Opinion
J-A25006-19 No. 500 MDA 2019
12-24-2019
RANDY ALLEN BRADY Appellant v. LISA MARIE BRADY Appellee
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered March 4, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Civil Division at No: 2016-FC-2068-15 BEFORE: STABILE, J., MCLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:
Appellant, Randy Allen Brady ("Husband"), appeals from the March 4, 2019 order entered by the Court of Common Pleas of York County. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
The factual and procedural background was set forth by the trial court as follows.
Husband married Lisa Marie Brady ("Wife") on August 15, 1981, and separated on August 30, 2016. A Divorce Decree was entered on September 28, 2018. The economic resolution in this matter was reached in a Report and Recommendation of the Divorce Master ("Report") on August 20, 2018. At that time, no exceptions were filed to the Report, nor was an appeal pursued. On September 26, 2018, the [trial court] entered an Order and Decree which adopted the Report as a final order of the [trial court] ("Final Order").
The Report dealt with many of the issues related to the separation of the parties. Relevant to the current appeal, however, is the issue related to a loan given by Husband's parents in 2008, which was alleged to be for approximately $98,000. Husband was
seeking a credit for the loan or that the balance be considered in the overall distribution as a deduction of the estate. Wife had argued to the Divorce Master that Husband should not be given a credit for his payments towards the loan as he hadn't [paid] anything outside of interest payments and "there is no reason to believe that this debt will be collectable." The Divorce Master specifically considered the loan as solely Husband's in determining the percentage distribution of assets. On page 12 of the Report, the Divorce Master wrote:
"The Master notes that Husband will likely continue to make interest payments on the debt from his father. Whether or not this debt ever gets repaid is unknown, but if anyone is going to be 'on the hook' for this debt, it will be Husband. Husband will likely be in a better position financially in the future, but Wife has already received a significant amount of liquid assets which she can use to bolster her economic situation. This factor slightly favors Husband."
The Divorce Master then proceeded to recommend a 52/48 division of marital assets in favor of Wife. An even more favorable division for Wife would have been made had the Divorce Master not considered that Husband was solely responsible for this loan to his parents.
Initially, this matter came before the [trial court] as a Petition for Special Relief filed on February 19, 2019. In Wife's petition, she alleged that Husband and Husband's parents were colluding to undermine the specific terms of the Final Order, as Husband's parents filed a separate lawsuit against Wife for debt collection on the $98,000 loan. Husband and Husband's parents are all represented by the same counsel. As a result of the petition, Wife was looking for an order that made Husband solely liable for the loan to his parents, indemnified Wife from any claim related to that amount, and held Husband responsible for attorney fees to this action.
The matter proceeded to be heard in Motions Court on February 27, 2019. At that time, the [trial court] ruled that the Divorce Master had already assigned the debt in the Report on page 12 when the Divorce Master stated that "Husband is on the hook for the debt." So the [trial court] ordered that Husband was responsible for "all of Wife's attorney's fees now or in the future
that she may incur to defend against any actions by his parents with regard to this debt, and he shall hold her harmless for any judgment or settlement that may be issued to his parents related to this debt."Trial Court Opinion, 5/28/19, at 1-3 (citations to the Report omitted).
The order concluding the February 27, 2019 hearing (granting Wife's petition for special relief) was docketed on March 4, 2019.
On March 4, 2019, Husband, after the motions court proceeding, filed an Answer to the petition for special relief and raised new matter. On March 6, 2019, Husband filed a motion for reconsideration of the February 27, 2019 order, which the trial court denied on March 13, 2019, after a hearing. This appeal followed.
In new matter, Husband stated that his parents were not parties to the divorce action.
On appeal, Appellant raises four issues, all related to the loan from Husband's parents and addressed by the Divorce Master and the trial court. As explained below, they are waived.
The issues are:
I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err when it did not allow any testimony or presentation of evidence on Appellee's petition for special relief?Appellant's Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err when it assigned attorney's fees to Appellant without the legal authority to do so?
III. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err in assigning unsecured debt to Appellant when the Divorce Master refused to assign the debt to either party and stated that it was unsecured debt?
IV. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err when it ruled on the Appellee's petition for special relief deciding res judicata applies when [Husband's parents] were not parties to the divorce action?
Appellant did not file exceptions to the Report. "[F]ailure to file timely exceptions [ ] result[s] in a waiver of [appellate] claims of error in our [C]ourt." Sipowicz v. Sipowicz , 517 A.2d 960, 963 (Pa. Super. 1986); see also Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-2(b). Moreover, Appellant did not appeal the Final Order entered September 26, 2018. Finally, Appellant did not raise any issues, let alone any of those currently on appeal, at the February 27, 2019 hearing. As noted above, the hearing was held to address Wife's petition for special relief. While the hearing was brief, there is no indication that Appellant asked the trial court to address any issue or for the opportunity to answer the petition. Appellant did nothing. In sum, the issues are raised for the first time on appeal. As such, they are waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
It is undisputed that the September 26, 2018 order is final, as defined in Pa.R.A.P. 341, see Appellant's Brief at 1. Similarly, it is well-stablished that, in order to preserve the right to appeal a final order of the trial court, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the entry of that order, see Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Appellant failed to do so.
Even if we were to conclude that the issues are not waived, we would have found the issues without merit for the reasons provided by the trial court in its May 28, 2019 opinion.
A trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an award of equitable distribution. See Dalrymple v. Kilishek , 920 A.2d 1275, 1280 (Pa. Super. 2007). Specifically,
Our standard of review when assessing the propriety of an order effectuating the equitable distribution of marital property is whether the trial court abused its discretion by a misapplication of the law or failure to follow proper legal procedure. We do not lightly find an abuse of discretion, which requires a showing of clear and convincing evidence. This Court will not find an "abuse of discretion" unless the law has been "overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised" was "manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence in the certified record."Balicki v. Balicki , (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Appellant first argues that the trial court erred for not allowing the introduction of evidence on Wife's special petition. The trial court noted, and we agree, that Appellant did not raise any new matter at the February 27, 2019 hearing necessitating the introduction of additional evidence, and that the only matter contested pertained to the loan, which it had been disposed of in a final order. We add that Appellant's allegation that the trial court did not allow any testimony from either party and did not allow the presentation of any evidence is unsupported in the record. Indeed the record does not show any request from Husband, let alone one that was denied by the trial court. Notably, Appellant provided no citation to the record supporting his unsubstantiated allegations. See Husband's Brief at 10.
Next, Appellant alleges that awarding Wife attorney's fees in connection with the suit brought by Husband's parents was an error because there was no factual finding or legal support. The trial court explained that the award was appropriate because the loan was assigned to Husband, Husband was also responsible for attorney fees Wife incurred while defending from suit from Husband's parents. We agree with the trial court's analysis and conclusions. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/28/19, at 6.
Next, Appellant claims the trial court erred in assigning an unsecured debt to Appellant when the Divorce Master refused to do so. As noted by the trial court, the allegation is devoid of any merit. In fact, the Divorce Master clearly assigned the debt to Appellant. Id. (quoting page 12 of the Report). The claim is therefore without merit.
Finally, Appellant claims that the trial court erred in finding that the doctrine of res judicata applied to Husband's parents' suit. The trial court noted that it would allow Husband's parents to proceed against Husband for the loan. It merely barred any action against Wife with regards to the loan because it was not assigned to her. Id. We discern no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court's analysis and conclusions.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 12/24/2019
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