Opinion
2:23-cv-00106-BHH-MGB
05-04-2023
Lewis Brady, Plaintiff, v. Live 5 News; Fox 24 News; Hill-Finklea Detention Center; St. Stephen Police Department; and, Berkeley County Sheriff's Department, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Lewis Brady (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action alleging violations of South Carolina state law and, possibly, the Fourteenth Amendment. (See Dkt. No. 1.) Under Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed.
BACKGROUND
The undersigned notes at the outset that the rambling, incoherent nature of Plaintiff's allegations makes it difficult to ascertain the true facts underlying the claims here. Based on the undersigned's review, however, Plaintiff's Complaint appears to stem from a series of events that took place in August 2022 and resulted in Plaintiff's arrest and subsequent detention at the Hill-Finklea Detention Center in Berkeley County, South Carolina.
According to Plaintiff, on or around August 21, 2022, he informed Officer Thomas Holmes with the St. Stephen Police Department that members of the Gangster Disciples Gang had put a “hit” on his (Plaintiff's) life and were following him with the intent to “do bodily harm.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 3-4.) Plaintiff further reported that the Gangster Disciples Gang had “hijacked” his cell phone with “spyware” so that its members could track his movements, access his bank accounts, and interfere with any attempts to call 9-1-1. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that when Officer Holmes inspected his cell phone, the device showed signs of tampering; specifically, Plaintiff contends that a “video popped up” on the device, proving that the gang members were attempting to “control” his cell phone and “seek audio and video of what [was] happening between [him and Officer Holmes]” in that very moment. (Id. at 4.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff claims that Officer Holmes did not believe him and “handed [him] off” to another officer. (Id.)
Although not entirely clear, the Complaint seems to suggest that a day or so later, Plaintiff was in a car accident while attempting to flee from the Gangster Disciples Gang. (Id. at 5.) As a result of the crash, Plaintiff claims that he sustained physical injuries and was wrongfully arrested by the Berkeley County Sheriff “for failure to stop for blue lights and grand larceny.” (Id.) Plaintiff seems to contend that the crash was caused, at least in part, by Officer Holmes' “failure to act” and could have been avoided if he had investigated Plaintiff's complaint regarding the Gangster Disciples Gang “in good faith.” (Id. at 8.)
Following the arrest, Plaintiff claims that certain Berkeley County officials disseminated false information to “Live 5 News as well as other media sources” regarding the criminal charges pending against him. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that these media sources apparently broadcasted that he had been arrested for attempted murder, which was not accurate.(Id.) Plaintiff argues that a jury could have been “prejudiced” by the media's “slander,” “defamation of character,” and “gross negligence,” and notes that “there has been no retraction” despite these purported untruths. (Id. at 5, 7.)
Criminal records show that Plaintiff was in fact arrested on August 23, 2022, for: (1) failure to stop for a blue light (Case No. 2022A0810201613); and (2) grand larceny (Case No. 2022A0820500212). See https://publicindex.sccourts.org/berkeley/publicindex/ (last visited April 27, 2023); see also see also Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (explaining that a federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (same). Plaintiff was “not indicted” on the first charge, but pled guilty to the grand larceny offense on February 10, 2023.
With respect to his detention at the Hill-Finklea Detention Center, Plaintiff claims that he notified officers of special dietary needs based on his high blood pressure, cardiovascular disease, and diabetes, but was continually served foods that worsened these conditions. (Id. at 6.) According to Plaintiff, his diet resulted in “medical issues” such as “inflammation of testicles,” “inflammation of legs and ankles,” and water retention. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that these “illnesses” may have “long term permanent effects” on his health, including “shortening [his] lifespan” and impacting his ability to “produce offspring.” (Id.)
Based on the above, the Complaint raises claims of slander, defamation of character, and gross negligence against Live 5 News; Fox 24 News; Hill-Finklea Detention Center; the St. Stephen Police Department; and the Berkeley County Sheriff's Department (collectively, “Defendants”). (Id. at 2-3, 5.) Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $100 million for his “pain and suffering” and “medical bills.” (Id. at 3.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 9, 2023, the undersigned issued an order notifying Plaintiff that his Complaint was subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Dkt. No. 5.) In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, however, the undersigned granted him twenty-one days, plus three days for mail time, to file an amended complaint that cured the identified pleading deficiencies. (Id. at 4.) In addition to the amended complaint, the undersigned also directed Plaintiff to file a completed set of proposed service documents for each of the defendants named in the amended pleading as required under General Order In Re: Procedures in Civil Actions Filed by Prisoner Pro Se Litigants, No. 3:07-mc-5014-JFA (D.S.C. Sept. 18, 2007). (Id. at 4-5.) The undersigned emphasized that if Plaintiff did not follow the instructions above within the time permitted by the order, his case would be summarily dismissed. (Id.)
Less than one week later, the Court received a Notice of Change of Address from Plaintiff dated March 9, 2023. (Dkt. No. 7.) Based on the date of the notice, the undersigned assumed Plaintiff did not receive the Court's previous order (Dkt. No. 5) and resent a copy of the same to the new address. In an abundance of caution, the undersigned also extended the deadline by which Plaintiff was required to file an amended pleading so that he received a full twenty-one days. The undersigned reminded Plaintiff that if he failed to comply with the Court's instructions by the updated deadline, his case would be summarily dismissed. (Id. at 2.) To date, Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint or any proposed service documents, and the time to do so has lapsed.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
Although Plaintiff was apparently released from the Hill-Finklea Detention Center after filing this lawsuit, the PLRA's “plain language . . . focuses on the time that a lawsuit is ‘brought' in federal court....” Chase v. Peay, 286 F.Supp.2d 523, 528 (W.D.Md. Sept. 30, 2003); see also Chinn v. Martin, No. 2:16-cv-80, 2016 WL 7404713, at *3 (S.D. W.Va. Dec. 21, 2016) (noting that a “plaintiff's status for PLRA . . . is determined at the time of filing”).
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also id. § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 39091 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”).
DISCUSSION
Despite the undersigned's express warning, Plaintiff failed to file an amended pleading or any proposed service documents. The undersigned therefore finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal under Rule 41(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., for failure to prosecute and comply with an order of this Court. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962). Notwithstanding Plaintiff's failure to bring this case into proper form, however, the undersigned finds that the Court cannot entertain Plaintiff's Complaint in any event.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, meaning they possess only that power authorized by Article III of the United States Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute. Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1992). Accordingly, a federal court is required, sua sponte, to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists “and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears.” In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998).
There is no presumption that a federal court has jurisdiction over a case, Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999), and a plaintiff must allege facts essential to show jurisdiction in his or her pleadings. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); see also Dracos v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 762 F.2d 348, 350 (4th Cir. 1985) (“[P]laintiffs must affirmatively plead the jurisdiction of the federal court.”). To this end, Rule 8(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the complaint provide “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction....” There are two primary bases for exercising original federal jurisdiction: (1) “federal question,” under 28 U.S.C. § 1331; and (2) “diversity of citizenship,” under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Plaintiff's Complaint does not specify which basis for jurisdiction applies here; the undersigned therefore addresses each in turn.
With respect to federal question jurisdiction, the plaintiff must assert a cause of action “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “[T]he complaint must, however, contain allegations affirmatively and distinctly establishing federal grounds not in mere form, but in substance and not in mere assertion, but in essence and effect.” Burgess v. Charlottesville Savings and Loan Assoc., 477 F.2d 40, 43 (4th Cir. 1973) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In other words, federal jurisdiction requires “more than a simple allegation that jurisdiction exists or citation to a federal statute, and a mere allegation that a federal statute has been violated is not sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Brantley v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. 9:19-cv-490-BHH-BM, 2019 WL 8918793, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 8, 2019) (internal citations omitted), adopted, 2020 WL 1181309 (D.S.C. Mar. 11, 2020).
Here, the Complaint does not explicitly assert any federal causes of action. Rather, Plaintiff alleges slander, defamation of character, and gross negligence (Dkt. No. 1 at 2-3, 5), all of which fall under the purview of South Carolina state law. Construing the allegations liberally, however, the undersigned notes that it is possible Plaintiff is also attempting to assert violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on Officer Holmes' purported failure to protect him from the Gangster Disciples Gang (id. at 3-4) and/or the food served at Hill-Finklea Detention Center (id. at 6). Even so, Plaintiff's allegations still fall short of an actionable federal claim.
Section 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim to relief under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). As the undersigned previously warned Plaintiff, the Complaint fails to name a defendant amendable to suit under § 1983 because only “persons” may act under color of state law. (Dkt. No. 5 at 3.) The Hill-Finklea Detention Center, St. Stephen Police Department, and" Berkeley County Sheriff's Department do not qualify as “persons” for purposes of § 1983, regardless of whether Plaintiff refers to the physical buildings or the staff and collection of officials they house. See, e.g., Madison v. Shell, No. 7:22-cv-3549-TMC-JDA, 2022 WL 17156885, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 3, 2022) (noting that a police department “is a facility, building, or group of people,” and therefore is “not subject to suit because it cannot be sued as a ‘person' in a § 1983 lawsuit”), adopted, 2022 WL 17128451 (D.S.C. Nov. 22, 2022); Brooks v. Borghi, No. 5:21-cv-3282-BHH-MHC, 2022 WL 17543121, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 18, 2022) (finding that the sheriff's office is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983), adopted, 2022 WL 17542998 (D.S.C. Dec. 8, 2022); Sumpter v. Georgetown Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 0:20-cv-1770-JMC-PJG, 2020 WL 3060395, at *2 (D.S.C. June 8, 2020) (explaining that “inanimate objects” like detention centers “are not ‘persons' and do not act under color of state law”). Accordingly, any § 1983 claims against said Defendants are subject to summary dismissal.
With respect to Live 5 News and Fox 24 News, media outlets are neither persons nor state actors. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) (stating that the party charged with the conduct in a § 1983 action “must . . . fairly be said to be a state actor”); see also Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 383 (2012) (“Anyone whose conduct is fairly attributable to the state can be sued as a state actor under § 1983.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Purely private conduct, “no matter how wrongful, injurious, fraudulent, or discriminatory,” simply does not provide a basis for action under § 1983. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936. Because Live 5 News and Fox 24 News are private entities-not state actors-any such claims against them are likewise subject to summary dismissal. See, e.g., Ward v. Detective Daniel Eng., No. 2:17-cv-1795-HMH-SVH, 2017 WL 3575528, at *3 (D.S.C. July 26, 2017) (finding that “Channel 5 News is not a person acting under the color of state law under § 1983”), adopted sub nom. Ward v. Daniel Eng., 2017 WL 3535057 (D.S.C. Aug. 17, 2017); Newell v. Roy Cooper Governor's COVID-19 Task Force, No. 5:20-ct-3378-M, 2022 WL 450983, at *3 (E.D. N.C. Feb. 14, 2022) (explaining that ABC News is not a person amenable to suit under § 1983).
Nonetheless, even if Plaintiff named a proper defendant under § 1983, the undersigned finds that his allegations regarding Officer Holmes' purported “failure to act” and the conditions of confinement at the detention center still fail to state a claim to relief. With respect to the former allegations, it is well-established that “the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect ‘the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each other.'” See Turner v. Thomas, 930 F.3d 640, 645 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989)). In other words, the “State's failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.” See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195 (explaining that the State is not required to provide its citizens with particular protective services). Accordingly, Officer Holmes' alleged failure to provide Plaintiff with adequate protection from the Gangster Disciples Gang does not reach the level of a constitutional violation.
With respect to Plaintiff's allegations regarding the food service at Hill-Finklea Detention Center, a detainee must prove two elements to demonstrate unconstitutional conditions of confinement: (1) that objectively the deprivation of a basic human need was sufficiently serious, and (2) that subjectively the prison officials acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (referencing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-98 (1991)). To satisfy the objective prong, the plaintiff must demonstrate “a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions,” Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1381 (4th Cir. 1993), or demonstrate a substantial risk of such serious harm resulting from the prisoner's unwilling exposure to the challenged conditions,” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-35 (1993). To satisfy the subjective prong, the plaintiff must show “deliberate indifference” by prison officials. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. “[D]eliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence . . . [but] is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id. at 835.
In the instant case, Plaintiff claims that despite informing staff at Hill-Finklea Detention Center that he suffered from high blood pressure, cardiovascular disease, and diabetes, they continued to serve him “high sodium foods, carbohydrates, and starches.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) As noted above, however, Plaintiff attempts to draw the unsubstantiated conclusion that these foods exacerbated his medical conditions based on vague-and seemingly unrelated-symptoms, including “inflammation” of his testicles, legs, and ankles, and speculative long term effects, such as infertility. (Id.) Because these conclusory, somewhat nonsensical allegations fail to provide any meaningful insight into the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff's purported diet at the Hill-Finklea Detention Center, the Complaint does not demonstrate that the food being consumed by Plaintiff was so inadequate as to “present an immediate danger to [his] health and wellbeing.” French v. Owen, 777 F.2d 1250, 1255 (7th Cir. 1985); see also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (noting that federal courts lack the power to entertain claims that are “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit”); Holloway v. Pagan River Dockside Seafood, Inc., 669 F.3d 448, 452-53 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a complaint raising claims “so insubstantial, implausible . . . or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The undersigned therefore finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege a plausible federal claim based on his conditions of confinement and, consequently, cannot invoke federal question jurisdiction here.
To be sure, Plaintiff's claim is undermined by the detention center supply sheet he attached to the Complaint, which shows that he ordered numerous foods that are inconsistent with his alleged dietary restrictions. (See Dkt. No. 11, indicating that Plaintiff placed orders for lemon creme cookies, vanilla wafers, apple fried pie, jalapeno pretzel pieces, and Doritos nacho cheese chips, among other items.)
Turning to the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), the plaintiff must demonstrate complete diversity of parties and an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000. As the undersigned previously explained to Plaintiff, complete diversity of parties means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same state as any party on the other side. (Dkt. No. 5 at 3.) See also Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-74 (1978). There “is no diversity of citizenship in a suit which, although nominally against state agencies and officers, is in reality a suit against a state.” See King v. All Approved Autoworks, No. 2:21-cv-4005-DCN-MGB, 2022 WL 17668126, at *5 (D.S.C. Oct. 27, 2022) (referencing Wilson v. Baltimore City State's Attorney's Off., No. 8:16-cv-1269-TDC, 2017 WL 2166373, at *2 (D. Md. May 16, 2017)); see also Comm'r of Lab. of N. Carolina v. Dillard's, Inc., 83 F.Supp.2d 622, 626 (M.D. N.C. 2000) (agreeing that a State is not considered a citizen for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, nor is a State agency when acting as an alter ego of the State). Accordingly, the Berkeley County Sheriff's Department-as an arm of the State of South Carolina -precludes Plaintiff from asserting diversity jurisdiction under § 1332(a).
A county sheriff's department in South Carolina operates as a state agency and an “arm of the state.” Carter v. U.S. Dist. Ct., Charleston, No. 2:12-cv-1377-CMC-PJG, 2012 WL 3150608, at *3 (D.S.C. July 13, 2012), adopted, 2012 WL 3150597 (D.S.C. Aug. 2, 2012); see also Bey v. S.C. Berkeley 9th Jud. Ct., No. 2:17-cv-3248-RMG-MGB, 2018 WL 1135382, at *6 (D.S.C. Feb. 7, 2018) (referencing S.C. Code Ann. § 23-13-550 (2008) and S.C. Code Ann. § 23-13-10 (2012)).
The undersigned notes, however, that even if the Berkeley County Sheriff's Department was considered a “citizen” for purposes of § 1983, Plaintiff is also a citizen of South Carolina-meaning there is no diversity of citizenship.
Without original jurisdiction over a civil action, a federal court generally cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any related state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (stating that the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (stating that “if the federal claims are dismissed . . ., the state claims should be dismissed as well”); see also Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Constitution does not contemplate the federal judiciary deciding issues of state law among non-diverse litigants.”). Given that Plaintiff has not alleged a valid federal cause of action or complete diversity of parties, the undersigned finds that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action and, thus, cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims, which are all that remain here.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's action is subject to summary dismissal for failure to comply with an order of this Court pursuant to Rule 41(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., failure to state a federal claim upon which relief may be granted, and lack of jurisdiction. The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that this action be DISMISSED without prejudice and without further leave to amend or bring this case into proper form, as Plaintiff has already had an opportunity to do so. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 798 (4th Cir. 2022); see also Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties' attention is directed to an important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 835 Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).