Opinion
Civil Action 2: 21-cv-1632
12-16-2021
GREGORY LEWIS BRADLEY, JR., Petitioner, v. WARDEN WILLIAM SHOUPPE, Respondent.
GREGORY LEWIS BRADLEY, JR. Beaver County Jail
GREGORY LEWIS BRADLEY, JR. Beaver County Jail
Nora Barry Fischer, Senior United States District Judge
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Cynthia Reed Eddy, Chief United States Magistrate Judge
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that the pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Petitioner, Gregory Lewis Bradley, Jr., pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, be summarily dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies and that a certificate of appealability likewise be denied.
II. REPORT
A. Background
Petitioner, Gregory Lewis Bradley, Jr., (“Petitioner” or “Bradley”) is a pretrial detainee facing trial on state criminal charges in the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County, at Criminal Docket Number CP-04-CR-0001557-2021. The federal habeas petition has not yet been served but this Court may dismiss it if it plainly appears on its face that petitioner is not entitled to relief in habeas. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243; Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. That is the case here; it is clear that Bradley is not entitled to federal habeas relief at this time.
The docket sheet for Bradley's criminal case is available online and this Court takes judicial notice of it. That docket, along with the petition, establishes the following facts.
Bradley is in the pretrial stages of a criminal case in which he has been charged with Strangulation - Applying Pressure to Throat or Neck; Simple Assault; and Harassment - Subject To Other Physical Contact. The criminal docket reflects that a hearing on omnibus pretrial motions is scheduled for February 2, 2022, and, at the request of defense counsel, the trial of the case has been continued to the court's March 2022 Trial Term. Bradley is represented in his criminal case by attorney Gerald V. Benyo, Jr.
In the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Bradley asks this Court to immediately release him from custody to protect his right against unlawful arrest and detention.
B. Discussion
“For state prisoners, federal habeas corpus is substantially a post-conviction remedy.” Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 441 (3d Cir. 1975) (citing Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 60 (1967) and 28 U.S.C. § 2254). After a state prisoner has been convicted, sentenced, and has exhausted his remedies in the state courts, he may seek federal habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which is the federal habeas statute applicable to state prisoners “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (emphasis added).
While § 2254 applies to post-trial situations, the more general habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, does provide federal courts with jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus before a state court judgment is rendered, but only in very limited circumstances. Brian R. Means, Federal Habeas Manual § 9C:2 (available at Westlaw FEDHABMAN) (2021 Update) (“If . . . the petitioner is in custody pursuant to something other than a judgment of a state court (e.g., pre-trial detention, pre-trial bond order, awaiting extradition, he may proceed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241”) (emphasis in original). “[T]hat jurisdiction must be exercised sparingly in order to prevent in the ordinary circumstances ‘pre-trial habeas interference by federal courts in the normal functioning of state criminal processes'.” Duran v. Thomas, 393 Fed.Appx. 3 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Moore, 515 F.2d at 445-46).
Section 2241 provides in relevant part: “The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the Untied States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (emphasis added). Thus, under this statute, a state criminal defendant has the mechanism in a federal habeas action to challenge the legality of his pre-trial confinement by arguing that he should not be in pre-trial custody in the first place because, for example: (1) his upcoming trial violates his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause, see, e.g., United States v. Webb, 516 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1975); or, (2) he is being deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, see, e.g., Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct., 410 U.S. 484, 492-93 (1973); or, (3) the trial court has unconstitutionally denied or revoked bail, see, e.g, Atkins v. Michigan, 644 F.2d 543, 550 (6th Cir. 1981). Bradley's case is not similar to the aforementioned types of cases.
Further, to the extent that Bradley has raised any federal constitutional claims in his petition, it does not appear from the petition that Bradley has exhausted his state court remedies.There is no express statutory requirement that a pre-trial detainee exhaust state court remedies prior to asserting his claims in federal court. “However, a body of jurisprudential law requires detainees seeking relief pursuant to § 2241 to first exhaust state court remedies before seeking federal intervention.” Brian R. Means, Federal Habeas Manual § 9C:2 (2021Update), available at Westlaw FEDHABMAN (citing Braden, 410 U.S. at 489-91, Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F.3d 782, 812 (11th Cir. 2004) (Tjoflat, J., concurring); Knox v. State of Wyo., 959 F.2d 866, 868 (10th Cir. 1992); Dickerson v. State of La., 816 F.2d 220, 225 (5th Cir. 1987); Benson v. Superior Court Dept. of Trial Court of Mass, 663 F.2d 355, 358 (1st Cir. 1981); Carden v. State of Mont., 626 F.2d 82, 83 (9th Cir. 1980); Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 442 (3d Cir. 1975)). See, e.g., Schandelmeier v. Cunningham, 819 F.2d 52, 53 (3d Cir. 1986) (“The state court exhaustion requirement is mandated by statute under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and has developed through decisional law in applying principles of comity and federalism as to claims brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.”) Once a petitioner's federal claims have been fairly presented to the state courts and those proceedings conclude, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied. The petitioner carries the burden of proving exhaustion of all available state court remedies. See, e.g., Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997).
If in fact Bradley has exhausted his state court remedies, he should address the issue in his objections to the report and recommendation.
Because Bradley has not completed the exhaustion of his state court remedies, it is recommended that Bradley's habeas petition be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
Moreover, to the extent that Bradley's petition could be construed as a challenge to his ongoing state criminal proceedings, the Court finds that it is appropriate to abstain from entertaining the petition based on the three requirements of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971): (1) there is ongoing state criminal prosecution of Bradley which his request for relief would interfere; (2) the state proceedings implicate the important state interest of enforcing its criminal laws; and (3) Bradley has an opportunity to raise any constitutional claims in his state criminal proceedings. If the three Younger requirements are satisfied, abstention is required unless the petitioner demonstrates that the state proceedings are motivated by bad faith, the state law being challenged is patently unconstitutional, or there is no adequate alternative state forum where the constitutional issues can be raised. Id. at 670 n. 4 (citing Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989)). These exceptions are to be construed “very narrowly” and invoked only in “extraordinary circumstances.” Id. The instant habeas action does not raise the type of extraordinary circumstances contemplated under Younger.
Based upon all of the foregoing, at this time Petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. It is therefore recommended that the Court dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus without prejudice to Bradley's ability to timely file another habeas petition, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or § 2241 as the circumstances require, following proper exhaustion of available state court remedies and satisfaction of any other applicable procedural prerequisites.
C. Certificate of Appealability
Section 102 of AEDPA, which is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2253, governs the issuance of a certificate of appealability for appellate review of a district court's disposition of a habeas petition. It provides that “[a] certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Applying this standard here, jurists of reason would not find it debatable that the claims raised in the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus have not been exhausted. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability should be denied.
III. Conclusion
For all of the above reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus be dismissed without prejudice and that a certificate of appealability be denied. Further, it is recommended that the pending Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (ECF NO. 1) be denied as moot.
Bradley is permitted to file Objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Bradley because he is a non-electronically registered party, must file objections to this Report and Recommendation by January 3, 2022. Bradley is cautioned that failure to file Objections within this timeframe “will waive the right to appeal.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Siers v. Morrash, 700 F.2d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1983)). See also EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing standard of appellate review when no timely and specific objections are filed as limited to review for plain error).