Opinion
NO. 03-15-00318-CR
07-07-2016
Jamaal Bradley, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 331ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. D-1-DC-13-302424, HONORABLE DAVID CRAIN, JUDGE PRESIDINGMEMORANDUM OPINION
Jamaal Bradley was charged with the offense of evading arrest or detention, and the State later filed a notice of its intent to enhance the permissible punishment range and alleged in the notice that Bradley had previously been convicted of a felony offense. See Tex. Penal Code § 38.04(a) (explaining that "[a] person commits an offense if he intentionally flees from a person he knows is a peace officer or federal special investigator attempting lawfully to arrest or detain him"), (b)(2)(A) (elevating offense level to third-degree felony if "the actor uses a vehicle while the actor is in flight"); see also id. § 12.42(a) (elevating punishment range for third-degree felony to that of second-degree felony if person has previously been convicted of felony offense). After the jury found Bradley guilty of the offense during the guilt-or-innocence phase, Bradley entered a plea of true to the enhancement allegation. At the end of the punishment phase, the jury recommended that Bradley be sentenced to eleven years' imprisonment, and the district court rendered its judgment of conviction in accordance with the jury's verdicts. See id. § 12.33 (setting out punishment range for second-degree felonies). Bradley appeals the district court's judgment of conviction and argues in his brief that the district court erred by denying one of his challenges for cause during voir dire. We will affirm the district court's judgment of conviction.
GOVERNING LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A defendant may move to challenge a potential jury member on the ground that the panelist "has a bias or prejudice . . . against the defendant." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 35.16(a)(9); see also Halay v. State, No. 03-07-00327-CR, 2008 WL 5424095, at *11 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 31, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (providing that "[a] juror is biased when 'an inclination toward one side of an issue rather than to the other leads to the natural inference that [the juror] will not or did not act with impartiality'" (quoting Anderson v. State, 633 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982))). In other words, a panelist is challengeable "if he cannot impartially judge the credibility of witnesses," but "this means only that jurors must be open-minded and persuadable, with no extreme or absolute positions regarding the credibility of any witness." Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In other words, given that "'complete impartiality cannot be realized as long as human beings are called upon to be jurors,'" panelists "are not challengeable for cause simply because they would give certain classes of witnesses a slight edge in terms of credibility." Id. (quoting Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). "The test is whether a bias or prejudice would substantially impair the venire member's ability to carry out the juror's oath and judicial instructions in accordance with the law." Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). "Before venire members may be excused for cause, the law must be explained to them, and they must be asked whether they can follow that law, regardless of their personal views." Id. The party seeking to have the panelist struck does not meet his burden of establishing that the challenge is proper "until he has shown that the venire member understood the requirements of the law and could not overcome his or her prejudice well enough to follow the law." Id.
"Because the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the demeanor of a prospective juror, we review a trial court's determination of a challenge for cause only for clear abuse of discretion." Fierro v. State, 969 S.W.2d 51, 57 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.). In other words, "we reverse 'only when the trial judge's decision was so clearly wrong as to lie outside that zone within which reasonable persons might disagree.'" Id. (quoting Kemp v. State, 846 S.W.2d 289, 297 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). In addition, "[w]hen the potential juror's answers are vacillating, unclear or contradictory, particular deference is accorded to the trial court's decision." King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see Rachal v. State, 917 S.W.2d 799, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (explaining that trial court's "superior point of view is particularly important and deserving of our deference" when potential juror's statements are unclear). Furthermore, "[w]hen reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a challenge for cause, we look at the entire record to determine if there is sufficient evidence to support the court's ruling." Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Coleman v. State, No. AP-75,478, 2009 WL 4696064, at *11 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 9, 2009).; see Fierro, 969 S.W.2d at 58 (stating that when "reviewing the trial court's exercise of its discretion in a particular case, we review the totality of the relevant voir dire examination").
DISCUSSION
In his sole issue on appeal, Bradley contends that the district "court erred by denying a challenge for cause on Panelist #13 . . . who indicated he would afford a higher degree of credibility to witnesses who were law enforcement officers, at the outset of their testimony" because "the panelist provided no reassurance that he could set this bias aside." Stated differently, Bradley contends that the panelist's "remarks left grave doubt as to whether he would be able to gauge the credibility and truthfulness of an officer in the same manner as other witnesses."
During voir dire, Bradley's attorney discussed potential biases that the panelists might have, including any potential bias in favor of law-enforcement officials, and then asked, "Is there anyone who would say I would start a law enforcement officer at a higher level than any other type of witness at the outset before you hear anything about the person? Anyone?" In response, the panelist at issue answered, "Yes, sir." Shortly thereafter, the panelist agreed with the statement that he would "start" a law-enforcement officer "at a higher level" before the officer testified.
Later, when the panelist was brought before the district court for additional questioning, the following exchange occurred:
[Bradley's attorney]: When we visited about the issue of credibility of witnesses before they take the witness stand, I talked about law enforcement and you told me that you would also always start law enforcement off at a higher level than other witnesses in terms of -- where you would start them off in terms of credibility; is that correct?
[Panelist]: That's correct.
[Bradley's attorney]: That's just for any law enforcement officer at the outset?
[Panelist]: I would say so, yes, sir.
[Bradley's attorney]: Would you agree with me that that sort of higher level of respect and credibility that you have at the outset would continue, throughout the testimony you would sort of weigh on the side of law enforcement if it was a close call?
[Panelist]: I can't say.
[Bradley's attorney]: Okay.
[Panelist]: I mean, I come in, as I said, just because of my experiences, my child, I've got a wife that's a school teacher and when I see law enforcement I credit them and I respect them going in.
[Bradley's attorney]: Uh-huh.
[Panelist]: I would like to think that I'm open, and if there is something that they have done that is inconsistent or incorrect, that's a separate individual case.
[Bradley's attorney]: Would you agree with me if you were looking -- if you had a law enforcement witness versus a non-law enforcement witness that I would have a higher burden of disproving what they're saying because of their uniform and --
[Panelist]: I would like to think not, but possibly so.
[Bradley's attorney]: Okay.
[Panelist]: I mean, I can't say.
After Bradley's attorney finished his questioning, the State questioned the panelist as follows:
[State]: Are you telling the Court that your respect for law enforcement and the fact that you've had some direct contact with them is the reason you would give them more credibility at the outset?
[Panelist]: I would say that's a fair assessment.
[State]: Would you be able to tell this Court that you can set this aside and not judge their credibility based on the fact that they have a badge and a gun and listen to what they had to say and determine the credibility based on that?
[Panelist]: I would like to think so but I'm not sure. I'm not in your shoe -- or your shoes that I would agree with my assessment.
[State]: Sure. And I'm going to go back to kind of what Mr. Woods was saying, you know, about a "yes" or "no." I mean, it's -- I kind of got to pin you down on the issue of whether or not you feel like you would give more credibility just based on the fact that they're an officer and not be able to set aside that fact.
[Panelist]: I think I could set it aside.
Once the panelist left the court room, the district court overruled Bradley's request to strike the panelist and explained that it believed that the panelist had "rehabilitated himself."
In light of the preceding, Bradley correctly points out on appeal that the panelist repeatedly stated that he would initially place the credibility of a law-enforcement officer at a higher level than other witnesses. However, the panelist did not assert an extreme or absolute position regarding the credibility of law-enforcement officers; on the contrary, the panelist explained that he thought he was "open" to considering whether any particular witness was credible and that although he credits and respects law-enforcement officers, he thought that he could set aside that leaning and evaluate the credibility of the law-enforcement witnesses based on what they say and not on their profession. Cf. Ladd, 3 S.W.3d at 559-60 (concluding, when record showed that panelist "would not automatically believe policemen or doctors," that panelist "was not challengeable for cause because he would tend to believe policemen and doctors slightly more than others" if they were testifying "about matters within their expertise"); Harris v. State, 784 S.W.2d 5, 21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (determining that potential juror who would give more weight to police officer's testimony was qualified to serve when he also explained that he could be fair and impartial, would not automatically believe law-enforcement officer over lay witness, and agreed that he could serve as juror and follow law given to him); see also Green v. State, No. 14-08-00075-CR, 2009 WL 136917, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 20, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (overruling issue asserting that trial court erred by denying challenge for cause when record showed that panelist said "that he would give a police officer's testimony more credibility" but when record also indicated that "the response was not extreme or absolute" and that "he would wait until hearing a police officer's testimony before judging the officer's credibility"). Moreover, although the panelist repeatedly stated that he was not sure or could not say if he would be able to set aside his beliefs before ultimately concluding that he thought that he could, those types of contradictory and vacillating statements require even greater deference to the district court's ruling.
Based on the record before this Court, we cannot conclude that the district court clearly abused its discretion by denying Bradley's motion to strike the panelist for cause. Accordingly, we overrule Bradley's issue on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled Bradley's sole issue on appeal, we affirm the district court's judgment of conviction.
/s/_________
David Puryear, Justice Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Puryear and Pemberton Affirmed Filed: July 7, 2016 Do Not Publish