Opinion
No. 116 C.D. 2014
09-10-2014
Christopher Bradley, Petitioner v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Crucible Compaction Metals), Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY PRESIDENT JUDGE PELLEGRINI
Christopher Bradley (Claimant) petitions for review of the order of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Board) denying Claimant's petition for rehearing and affirming the order of a Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) that denied Claimant's claim petition for compensation benefits and his penalty petition under the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act (Act). We affirm.
Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§1-1041.4; 2501-2708.
In July 2009, Claimant filed a claim petition alleging that he was diagnosed with nodular sclerosis-type Hodgkin's lymphoma in August 2006 due to his exposure to hazardous carcinogenic substances while working as a maintenance man for Crucible Compaction Metals (Employer). Claimant sought full disability benefits from August 2006 to March 2007 and from May 2008 onward, as well as partial benefits from March 2007 to May 2008, medical benefits, counsel fees and disfigurement benefits due to scarring on his neck. Claimant later amended his claim petition to allege that he contracted lymphoma as a result of continual occupational exposure to Trichloroethylene (TCE), a halogenated hydrocarbon, thereby bringing his claim under the occupational disease provisions of Section 108(c) of the Act. In April 2011, Claimant filed a penalty petition alleging that Employer violated its statutory duties by failing to conduct an industrial hygiene program and failing to investigate his claim. Employer filed an answer to the claim petition denying the averments.
In a proceeding on a claim petition for compensation benefits, the claimant bears the burden of proving that he was injured in the course of employment and that he suffered a disability as a result of the injury. Waronsky v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Mellon Bank), 958 A.2d 1118, 1123 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008), appeal denied, 968 A.2d 1281 (Pa. 2009). Section 301(c)(2) of the Act defines the term "injury in the course of employment" to include an "occupational disease as defined in section 108 of [the Act]." 77 P.S. § 411(2). In turn, Section 108(c), added by Act of October 17, 1972, P.L. 930, as amended, 77 P.S. §27.1(c), states, in pertinent part, that "[t]he term 'occupational disease,' as used in this act, shall mean only the following diseases. ... Poisoning by ... halogenated hydro-carbons ... or any preparations containing these chemicals or any of them, in any occupation involving direct contact with, handling thereof, or exposure thereto." See also Section 301(e) of the Act, 77 P.S. §413 ("If it be shown that the employe, at or immediately before the date of disability, was employed in any occupation or industry in which the occupational disease is a hazard, it shall be presumed that the employe's occupational disease arose out of and in the course of his employment, but this presumption shall not be conclusive.").
See Section 435(d)(i) of the Act, added by the Act of February 8, 1972, P.L. 25, as amended, 77 P.S. §991(d)(i) ("The department, the board, or any court which may hear any proceedings brought under this act shall have the power to impose penalties as provided herein for violation of the provision of this act or such rules and regulations or rules of procedure.... Employers and insurers may be penalized a sum not exceeding ten per centum of the amount awarded and interest accrued and payable: Provided, however, That such penalty may be increased to fifty percentum in cases of unreasonable or excessive delays. Such penalty shall be payable to the same persons to whom the compensation is payable.").
Before the WCJ, Claimant testified that Employer's business consisted of making a mold and pouring powdered metals into the mold and then putting the mold into an autoclave. Claimant stated that he started working in Employer's autoclave department in February 1998 and moved to the maintenance department in September 2003. He testified that he worked all three shifts and throughout Employer's plant. He stated that he used cans of "Spray On" in the maintenance department to degrease and clean parts and that it was also used for leak detection. Claimant testified that on virtually every shift, he either used it to clean parts or was present when it was used to detect leaks, and that he inhaled it and coughed and was nauseated and that his hands were dry and scaly when he used it. He identified that a can of "Spray On" that he used at work indicated that its contents included TCE.
Claimant testified that an August 2006 biopsy confirmed that he had lymphoma and he left work for treatment. He stated that he told his foreman at that time that he believed something in the plant caused his cancer. He testified that he treated with Dr. Rahman and remained out of work while he underwent chemotherapy and that he received sickness and accident benefits that Employer funded from August 2006 to March 2007. Claimant stated that he was released to return to work in March 2007, with the restrictions of daylight shift only and that he avoid high dose oxygen and noxious inhaled chemicals. He testified that he worked daylight shift only from March 2007 until May 2008. He stated that in June 2008, Employer offered him jobs in the autoclave and SA departments but the jobs required him to work swing shifts and he hadn't been cleared to work those shifts. Claimant testified that in July 2008, Employer sent him a letter indicating that he had voluntarily quit and a letter in September 2008 stating that he had resigned. In September 2008, Dr. Rahman lifted his shift restrictions.
Claimant stated that he did not resign and that he currently feels able to do shift work and is able to return to work. He testified that he is working a full-time job for Hukill Contracting and earns $11.00 per hour and has no doctor's restrictions on his ability to work this job. He stated that he is aware that Employer filed for bankruptcy and was bought out by ATI Powder Metals.
Claimant presented the deposition testimony of Frederick Fochtman, Ph. D. (Dr. Fochtman), who has a doctorate in pharmaceutical chemistry and is a Diplomat of the American Board of Forensic Toxicology and the American Board of Toxicology. Dr. Fochtman testified that he is not licensed to practice medicine and he does not provide diagnosis or treatment of patients with cancer and that he prepared a report regarding Claimant's Hodgkin's lymphoma. He stated that he reviewed Claimant's testimony that identified exposures to TCE through "Spray On" and Hexavalent Chromium (Chrome VI) and air monitoring analyses that identified Chromium in the air at Employer's plant at twice the threshold limit value, but that Chromium is not the same as Chrome VI and the report does not indicate what level of either was present. He opined that Claimant's exposure at work caused his Hodgkin's lymphoma. He noted that there are reports which connect Chrome VI exposure to lymphoma, citing the Bick article which shows a causal relationship between exposure to Chrome VI to the development of Hodgkin's lymphoma. Dr. Fochtman stated that peer-reviewed epidemiology studies shows a causal relationship between Chrome VI exposure and lymphoma to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, and he opined that there is a greater incident of lymphoma among Chrome VI exposed persons than in the general public. Dr. Fochtman also testified that the literature reveals that exposure to TCE is related to a variety of cancers, including Hodgkin's lymphoma, and that there are studies linking exposure to TCE to Hodgkin's lymphoma. He opined that Claimant's exposure to Chrome VI in combination with TCE caused Claimant's Hodgkin's lymphoma. He opined that they worked together with an additive effect, but he believes that neither substance individually caused Claimant's Hodgkin's lymphoma on its own. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 525a-527a, 569a-572a). Dr. Fochtman specifically testified that exposure to TCE alone did not cause Claimant's Hodgkin's lymphoma.
Section 108(n) of the Act also states:
The term "occupational disease," as used in this act, shall mean only the following diseases.77 P.S. §27.1(n).
* * *
(n) All other diseases (1) to which the claimant is exposed by reason of his employment, and (2) which are causally related to the industry or occupation, and (3) the incidence of which is substantially greater in that industry or occupation than in the general population....
Claimant also submitted the June 2008 and December 2010 reports of David Wilson, M.D. (Dr. Wilson), stating that Claimant was two years out from his diagnosis of Hodgkin's disease and mediastinal lymph nodes, that he responded well to chemotherapy, and that he appears to be in remission. Dr. Wilson stated that he was unaware of any sort of relationship between Hodgkin's disease and environmental or occupational exposure, but noted that there have been reported associations between pesticides and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. Dr. Wilson stated that any conclusion of cause and effect between Claimant's workplace exposures and his development of Hodgkin's disease would be speculative and that he was unaware of any relationship between this disease and TCE and Chrome VI. He stated that while non-Hodgkin's lymphomas have been reported in individuals similarly exposed, it stands to reason that there would be an increased risk of Hodgkin's disease as well, but that he personally could not swear to it.
Claimant also presented the testimony of Ronald Swedish (Swedish), who worked with him between 2002 and 2008 in Employer's maintenance department. Swedish corroborated Claimant's testimony that "Spray On" was used in that department on motors and to clean pumps and bearings and in the super alloy department. He also corroborated Claimant's testimony that he coughed and was nauseated when he inhaled it. He stated that he did not know what hexavalent chromium is.
Claimant also presented the testimony of Christine Knezevich, a certified industrial hygienist and Employer's Health and Safety Director. She stated that she did not work with Claimant and did not recall the use of "Spray On" or TCE at the plant. She testified that there were no job safety analyses for the maintenance department and that the analyses that she did have did not mention "Spray On." She stated that she understood that TCE is a solvent and that it can be absorbed by the skin and can cause degreaser's flush, which is a skin rash. She testified that she did not recall TCE being classified as a human carcinogen by OSHA.
Employer presented the deposition testimony of Allan J. Lippman, M.D. (Dr. Lippman), who is certified in internal medicine and oncology and has been in practice 35 years and whose entire practice deals with oncology. Dr. Lippman stated that Claimant has Hodgkin's lymphoma, a malignant disorder affecting the body's immune system that is characterized by the unique appearance of the malignant Reed-Sternberg cell. He testified that risk factors for Hodgkin's lymphoma include environmental or genetic factors and is associated with patients with immune disorders, but that the ultimate cause of Hodgkin's lymphoma is not known and that it is not possible to determine the cause in every case. He opined that based on his review of the literature, he did not find any relationship between exposure to TCE and the development of Hodgkin's lymphoma, and that TCE has not been shown to be a human carcinogen or to have any relation whatsoever to the development of Hodgkin's lymphoma. (R.R. at 820a-823a). He stated that Chrome VI has not been shown to have any relationship to the development of Hodgkin's lymphoma and while there may be a connection between Chrome VI and certain types of cancer, it is not generally accepted in the medical community that Chrome VI causes Hodgkin's lymphoma. (Id. at 823a-826a). Dr. Lippman opined, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that Chrome VI and TCE, acting either alone or in concert, were not substantial contributing factors to Claimant's development of Hodgkin's lymphoma. (Id. at 829a-830a).
Employer also submitted the deposition testimony of Rocco Longo, its Director of Production, who stated that while "Spray On" is used in the super alloy department to check for leaks, Claimant would only be called in after the leak was found and would not be present when the leak checking was performed. He testified that "Spray On" was not used in the maintenance department and that it was not kept in that department. He stated that Safety-Kleen was used in that department for cleaning and degreasing and that Claimant obtained the can of "Spray On" from Ed Moss, a powder processor and the unit chair for the local union.
In her decision, the WCJ found as fact that even if Claimant was able to factually establish workplace exposure to both TCE and Chrome VI, Dr. Fochtman's testimony is insufficient to establish a causal connection between that exposure and his development of Hodgkin's lymphoma because it was based solely on the Bick article and that article does not support his opinion. The WCJ noted that the Chrome VI testing was below the threshold level value set forth in the article; that Dr. Fochtman did not identify what the Bick article considered "many years;" and that the article admitted that the development of Hodgkin's lymphoma in this small isolated population that was exposed to Chrome VI over a long period of time could have been a chance occurrence.
The WCJ also found that Dr. Fochtman's opinion that Claimant's lymphoma was caused in part by his exposure to TCE is also not credible or persuasive. The WCJ noted that while he cited articles showing a positive causal relationship between TCE exposure and lymphoma in the lung, Dr. Lippman testified that Claimant's lymphoma was not in the lung and Dr. Fochtman did not identify any articles documenting a connection between TCE exposure and Hodgkin's lymphoma. The WCJ found that while Dr. Fochtman testified that TCE alone did not cause Claimant's lymphoma, and that TCE and Chrome VI both acted in concert to cause it, he did not cite any study identifying exposure to both as a substantial contributing factor in the development of Hodgkin's lymphoma and that Dr. Lippman's testimony was credible and persuasive.
On considering the testimony of both experts, the WCJ found as fact: (1) there are no studies linking TCE exposure to the development of Hodgkin's lymphoma; (2) the Bick article is the only article linking Chrome VI exposure to the possible development of Hodgkin's lymphoma; (3) the exposure at Employer's plant is likely less than that present in Bick; (4) there are no articles linking exposure to both Chrome VI and TCE to the development of Hodgkin's lymphoma; (5) Dr. Lippman's conclusions are based on research and literature available regarding the causes of Hodgkin's lymphoma; and (6) Dr. Lippman's testimony is accepted as the most consistent and persuasive and Dr. Fochtman's testimony is rejected to the extent that it differs from Dr. Lippman's. Finally, the WCJ also found that Claimant's penalty petition was based on Employer's failure to provide exposure documents and that it should be dismissed because Employer provided the documents as required by her orders.
Based on the foregoing, the WCJ dismissed the claim petition because while Claimant met his burden and established that he was exposed to TCE and was entitled to a rebuttable presumption that the exposure caused his Hodgkin's lymphoma under Section 108(c) of the Act, Employer rebutted that presumption because both Claimant's and Employer's expert witnesses testified that the TCE exposure alone did not cause Claimant's Hodgkin's lymphoma. The WCJ also concluded that Claimant did not meet his burden of proving that exposure to both TCE and Chrome VI was a substantial contributing factor to his development of Hodgkin's lymphoma and that the penalty petition should be dismissed because Claimant did not establish a violation of the Act.
While Claimant's appeal of the WCJ's decision was pending before the Board, he filed a petition for rehearing under Section 426 of the Act for the Board to consider newly acquired causation evidence. Claimant alleged that a recent analysis of DNA sequencing from cells from his biopsied mediastinal lymph node determined that mutations in the malignant cells were caused by DNA adducts from TCE metabolism. Claimant asserted that this proves that his condition was caused by his TCE exposure and requires remand. Regarding its timing, Claimant only stated that this evidence was not in his possession at the time of the WCJ's hearings and that the results were not readily ascertained and could not have been discovered through reasonable diligence.
Added by Act of June 26, 1919, P.L. 642, as amended, 77 P.S. §871. Section 426 states, in pertinent part, that "[t]he board, upon petition of any party and upon cause shown, may grant a rehearing of any petition upon which the board has made an award or disallowance of compensation ... or upon which the board has sustained or reversed any action of a [WCJ]...."
Ultimately, the Board issued an Opinion affirming the WCJ's decision denying Claimant's claim and penalty petitions. The Board found that Claimant's penalty petition was without merit because Claimant's evidentiary challenge went to the issue of exposure and the WCJ accepted his exposure evidence, and that penalties are only imposed if the claimant is awarded compensation and Claimant did not prevail on his underlying claim petition in this case.
The Board also noted that Claimant's penalty petition was based on the purported violation of the WCJ's interlocutory discovery orders and that those orders were not part of the certified record. While Claimant attached one of the orders as an appendix to his appellate brief, that order cannot be considered by this Court in disposing of this appeal because it is not part of the certified record. See B.K. v. Department of Public Welfare, 36 A.3d 649, 657 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) ("An appellate court is limited to considering only those facts that have been duly certified in the record on appeal. For purposes of appellate review, that which is not part of the certified record does not exist. Documents attached to a brief as an appendix or reproduced record may not be considered by an appellate court when they are not part of the certified record.") (citations omitted). See also Fotta v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (U.S. Steel/USX Corporation Maple Creek Mine), 626 A.2d 1144, 1147 n.2 (Pa. 1993) ("[T]he report is not part of the record and our review is limited to the evidence contained in the record. Humphrey v. W.C.A.B. (Super Market Service), [514 A.2d 246, 251 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986)].")
Regarding Claimant's rehearing petition, the Board treated it as a petition for remand because a request for rehearing was not appropriate before the Board disposes of an appeal. In disposing of the petition, the Board stated, in relevant part:
See Section 419 of the Act, 77 P.S. §852 ("The board may remand any case involving any question of fact arising under any appeal to a [WCJ] to hear evidence and report to the board the testimony taken before him or such testimony and findings of fact thereon as the board may order...."); Puhl v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Sharon Steel Corp.), 724 A.2d 997, 1000 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999) ("[W]e note that a petition for rehearing under section 426 of the Act is properly filed only after the WCAB has issued a decision. Because Claimant filed his petition before the WCAB ruled in this matter, Claimant's Petition for Rehearing was premature. Thus, Claimant's request to present new evidence is properly considered a Petition for Remand under section 419 of the Act.... Further, we recognize that our courts have frequently analyzed remand issues under the same standards used in section 426 rehearing cases.") (citations omitted and emphasis in original).
Claimant contends that this DNA testing of Claimant's biopsied tissues was "recent," but testified that his biopsy was done in mid-2006 and concedes that other testing was done on his biopsied tissue. He does not assert that the testing was not, or could not have been, performed by the time of the WCJ proceedings. Claimant filed his [Claim] Petition in 2009 and the last hearing was not held until June, 2011. We simply do not know when this testing was performed and Claimant offers no attempt at an explanation as to why he could not have introduced this evidence before the WCJ. Assuming it was not performed until after the record closed, Claimant does not articulate a reason why he did not have it performed at a time when the results of the test could have been offered to the WCJ to aid her in the decision-making process.
We cannot agree that this matter presents a situation where additional testing revealed something not previously ascertainable, even though it may not have been previously "ascertained," to use Claimant's word. Case law does not mandate a remand every time a losing party can point to something his counsel did not introduce as otherwise, piecemeal hearings prompted by the wisdom of hindsight would become the rule. Moreover, Claimant contended before the WCJ that TCE and Chrome VI worked in combination to cause his disease. In fact, Dr. Fochtman testified that exposure to TCE alone did not cause his condition. Claimant's assertion that his alleged recent evidence "proves that occupational exposure to [TCE] caused" his disease appears somewhat at odds with the basis of his case as presented to the WCJ, and would not, in this respect, serve to meet his burden. Further, the WCJ already decided to credit [Employer]'s expert evidence, contrary to that proffered by Claimant. Given all of the aforementioned, we see no basis to remand the matter.(Board 12/23/13 Opinion at 28-30) (citation omitted). Claimant then filed the instant appeal from the Board's Opinion and Order affirming the WCJ's decision.
In February 2014, Claimant filed another rehearing petition pursuant to Section 426 addressing the foregoing deficiencies in the initial petition that the Board denied by order dated March 6, 2014. Claimant's appeal of that order is docketed in this Court at No. 571 C.D. 2014. By orders dated April 22, 2014, and July 28, 2014, we denied Claimant's requests to consolidate that appeal for disposition with the instant cross-appeals.
Our review is limited to determining whether errors of law were made, constitutional rights were violated, and whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Ward v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia), 966 A.2d 1159, 1162 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 982 A.2d 1229 (Pa. 2009).
This Court quashed Employer's cross-appeal of the Board's order by order dated June 4, 2014.
Claimant argues that the Board erred in denying his remand petition and in affirming the WCJ's denial of his penalty petition because the after-acquired DNA evidence conclusively proves that his condition was caused by his TCE exposure requiring the award of benefits under the Act, and because Employer's failure to comply with the WCJ's interlocutory discovery orders requires remand for consideration of this dispositive evidence.
We note that Claimant failed to include a Statement of Questions Involved in his appellate briefs as required by Pa. R.A.P. 2116(a). Pa. R.A.P. 2116(a) states, in relevant part, "The statement of questions involved must state concisely the issues to be resolved, expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement will be deemed to include every subsidiary question fairly comprised therein. No question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby...." See Wirth v. Commonwealth, ___ A.3d ___ (Pa., Nos. 82 MAP 2012, 83 MAP 2012, 84 MAP 2012, 85 MAP 2012, filed June 17, 2014), slip op. at 58; Commonwealth v. Lynn, 71 A.3d 247 (Pa. 2013); Kull v. Guisse, 81 A.3d 148, 160 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013), appeal denied, 91 A.3d 163 (Pa. 2014).
However, the Board did not err in denying Claimant's remand petition. In deciding whether to grant a remand based on after-discovered evidence, the Board is not bound by the standards employed by courts in determining whether to grant a new trial based on after-discovered evidence. Cudo v. Hallstead Foundry, Inc., 539 A.2d 792, 794 (Pa. 1988). Rather, it is within the Board's broad power to grant a remand "when justice requires." Jackson v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Delphi Company), 560 A.2d 755, 757 (Pa. 1989); Cudo, 539 A.2d at 794. Remand is permitted to allow a party to present newly-discovered, non-cumulative evidence and will not be granted "to permit the party to strengthen weak proofs already presented." Paxos v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Frankford-Quaker Grocery), 631 A.2d 826, 831 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993).
The decision to grant or deny a remand is within the Board's discretion and this Court will reverse that decision only if there is an abuse of that discretion. Puhl, 724 A.2d at 1000 n.4. An abuse of discretion occurs not merely when the Board reaches a decision contrary to one that this Court would have reached; rather, an abuse of discretion occurs "when the course pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will." Payne v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Elwyn, Inc.), 928 A.2d 377, 379 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (citation omitted).
As outlined by the Board, in his petition Claimant failed to set forth whether or not the new evidence was, in fact, "newly-discovered" because he failed to allege when it was obtained and why it could not have been obtained and presented at the time of the proceedings before the WCJ. The petition also fails to demonstrate that this evidence is not being used to merely strengthen the weak proof of causation that was already presented through Dr. Fochtman's discredited expert testimony and report and to impeach the credited expert testimony and report of Dr. Lippman. Moreover, in addition to the foregoing defects, in the petition, Claimant attempts to change the theory of the case that his Hodgkin's lymphoma was caused by an interaction between Chrome VI and TCE to the theory that it was caused by TCE alone, a proposition rejected by his own expert.
The foregoing distinguishes this case from our opinion in Puhl. See id., 724 A.2d at 1002.
Finally, the Board did not err in affirming the WCJ's denial of his penalty petition because, as the Board explained, penalties are only appropriately awarded where the claimant prevails in the proceeding and Claimant's claim petition was denied in this case. See Jaskiewicz v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (James D. Morrisey, Inc.), 651 A.2d 623, 626 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994), appeal denied, 661 A.2d 875 (Pa. 1995) ("The [WCJ] concluded that the Act, as written, only allows penalties if the Claimant is awarded any compensation. We agree that the words 'of the amount awarded' indicate the legislature's intention to award penalties only when a claimant is awarded benefits....") (footnote omitted).
The assessment and amount of penalties imposed is a matter for the WCJ's discretion which this Court will not reverse absent an abuse of that discretion. North Pittsburgh Drywall Co., Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Owen), 59 A.3d 30, 43 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).
While Claimant only sought the imposition of a monetary penalty in his penalty petition, he argues on appeal that remand for the imposition of a penalty is proper based on Employer's purported violation of a WCJ discovery order that is not part of the certified record, and he cites Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure in support thereof. However, Claimant's reliance on those rules is misplaced because they do not govern workers' compensation proceedings. Ace Tire Company v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Hand), 515 A.2d 1020, 1023 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986), appeal denied, 529 A.2d 1083 (Pa. 1987); Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 423 A.2d 1125, 1127 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981). Rather, workers' compensation proceedings are governed by the Special Rules of Administrative Practice and Procedure Before Workers' Compensation Judges, and 34 Pa. Code §§131.61 to 131.70 govern the exchange of information, depositions and discovery, and 34 Pa. Code §§131.122 and 131.123 govern the disposition of Section 435(d)(i) penalty petitions based on violations of the Act or of the regulations. --------
Accordingly, the Board's order is affirmed.
/s/_________
DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 10th day of September, 2014, the order of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board at No. A11-1956 is affirmed.
/s/_________
DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge