Prior to its amendment in 1995, SDCL 62-1-1(7) provided the definition for "injury" or "personal injury" as "only injury arising out of and in the course of the employment, and shall not include a disease in any form except as it shall result from the injury." Brady Memorial Home v. Hantke, 1999 SD 77, ¶ 11, 597 N.W.2d 677, 680 n. 7. In 1995, the legislature twice amended the workers' compensation law to add the relevant language of "major contributing cause."
We have further said "South Dakota law requires [Wise] to establish by medical evidence that the `employment or employment conditions are a major contributing cause of the condition complained of.' `A possibility is insufficient and a probability is necessary.'" Brady Memorial Home v. Hantke, 1999 SD 77, ¶ 11, 597 N.W.2d 677, 680 (internal citation and emphasis omitted) (citing Maroney v. Aman, 1997 SD 73, H9, 565 N.W.2d 70, 73 (citation omitted)). [¶ 22.] Employer argues that Wise failed to meet his burden of proof because Dr. Hoversten's opinion did not use the exact words of the statutes.
We have often stated that "`[u]nder SDCL 1-26-37, when the issue is a question of fact, then the clearly erroneous standard is applied to the agency's findings; however, when the issue is a question of law, the actions of the agency are fully reviewable.'" Brady Mem'l Home v. Hantke, 1999 SD 77, ¶ 8, 597 N.W.2d 677, 679-80 (quoting Wagaman v. Sioux Falls Constr., 1998 SD 27, ¶ 12, 576 N.W.2d 237, 240 (citations omitted)). Under our review, "we are required to give `great weight to the findings and inferences made by Department on factual questions.'" Id. (citations omitted).
Our law requires a claimant to establish that his injury arose out of his employment by showing a causal connection between his employment and the injury sustained. Brady Memorial Home v. Hantke, 1999 SD 77, ¶ 11, 597 N.W.2d 677, 680 (citing Maroney v. Aman, 1997 SD 73, ¶ 9, 565 N.W.2d 70, 73). Although a claimant must establish this causal connection, the "employment need not be the direct or proximate cause of injury. . . ." Canal Ins. Co. v. Abraham, 1999 SD 90, ¶ 12, 598 N.W.2d 512, 516 (citing Bergren v. S.E. Gustafson Constr. Co., 75 S.D. 497, 68 N.W.2d 477 (1955); Anderson v. Hotel Cataract, 70 S.D. 376, 17 N.W.2d 913 (1945)).
We have emphasized, “[a] claimant need not prove his work-related injury is a major contributing cause of his condition to a degree of absolute certainty.” Id. ¶ 12 (citing Brady Mem'l Home v. Hantke, 1999 S.D. 77, ¶ 16, 597 N.W.2d 677, 681). But the claimant must establish causation “to a reasonable degree of medical probability, not just possibility.”
Brown v. Douglas Sch. Dist., 2002 SD 92, ¶ 23, 650 N.W.2d 264, 271. [¶ 12.] A claimant need not prove his work-related injury is a major contributing cause of his condition to a degree of absolute certainty. Brady Mem'l Home v. Hantke, 1999 SD 77, ¶ 16, 597 N.W.2d 677, 681 (citations omitted). Causation must be established to a reasonable degree of medical probability, not just possibility.
The evidence necessary to support an award must not be speculative, but rather must be "precise and well supported." Byrum v. Dakota Wellness Foundation, 2002 SD 141, ¶ 16, 654 N.W.2d 215, 219; Brady Memorial Home v. Hantke, 1999 SD 77, ¶ 16, 597 N.W.2d 677, 681. SDCL 62-1-1(7) sets forth the showing necessary to establish a compensable work injury and provides in pertinent part:
Further, an award cannot rest upon speculative medical evidence. Brady Memorial Home v. Hantke, 1999 SD 77, ¶ 16, 597 N.W.2d 677 [¶ 17.] Dr. Cho's testimony rests on sweeping conclusions without the benefit of Byrum's previous medical records, which document some thirty chiropractic visits for back pain between 1994 and 1995.
We have often stated that "`[u]nder SDCL 1-26-37, when the issue is a question of fact, then the clearly erroneous standard is applied to the agency's findings; however, when the issue is a question of law, the actions of the agency are fully reviewable.'" Brady Mem'l Home v. Hantke, 1999 SD 77, ¶ 8, 597 N.W.2d 677, 679-80 (quoting Wagaman v. Sioux Falls Constr., 1998 SD 27, ¶ 12, 576 N.W.2d 237, 240 (citing Loewen v. Hyman Freightways, Inc., 1997 SD 2, ¶ 6, 557 N.W.2d 764, 766 (citations omitted))). Under our review, "we are required to give `great weight to the findings and inferences made by Department on factual questions.'" Id. (quoting Wagaman, 1998 SD 27, ¶ 12, 576 N.W.2d at 240 (citing Sopko v. C R Transfer Co., Inc., 1998 SD 8, ¶ 6, 575 N.W.2d 225, 228 (citations omitted))).