Bradley v. City of Los Angeles

6 Citing cases

  1. Gurule v. Board of Pension Commissioners

    126 Cal.App.3d 523 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 1 times

    Numerous California cases have held that language similar to that found in section 190.12(a) must be liberally construed to provide a service-connected disability to injuries that merely aggravated preexisting conditions. (See Dillard v. City of Los Angeles (1942) 20 Cal.2d 599 [ 127 P.2d 917]; Bradley v. City of Los Angeles (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 592 [ 131 P.2d 391]; Faber v. Board of Pension Commissioners for, the City of Los Angeles (1943) 56 Cal.App.2d 825 [ 133 P.2d 404].) It is therefore quite obvious that after Gelman, the wording of 190.12(a) was suspect and the charter should have been amended, as was section 31720, to clearly define its coverage.

  2. Gilman v. City of Long Beach

    111 Cal.App.2d 747 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952)   Cited 3 times

    " A similar provision, found in section 183 of the Los Angeles city charter, has received broad interpretation in Cordell v. City of Los Angeles, 67 Cal.App.2d 257 [ 154 P.2d 31], and in Bradley v. City of Los Angeles, 55 Cal.App.2d 592 [ 131 P.2d 391]. In the Cordell case the words "shall die as a result of any injury received during the performance of his duty," are held to mean "that a causal relation, mediate or immediate, must be shown between the duty performed by the decedent and the immediate cause of his death," quoting from Lawrence v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal.App.2d 6 [ 127 P.2d 931].

  3. Platt v. City of Los Angeles

    72 Cal.App.2d 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946)   Cited 2 times

    In the case with which we are here concerned, while the self-inflicted fatal wound was the result of decedent's unsoundness of mind, there was substantial evidence that his mental derangement was not in turn caused by the injuries received in line of duty as a police officer. In Bradley v. City of Los Angeles, 55 Cal.App.2d 592 [ 131 P.2d 391], the policeman was bitten by a mad dog. It was conceded that he had a preexisting liver condition.

  4. Crawford v. McLaughlin

    286 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1960)   Cited 6 times
    In Crawford v. McLaughlin, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 264, 286 F.2d 821 (1960), the Court of Appeals emphasized that the evidence in such a case as the present one be considered in the light of the "humane purpose of such retirement laws."

    We are fortified in this conclusion by consideration of the humane purpose of such retirement laws. See Bradley v. City of Los Angeles, 1942, 55 Cal.App.2d 592, 131 P.2d 391. This purpose would partially fail of accomplishment were the evidence in this record held to be insufficient to support retirement under section 4-527. Reversed and remanded.

  5. Carroll v. District of Columbia Board of Appeals & Review

    292 A.2d 161 (D.C. 1972)   Cited 4 times
    Rejecting complaint "that the Assistant Corporation Counsel who sat as a member of the Retirement Board when [petitioner's] case was heard also acted as counsel on behalf of the District of Columbia at the later hearing before the Board of Appeals and Review"; "in the absence of any showing that petitioner was prejudiced thereby, this combination of functions did not constitute error"

    " See Wingo v. Washington, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 410, 395 F.2d 633 (1968); Blohm v. Tobriner, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 2, 350 F.2d 785 (1965); Hyde v. Tobriner, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 311, 329 F.2d 879 (1964); Bradley v. City of Los Angeles, 55 Cal.App.2d 592, 131 P.2d 391 (1942). "The purpose of this legislation is to create an additional category of service-connected disability which will enable the member to retire if an injury or disease contracted other than exclusively in the performance of duty is so aggravated by the performance of duty as to disable the member from further duty, and to place the burden of proof on the Government that such duty did not aggravate the injury or disease contracted (it may or may not have been incurred or contracted in the performance of duty).

  6. Branson v. Firemen's Retirement Fund

    79 Idaho 167 (Idaho 1957)   Cited 5 times

    "Where there is a direct, causal connection between the injury and the death, even in cases where the decedent was suffering from a serious disease, which injury accelerated or aggravated the condition, the widow and children can recover." To the same effect see: Dryden v. Board of Pension Com'rs, 1936, 6 Cal.2d 575, 59 P.2d 104; Bradley v. City of Los Angeles, 1942, 55 Cal.App.2d 592, 131 P.2d 391; Faber v. Board of Pension Com'rs of City of L.A., 1943, 56 Cal.App.2d 825, 133 P.2d 404; Lundrigan v. City of Los Angeles, 1947, 82 Cal.App.2d 238, 186 P.2d 12; Rogers v. Retirement Board, 1952, 109 Cal.App.2d 751, 241 P.2d 611; Smith v. Essex County Park Commission, 1933, 110 N.J.L. 206, 164 A. 395. The order of the Industrial Accident Board is reversed and the cause remanded to the Board with instructions to enter an award in favor of appellant in accordance with the views herein expressed.