Bradley v. Bradley

11 Citing cases

  1. Ward v. Ward

    502 So. 2d 477 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 21 times
    In Ward v. Ward, 502 So.2d 477 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), this court held that a husband who chose to retire from his job to spend more time in leisure activities had voluntarily reduced his income and was not entitled to modification of his alimony obligation to his former wife.

    At the time of Ward's voluntary retirement and the hearing on the parties' petitions more than a year later, Ward was — but for his precipitous decision to retire — fully capable of earning his pre-retirement income. Thus, were Ward a younger man who had simply quit his job for a lower paying one, the income he was capable of earning would be imputed to him in determining the amount of support he should be required to give to his wife, Desilets v. Desilets, 377 So.2d 761 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Fried v. Fried, 375 So.2d 46 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Bradley v. Bradley, 347 So.2d 789 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Mansfield v. Mansfield, 309 So.2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), even if the result were to be to require the husband to pay an amount of alimony entirely exhausting his actual income. Bradley v. Bradley, 347 So.2d 789.

  2. Williamson v. Williamson

    782 So. 2d 994 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

    The court's decision on alimony was within the bounds of its discretion. See Avery v. Avery, 548 So.2d 865, 866 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Bradley v. Bradley, 347 So.2d 789, 790 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Many of the factors the trial court considered in awarding alimony also support an unequal distribution of marital assets. We agree that the trial court erroneously valued the First Union account at $11,210.

  3. Arouza v. Arouza

    670 So. 2d 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 8 times

    Consequently, although the former wife has the ability to earn an income, she has voluntarily decided to remain unemployed. It is well settled that a trial court, who has made a finding that a party is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, may properly impute income to that party based upon that party's demonstrated earning capacity. See Polley v. Polley, 588 So.2d 638 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Scapin v. Scapin, 547 So.2d 1012 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Bradley v. Bradley, 347 So.2d 789 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). That is exactly what the trial court has done here. Accordingly, having found that the record contains ample evidence to support the trial court's decision to impute income to the former wife, and to support the trial court's finding regarding the former wife's ability to pay the fee awarded, we affirm the court's order awarding fees to the former husband in all respects.

  4. Wiedman v. Wiedman

    610 So. 2d 681 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 3 times

    Compare Greene v. Greene, 547 So.2d 1302 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). See Desilets v. Desilets, 377 So.2d 761 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Fried v. Fried, 375 So.2d 46 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Bradley v. Bradley, 347 So.2d 789 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Osman v. Osman, 280 So.2d 67 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 289 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1973); Foster v. Foster, 537 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. App. 1976). See In re Marriage of Smith, 77 Ill. App.3d 858, 33 Ill.Dec. 332, 396 N.E.2d 859 (1979).

  5. Manning v. Manning

    600 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 5 times
    In Manning, the former husband was dismissed from a temporary job paying $18.00 per hour, due to a back condition first revealed on a physical exam. Manning was not precluded from regaining the position if he could meet certain conditions; two weeks later, he accepted a permanent position paying $9.00 per hour, together with certain benefits, and the possibility of a promotion within six months.

    The test is essentially one based upon common sense — can the change in circumstances reasonably be expected to continue for the foreseeable future? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, permanency has been established. See, e.g., Vilas v. Vilas, 153 Fla. 102, 13 So.2d 807 (1943); Haas v. Haas, 552 So.2d 252 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); Bradley v. Bradley, 347 So.2d 789, 790 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (Hubbart, J., concurring). (To apply literally the concept of permanency would impose upon the moving party an insurmountable evidentiary burden.) Applying this test to the facts of the present case, I am unable to find any competent evidence to support a conclusion that the former husband's change in circumstances — his reduction in income — was not reasonably likely to continue for the foreseeable future.

  6. Pimm v. Pimm

    568 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 8 times

    A payor spouse's voluntary diminution of income where an ability to earn more is demonstrated has often been disregarded when such a spouse seeks reduction of alimony or support payments based on the voluntary diminution of income. Desilets v. Desilets, 377 So.2d 761 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Fried v. Fried, 375 So.2d 46 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Bradley v. Bradley, 347 So.2d 789 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Mansfield v. Mansfield, 309 So.2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). We cannot conclude, however, that a "voluntary" retirement under normal circumstances or at a normal or expected retirement age should be equated with such a voluntary diminution of income.

  7. Wright v. Wright

    559 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 1 times

    Both are forbidden to appellate courts by appellate law. See Marsh v. Marsh, 419 So.2d 629 (Fla. 1982); Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1976); Bradley v. Bradley, 347 So.2d 789 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Finally, I seriously question the wisdom and validity of the majority's reliance on the successor trial judge analogy. It may frequently occur that the trial judge who hears a modification petition in a dissolution case is not the original trial judge. However, that circumstance does not in any way deprive the second trial judge of jurisdiction or power to modify the judgment where, as here, appropriate evidence and circumstances exist.

  8. Scapin v. Scapin

    547 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 21 times
    In Scapin, the court held that because the husband had voluntarily reduced his income, the trial court properly imputed to him income that he was capable of earning, but was presently not earning. Scapin, however, is readily distinguishable from this case on the facts.

    Having found that appellant had the ability to earn if he so desired, the trial court could consider his earning capacity as well as his actual income, impute an income to him according to what it determined he could earn by use of his best efforts to gain employment equal to his capabilities, and on that basis enter a support award as if he were in fact earning the income so imputed. Bielecki v. Bielecki, 505 So.2d 546, 547 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Maddux v. Maddux, 495 So.2d 863 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). Income a spouse was capable of earning may be imputed in determining the amount of court ordered obligations, even if the result requires a spouse to pay support which entirely exhausts the actual income. Ward v. Ward, 502 So.2d 477 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Maddux; Bradley v. Bradley, 347 So.2d 789 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Moreover, income may be imputed to a former spouse for purposes of awarding alimony and child support, even if it is difficult to establish its source.

  9. Maddux v. Maddux

    495 So. 2d 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 22 times
    In Maddux the evidence supported the trial judge's finding that the husband was underemployed, and in Leone v. Weed, 474 So.2d 401 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), the record supported the finding that the former husband could regain his past financial position.

    In such a situation, an award of alimony entirely exhausting the husband's actual income may be a proper exercise of the trial judge's discretion. Bradley v. Bradley, 347 So.2d 789 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Additionally, a trial judge may consider the "earning capacity," not just the income alone, as a factor in determining alimony. Gallant v. Gallant, 468 So.2d 479, 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Platt v. Platt, 103 So.2d 253, 255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958).

  10. Stanzione v. Stanzione

    449 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

    PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Rubin v. Rubin, 418 So.2d 1065 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Bradley v. Bradley, 347 So.2d 789 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Castor v. Castor, 316 So.2d 588 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975).