Opinion
2021–02237 Index No. 701967/18
03-15-2023
Donald BRADLEY, etc., appellant, v. Keith PALIN, et al., respondents.
Law Office of Patrick Mullaney, P.C. (Michael H. Zhu, Esq., P.C., New York, NY, of counsel), for appellant. Anna J. Ervolina, Brooklyn, NY (Timothy J. O'Shaughnessy of counsel), for respondents.
Law Office of Patrick Mullaney, P.C. (Michael H. Zhu, Esq., P.C., New York, NY, of counsel), for appellant.
Anna J. Ervolina, Brooklyn, NY (Timothy J. O'Shaughnessy of counsel), for respondents.
FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, J.P., ROBERT J. MILLER, PAUL WOOTEN, LILLIAN WAN, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Joseph J. Risi, J.), entered March 8, 2021. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident is denied.
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained by him in a motor vehicle accident. The defendants moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident. By order entered March 8, 2021, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted that branch of the motion. The plaintiff appeals.
The defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident (see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 345, 746 N.Y.S.2d 865, 774 N.E.2d 1197 ; Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955, 956–957, 582 N.Y.S.2d 990, 591 N.E.2d 1176 ). The defendants’ submissions failed to eliminate triable issues of fact regarding the plaintiff's claim, set forth in the bill of particulars, that he sustained a serious injury under the 90/180–day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Despinos–Cadet v. Stein, 209 A.D.3d 978, 980, 177 N.Y.S.3d 320 ; Che Hong Kim v. Kossoff, 90 A.D.3d 969, 934 N.Y.S.2d 867 ; cf. Richards v. Tyson, 64 A.D.3d 760, 761, 883 N.Y.S.2d 575 ).
Since the defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden, it is unnecessary to determine whether the plaintiff's submissions were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642 ; Despinos–Cadet v. Stein, 209 A.D.3d at 980, 177 N.Y.S.3d 320 ).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident.
CONNOLLY, J.P., MILLER, WOOTEN and WAN, JJ., concur.