Bradley v. State

12 Citing cases

  1. Boucher v. Johnson

    373 A.2d 349 (N.H. 1977)   Cited 6 times

    Notwithstanding the aid which the statute thus gives to the property rights of the survivor, it "does not operate . . . to make the surviving tenant the owner of the account against his consent . . . . The surviving tenant's statutory right to the account is not one which he is compelled to accept." Bradley v. State, 100 N.H. 232, 236-37, 123 A.2d 148, 151 (1956). The surviving tenant is in a position analogous to that of a devisee or legatee, and has the right to prevent the passage of title by renunciation.

  2. Parenteau v. Gaillardetz

    166 A.2d 112 (N.H. 1960)   Cited 5 times

    (Emphasis supplied). Prior to the enactment of this statute the surviving joint tenant of a bank deposit had a difficult time to establish his rights to the account either because he could not prove the elements of a valid gift or because the transaction was considered testamentary in character and insufficient to satisfy the statute of wills. New Hampshire Sav. Bank v. McMullen, 88 N.H. 123; Packard v. Foster, 95 N.H. 47; Nashua Trust Co. v. Mosgofian, 97 N.H. 17. The same situation existed in later cases where the original depositor died before the effective date of RSA 384:28-32. Chretien v. Duhaime, 100 N.H. 254, 256; Bradley v. State, 100 N.H. 232. In the present case the statute had been in effect almost two years before the death of the depositor and in the statutory language was an account of the type described therein which was "maintained" in the bank after the passage of the statute.

  3. In re Merrill

    174 N.H. 195 (N.H. 2021)   Cited 1 times

    Even assuming that the respondent's mother had delivered the inter vivos gift with donative intent, the facts do not support a finding that the respondent ever accepted her mother's gift. See Bradley v. State, 100 N.H. 232, 236, 123 A.2d 148 (1956) (observing that a gift is "wholly inoperative unless accepted by the donee" (quotation omitted)). Under these circumstances, the respondent "had no real interest in the property" at the time the petitioner filed for divorce because she could not accept a gift of which she did not know.

  4. In re Estate of Lamson

    662 A.2d 287 (N.H. 1995)   Cited 2 times

    "The surviving tenant is in a position analogous to that of a devisee or legatee, and has the right to prevent the passage of title by renunciation." Id.; see Bradley v. State, 100 N.H. 232, 237, 123 A.2d 148, 151 (1956). The motivating factor permitting renunciation of these interests is that one should not be forced to accept burdensome, unbargained for tenders.

  5. In re Plaisted Estate

    253 A.2d 48 (N.H. 1969)   Cited 2 times

    If, for example, a collateral heir refused to accept a bequest and this bequest passed to a residuary legatee who was exempt, the State would have no authority to collect a tax against either the collateral heir or the residuary legatee. See Bradley v. State, 100 N.H. 232. We conclude that the determination of whether a person is exempt from the State's inheritance tax who takes property by virtue of the antilapse statute is based upon his relationship to the testator and not upon that of the legatee, who predeceased the testator.

  6. In re Cross Estate

    229 A.2d 170 (N.H. 1967)   Cited 1 times

    This constituted a renunciation and disclaimer of any general power of appointment she had under the will. Coleman v. Burns, 103 N.H. 313, 316; Bradley v. State, 100 N.H. 232, 236; Perry v. Hale, 44 N.H. 363. In order for a renunciation to be effective it must occur within a reasonable time after the death of the testator.

  7. Brennan v. Timmins

    187 A.2d 793 (N.H. 1963)   Cited 5 times

    Cournoyer v. Bank, 98 N.H. 385, 393. Later in considering a controversy involving joint accounts in Bradley v. State, 100 N.H. 232, 235, this court said: "The accounts in question were created by the deceased tenant during his lifetime with his own funds and the now surviving tenant had no knowledge of their existence until the day of the cotenant's death. Formerly, such deposits were not effective to give the survivor any ownership or interest in the accounts.

  8. In re Estate of Copeland

    179 A.2d 475 (Vt. 1962)   Cited 2 times

    The beneficiary of a trust can waive the provisions of a will for his benefit. Bradley v. New Hampshire, 100 N. H. 232, 123 A.2d 148, 151. A valid trust does not exist if the cestui que trust, when informed of it, clearly and unequivocally rejects or renounces its benefits. Such renunciation or disclaimer relates back to the date of the gift with the result that title to the property which is the subject matter of the gift does not pass to the beneficiary.

  9. Coleman v. Burns

    171 A.2d 33 (N.H. 1961)   Cited 5 times

    57 Am. Jur., Wills, s. 1571. As pointed out by the defendant there is nothing in the cases of Perry v. Hale, 44 N.H. 363 and Bradley v. State, 100 N.H. 232, to support this contention. In this case the Court found that Margaret's renunciation was "an honest, aboveboard act . . . openly made" and without protest from the plaintiff.

  10. Wilson County v. Wooten

    111 S.E.2d 875 (N.C. 1960)   Cited 5 times

    Under common law principles applicable to joint tenancies the survivor takes the entire property, free and clear of the claims of heirs or creditors of the deceased tenant, and the personal representative of such tenant has no right, title or interest therein. Spikings v. Ellis, supra; Petty v. Petty, 220 Ky. 569, 295 S.W. 863; In re Jackson's Estate, 112 Cal.App.2d 16, 245 P.2d 684; In re Kaspari's Estate (N.D.), 71 N.W.2d 558; Hill v. Havens, 242 Iowa 920, 48 N.W.2d 870; In re Ware's Estate, 218 Miss. 694, 67 So.2d 704; In re Zaring's Estate, 93 Cal.App.2d 577, 209 P.2d 642; Able-Old Hickory Building Loan Ass'n. v. Polansky, 138 N.J. Eq. 232, 47 A.2d 730; Bradley v. State, 100 N.H. 232, 123 A.2d 148; Guitner v. McEowen, 99 Ohio App. 32, 124 N.E.2d 744; Hoover v. Hoover, 90 Ohio App. 148, 104 N.E.2d 41; City of Corning v. Stirpe, 27 N.Y. Supp.2d 418, 262 A.D. 14, Affirmed 293 N.Y. 808, 59 N.E.2d 176; Goggin v. Goggin, 59 R.I. 145, 194 A. 730, 113 A.L.R. 569; Musa v. Segelke Kohlhaus Co., 224 Wis. 432, 272 N.W. 657, 111 A.L.R. 168; 48 C.J.S., Joint Tenancy, section 1, page 910, et seq.; 14 Am. Jur., Cotenancy, section 6, page 80. Our Legislature has not enacted any statute with respect to the rights of creditors against property held by virtue of a contract creating a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, except as to the right of survivorship in bank deposits created by a written agreement by husband and wife. Chapter 404 of the Session Laws of North Carolina, 1959, codified as G.S. 41-2.1.