Prospective purchasers would obviously be discouraged, knowing that they themselves could not occupy any portion of the premises except where they are able to invoke a "good cause" situation or decide upon permanent retirement of the premises from the rental housing market. Bradley v. Rapp, 132 N.J. Super. 429 (App.Div. 1975). Such properties would, in practicality, be confined to purchase for investment purposes only, as opposed to the rather common occurrence heretofore, of purchase both as a home and a source of supplemental income.
In response to a rental housing shortage, the Anti-Eviction Act,N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 to -61.12 (Act), limited evictions of tenants to reasonable grounds on suitable notice. Morristown Mem'l Hosp. v. Wokem Mortgage Realty Co., Inc., 192 N.J. Super. 182, 186 (App.Div. 1983); Bradley v. Rapp, 132 N.J. Super. 429, 432-33 (App.Div. 1975). Prior to its enactment, a landlord had a right to possess its leased property without good cause, subject to certain procedural limitations.
[at p. 678, 581 A.2d at 136]. This interpretation is not only grammatically correct but also has the salutary effect of creating harmony of treatment between owner-occupied premises on the one hand and premises containing three residential units where the purchaser wishes to occupy one of them. (Compare the first paragraph of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 with N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(l)(3)).Dempsey v. Mastropasqua, 242 N.J. Super. 234, 238-239, 576 A.2d 335 (App.Div. 1990); see also, Bradley v. Rapp, 132 N.J. Super. 429, 334 A.2d 61 (App.Div. 1975), certif. den. 68 N.J. 149, 343 A.2d 437 (1975); Durruthy v. Brunert, 228 N.J. Super. 199, 549 A.2d 456 (App.Div. 1988).
Unfortunately, an analysis of the companion legislation and its legislative history does not illuminate the issues here. In Bradley v. Rapp, 132 N.J. Super. 429 (App.Div. 1975), certif. den. 68 N.J. 149 (1975), the Appellate Division — in one of the earliest appellate decisions construing the Anti-Eviction Act — determined that one who purchases a two-family property for the express purpose of immediately residing therein renders the premises "owner-occupied" within the meaning and intendment of that phrase as used in N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1.
The Legislature's statement of purpose attached to this statute indicates that the purpose for this enactment was to prevent "arbitrary" and "unfair" ousters of residential tenants at a time when the Legislature determined there to be a critical shortage of rental housing. Obviously, the purpose of the Anti-Eviction Act was not to eliminate evictions but to limit them to reasonable grounds. See Bradley v. Rapp, 132 N.J. Super. 429 (App.Div. 1975). The statement of the purpose of the Anti-Eviction Act as appended to Assembly Bill 1586, L. 1974, c. 49, § 2 which was not included in the New Jersey Statutes Annotated reads as follows:
Franklin Tower One, supra, 304 N.J. Super. at 591-92 (citing Riverview Realty v. Williamson, 284 N.J. Super. 566, 568 (App. Div. 1995); Montgomery Gateway East I v. Herrera, 261 N.J. Super. 235, 241 (App. Div. 1962)); see also Bradley v. Rapp, 132 N.J. Super. 429, 432 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 68 N.J. 149 (1975). When interpreting the Act, primary regard must be given to its purpose.
Nevertheless, we recognized such implicit rights based on our perception of the "legislative design" and "purpose" of the Anti-Eviction Act to protect tenants. Id. at 75, 581 A.2d 875 (quoting Bradley v. Rapp, 132 N.J.Super. 429, 433, 334 A.2d 61 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 68 N.J. 149, 343 A. 2d 437 (1975)). If, however, the Legislature intended to establish vested rights for tenants whose rental units were subject to the Act at the time of initial occupancy but later became exempt, there would be little need to enact specific provisions providing rights of limited duration after changes in the status and structure of the rental premises.
If the building qualifies as "owner-occupied" by reason of plaintiff's business operation, then the notice to quit was sufficient and she may terminate defendant's tenancy. The phrase "owner-occupied" in N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 was interpreted in Bradley v. Rapp, 132 N.J. Super. 429 (App.Div. 197 5). The notice to quit in that case failed to specify the reason for termination of the tenancy.
This court, in pursuing its duty to interpret legislative action, must "strive to avoid an anomalous, unreasonable, inconceivable or absurd result." Bradley v. Rapp, 132 N.J. Super. 429, 433 (App.Div. 1975). To give the restrictive interpretation to the term "owner" urged by defendant would produce the "anomalous" result of precluding an owner in obvious need of housing, from assuming possession of his own property.
Subsequent cases have iterated and amplified the above statement on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Bradley v. Rapp, 132 N.J. Super. 429 (App.Div. 1975); Stamboulos v. McKee, 134 N.J. Super. 567 (App.Div. 1975); Puttrich v. Smith, 170 N.J. Super. 572 (App.Div. 1979). The court in Gross v. Barriosi, 168 N.J. Super. 149 (Cty.D.Ct. 1979) (citing 25 Fairmount Ave., Inc. v. Stockton, 130 N.J. Super. 276, 288 (Cty.Ct. 1974)) clearly stated the purpose of the act as: