 S.E.2d 424) and Sawyer v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 141 Ga. App. 298 ( 233 S.E.2d 227) as authority that Georgia has not recognized psychological or nervous injury precipitated by psychic trauma as compensable and that hence the claimant did not suffer an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The superior court, in reversing, ruled: "Injury caused by emotional trauma arising from a discharge from employment is compensable in Georgia.

This is, according to the expert testimony "a disease process." A similar situation was presented in Brady v. Royal Mfg. Co., 117 Ga. App. 312 ( 160 S.E.2d 424) where the claimant, following a severely emotional and upsetting job-related dispute, developed symptoms of paralysis in her left arm diagnosed as a conversion reaction. The court held that the claimant could not be said to have suffered an injury resulting from an "accident" as Georgia defines that term. It then stated: "The medical evidence does not indicate that she actually suffers from a paralyzed arm; on the contrary it indicates that she merely thinks it to be paralyzed and will not attempt to use it... This may and probably does indicate what claimant suffers from is some type of mental illness.

Although it is trite, let us say here again that the finding of the deputy director, approved by the full board, has the standing of a verdict by the jury; and under the "any evidence" rule, we must sustain that finding if there is any evidence to support it and the evidence must be construed most strongly toward supporting the verdict. Ocean Accident c. Corp. v. Farr, 180 Ga. 266 ( 178 S.E. 728); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Sanders, 182 Ga. 594 ( 186 S.E. 693); Wood v. Aetna Cas. c. Co., 116 Ga. App. 284, 289 ( 157 S.E.2d 60); Brady v. Royal Manufacturing Co., 117 Ga. App. 312, 315 ( 160 S.E.2d 424). There can be no question here but that Forrester was the employee of his original employer at the time of his death under this testimony and is entitled to workmen's compensation from that employer and his insurance carrier.

The board did not err in finding that the resulting injury was accidental, being emotionally initiated rather than physical. See in this connection Brady v. Royal Mfg. Co., 117 Ga. App. 312 ( 160 S.E.2d 424); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Griggs, 190 Ga. 277, 287 ( 9 S.E.2d 84); Klimas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, 12 A.D.2d 551 ( 207 NYS2d 72); Little v. J. Korber Co., 71 N. M. 294 ( 378 P.2d 119). Judgment affirmed. Quillian, J., concurs. Jordan, P. J., concurs in the judgment only.