Opinion
21-P-1011
10-12-2022
ADAM JAMES BRADLEY v. COLONEL, DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE & others.[1]
Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass.App.Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass.App.Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, Adam James Bradley, appeals from a Superior Court judgment dismissing his complaint pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12, 365 Mass. 754 (1974). We affirm.
Background.
In the light most favorable to Bradley, his civil complaint alleged the following facts:
Bradley's complaint states a number of legal conclusions. However, in reviewing the complaint, "we look beyond the conclusory allegations . . . and focus on whether the factual allegations plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief." Curtis v. Herb Chambers 1-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011), citing Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 635-636 (2008). In doing so, we consider, among other things, exhibits attached to the complaint. See Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., 432 Mass. 474, 477 (2000) .
In 2012, members of the Massachusetts Department of State Police (MSP) participated in an investigation that led to Bradley's arrest and conviction for murder. On September 25, 2020, Bradley filed a complaint with the MSP using citizen response form SP340 (SP340 complaint) and alleging misconduct by troopers who participated in the investigation. On October 1, 2020, Bradley received a letter from MSP Lieutenant Kevin Dwyer, a member of the MSP Complaint Intake Unit, stating:
"We are in receipt of the Citizen Response Form (SP340) dated 9/25/20 and the letter dated 9/18/20 that you sent detailing concerns you have in regard to the investigation and prosecution of charges levied against you in/around 2012. These concerns should be addressed with your attorney."
Bradley was unsatisfied with this response and sent a follow-up letter to Dwyer requesting that Dwyer process and investigate Bradley's SP340 complaint; Bradley did not receive an additional response.
Bradley then commenced this action against Dwyer in his official capacity, the MSP, and its Colonel (collectively, the MSP) . He sought an order compelling the MSP to process and investigate his SP340 complaint and a declaration that the failure to do so violates the MSP's legal duties and Bradley's rights. The MSP filed a joint motion to dismiss under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (1) & (6). A judge allowed the motion and dismissed the complaint because Bradley failed to establish that the MSP owed him a legal duty to investigate his SP340 complaint or that the MSP's failure to investigate his single SP340 complaint was an appropriate subject for declaratory relief.
Discussion.
We review the sufficiency of Bradley's complaint de novo, taking as true its factual allegations and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor. Curtis v. Herb Chambers 1-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011).
1. Mandamus.
Bradley's complaint first sought relief in the nature of mandamus under G. L. c. 249, § 5 -- specifically, an order to the MSP to "process and investigate" his SP340 complaint. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint in the nature of mandamus must plausibly allege that the defendants have a "clear cut duty" to perform a particular act. Simmons v. Clerk-Magistrate of the Boston Div. of the Hous. Court Dep't, 448 Mass. 57, 59-60 (2006), quoting Doe v. District Attorney for the Plymouth Dist., 29 Mass.App.Ct. 671, 675 (1991). Further, mandamus will not lie where it would "require public officers to make a particular decision on a matter within their discretion, . . . and [a court] to substitute [its] judgment for that of the official upon whom the Legislature has imposed the duty of making a decision." Leigh v. Commissioner of Pub. Health & Charities of Lawrence, 310 Mass. 343, 344 (1941).
Bradley points to three potential sources of law to establish that the MSP has a legal duty to process and investigate his civilian complaint: (1) G. L. c. 278A, § 16 (b); (2) Mass. Dep't of State Police, Gen. Order No. ADM-14, Personnel Investigations (2012) (ADM-14); and (3) Mass. Dep't of State Police, Gen. Order No. ADM-15, Internal Affairs (2008) (ADM-15). We conclude that none of them can support a claim for mandamus relief here.
The complaint does not discuss, and we express no view regarding, regulations recently promulgated by the Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission concerning law enforcement agencies' internal investigations of complaints of officer misconduct. See 555 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.01(2) (2022); G. L. c. 6E, § 3 (a) (28) .
By its plain language, G. L. c. 278A, § 16 (b), orders the director of the MSP's crime lab to "promulgate regulations governing the retention and preservation of evidence or biological material [relevant to a criminal investigation] by any governmental entity." The statute addresses the preservation of evidence already obtained; nothing in its language suggests that the MSP has a duty to investigate complaints of police misconduct in order to obtain such evidence.
b. ADM-14 and ADM-15.
Assuming, without deciding, that the MSP's own internal administrative orders are capable of establishing a legal duty enforceable by a court in the first place -- and that Bradley has standing to enforce such a duty --Bradley's reliance on the orders is still misplaced. The contents of ADM-14 and ADM-15 do not establish any clear cut, non-discretionary duty to process and investigate Bradley's SP340 complaint.
ADM-14 directs all SP340 complaints to be "documented and investigated according to complaint intake procedures." The procedures contained therein, however, reveal that complaints need only be investigated once they have been "assigned" to a supervisor. Nothing in ADM-14 explicitly requires intake officers to assign every SP340 complaint for further investigation, and we cannot impose such a duty where the MSP has not done so itself.
ADM-14 also establishes a duty to "[p]rocess SP340 [complaints] received according to standards established by the Division of Standards and Training." Bradley did not attach the standards to his complaint or claim that they establish any clear cut duty that the MSP has failed to perform. Although the MSP attached these standards to its brief, we decline to consider them. Cf. Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 460 Mass. 222, 224 (2011), S_.C.. 466 Mass. 156 (2013) (discussing materials that may be considered under rule 12 [b] [6]).
G. L. c. 22C, § 3, dictates that:
"[t]he colonel [of the MSP] shall, except as otherwise provided, direct all inspections and investigations. The colonel shall make all necessary rules and regulations for the government of the department, for reports to be made by employees of the department and for the performance of the duties of said employees."Where the colonel has discretion over whether to mandate investigation of all complaints and has not clearly chosen to do so, a court may not supersede this decision through a mandamus order. See Leigh, 310 Mass. at 344 ("[W]e have no right to substitute our judgment for that of the official upon whom the Legislature has imposed the duty of making a decision").
Similarly, ADM-15 states that the Internal Affairs Section of the MSP "may investigate any complaint" when it receives a request or direction from the Division of Standards and Training, or when the complaint alleges serious misconduct (emphasis added). Although "examples of serious misconduct" may include some of the allegations made by Bradley in his SP340 complaint, this does not negate the discretion granted to investigators by the use of the word "may." See Boxford v. Massachusetts Highway Dep't, 458 Mass. 596, 606 & n.22 (2010) (use of word "may" grants discretion, making mandamus unavailable).
Bradley's reliance on the public right doctrine is unavailing. That doctrine may confer standing to enforce a clear duty in some instances, but standing is beside the point where, as here, there is no such duty to enforce. See Perella v. Massachusetts Turnpike Auth., 55 Mass.App.Ct. 537, 539 (2002), quoting Tax Equity Alliance for Mass. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 423 Mass. 708, 714 (1996) ("In such cases, the plaintiff acts under the public right to have a particular duty performed that the law requires to be performed" [second emphasis added]).
Nor does Bradley's appeal to public policy establish an enforceable duty to investigate his SP340 complaint outside of the MSP's own complaint intake procedures. To the contrary, public policy has long cautioned against judicial interference with the discretionary powers exercised by separate branches of government. See, e.g., Sena v. Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 250, 258 (1994) ("[C]lose judicial scrutiny of investigatory practices could [usurp] the power and responsibility of the legislative or executive branches" [quotation and citation omitted]); Leigh, 310 Mass. at 344. Therefore, because Bradley has not shown that the MSP has a clear cut, non-discretionary duty to investigate his SP340 complaint, the judge was correct to dismiss the mandamus claim.
2. Declaratory judgment.
Bradley's complaint next sought a declaration that the MSP's failure to investigate violates Bradley's rights. To obtain declaratory relief under G. L. c. 231A, § 2, a complaint must allege that the practice at issue violates a duty owed to the plaintiff and that the violation has been consistently repeated. See Nelson v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 Mass. 379, 388 n.12 (1983) ("[A] complaint for declaratory relief is an appropriate way of testing the validity of regulations or the propriety of practices involving violations of rights, which are consistent and repeated in nature").
For the same reasons that Bradley cannot obtain an order for mandamus, discussed supra, Bradley's complaint failed to identify any duty owed to him under the specific sources of law identified in the complaint. Moreover, the complaint did not allege that the MSP has repeatedly violated any of Bradley's rights, even if the existence of those rights were sufficiently established. See Grady v. Commissioner of Correction, 83 Mass.App.Ct. 126, 137 n.9 (2013) ("It is not enough to claim a . . . violation; rather, a plaintiff must plead a particular . . . violation and demonstrate that such a violation extends beyond the plaintiff's individual case and is 'consistently repeated' by the administrative agency"). Therefore, Bradley did not establish any entitlement to declaratory relief, and the complaint was correctly dismissed.
3. Court clerk's failure to file certain papers.
Bradley asserts for the first time in his appellate brief that the Superior Court clerk did not properly file or docket certain items submitted by Bradley, including his reply and amended reply memoranda. Such issues should have been raised in the first instance with the clerk, or if necessary, the judge. In any event, Bradley submitted an affidavit stating that the judge received both documents, and we have received them as part of the record appendix. Therefore, it does not appear that the mistake prejudiced Bradley.
Judgment affirmed.
Desmond, Sacks & D'Angelo, JJ.
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.