Opinion
03-16-2016
Joseph Edward BRADY, et al., appellants, v. Albert A. GAUDELLI, respondent.
Joseph Edward Brady, P.C., Howard Beach, N.Y. (Joseph Edward Brady pro se of counsel), appellant pro se and for appellant Joseph Edward Brady. Thomas A. Illmensee, Garden City, N.Y., for respondent.
Joseph Edward Brady, P.C., Howard Beach, N.Y. (Joseph Edward Brady pro se of counsel), appellant pro se and for appellant Joseph Edward Brady.
Thomas A. Illmensee, Garden City, N.Y., for respondent.
JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, J.P., SANDRA L. SGROI, SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, and JOSEPH J. MALTESE, JJ.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for defamation, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Pineda–Kirwan, J.), dated October 24, 2014, which granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7).
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
In determining a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) for failure to state a cause of action, a court must accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the factual allegations fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511 ; East Hampton Union Free School Dist. v. Sandpebble Bldrs., Inc., 66 A.D.3d 122, 125, 884 N.Y.S.2d 94, affd. 16 N.Y.3d 775, 919 N.Y.S.2d 496, 944 N.E.2d 1135 ; Salvatore v. Kumar, 45 A.D.3d 560, 562–563, 845 N.Y.S.2d 384 ). "To properly state a cause of action [for] defamation, a plaintiff must allege that, without privilege or authorization, and with fault as judged, at minimum, by a negligence standard, the defendant published to a third party a false statement" (El Jamal v. Weil, 116 A.D.3d 732, 733, 986 N.Y.S.2d 146 ; see Liberman v. Gelstein, 80 N.Y.2d 429, 435, 590 N.Y.S.2d 857, 605 N.E.2d 344 ; Baker v. Inamdar, 99 A.D.3d 742, 744, 952 N.Y.S.2d 208 ; Salvatore v. Kumar, 45 A.D.3d at 562, 845 N.Y.S.2d 384 ).
An otherwise defamatory statement may be "privileged" and thus not actionable (Park Knoll Assoc. v. Schmidt, 59 N.Y.2d 205, 208–209, 464 N.Y.S.2d 424, 451 N.E.2d 182 ). Insofar as is relevant herein, an absolute privilege is accorded statements made at all stages of a judicial proceeding in communications among the parties, witnesses, counsel, and the court, provided that the statements may be considered in some way "pertinent" to the issue in the proceeding (Martirano v. Frost, 25 N.Y.2d 505, 507–508, 307 N.Y.S.2d 425, 255 N.E.2d 693 ; see Rabiea v. Stein, 69 A.D.3d 700, 700, 893 N.Y.S.2d 224 ; Fabrizio v. Spencer, 248 A.D.2d 351, 351, 669 N.Y.S.2d 848 ; Dachowitz v. Kranis, 61 A.D.2d 783, 783, 401 N.Y.S.2d 844 ). "The test of pertinency [to the litigation] is extremely liberal so as to ‘embrace [ ] anything that may possibly or plausibly be relevant or pertinent’ " (Black v. Green Harbour Homeowners' Assn., Inc., 19 A.D.3d 962, 963, 798 N.Y.S.2d 753, quoting Grasso v. Mathew, 164 A.D.2d 476, 479, 564 N.Y.S.2d 576 ). This privilege applies to all statements made in or out of court and regardless of the motive for which they were made (see Park Knoll Assocs. v. Schmidt, 59 N.Y.2d at 209, 464 N.Y.S.2d 424, 451 N.E.2d 182 ; Rabiea v. Stein, 69 A.D.3d at 700, 893 N.Y.S.2d 224 ; Rufeh v. Schwartz, 50 A.D.3d 1002, 1004, 858 N.Y.S.2d 194 ).
Here, the complaint alleges that the defendant, who was counsel for the executor in a probate proceeding, made allegedly defamatory statements in an affirmation in support of a motion in that proceeding to compel a continued examination pursuant to Surrogate's Court Procedure Act § 1404. The statements concerned the very subject of the probate proceeding, the contested last Will and Testament of the decedent. Therefore, the subject statements were absolutely privileged as a matter of law and cannot be the basis for a defamation action (see Sexter & Warmflash, P.C. v. Margrabe, 38 A.D.3d 163, 174, 828 N.Y.S.2d 315 ).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211[a][7] ).