Opinion
No. 1-736 / 00-0056.
Filed February 6, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, LINDA R. READE, Judge.
The petitioners appeal the district court's remand ruling in a judicial review action denying their request for attorney fees and costs pursuant to Iowa Code section 625.29 (1999).
AFFIRMED.
Victoria L. Herring, Des Moines, for appellants.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Grant K. Dugdale, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.
Considered by VOGEL, P.J., and MILLER and EISENHAUER, JJ.
Anna Bradley and Bradley Computer Training Consultants, Inc., (collectively "Bradley") appeal from a district court ruling denying an award of attorney fees and costs under Iowa Code section 625.29 (1999) following a remand from the Iowa Supreme Court. Finding no error in the court's denial of attorney fees and costs, we affirm.
Procedural background . In April of 1996, Bradley filed a petition for judicial review challenging adverse agency action by the Iowa Department of Personnel ("IDP"), the Iowa Department of Management, and Iowa Department of Economic Development. In particular, Bradley challenged IDP's handling of personal services contracts for computer training services. The district court affirmed IDP's handling of the contracts, and Bradley appealed to the supreme court. On appeal, our supreme court determined that competitive bidding requirements did not apply to contracts with personal service vendors, but that IDP violated an executive order and an administrative rule regarding special computer training programs for the Iowa Department of Transportation for 1995. Bradley v. Iowa Dep't of Personnel, 596 N.W.2d 526 (Iowa 1999). The supreme court reversed and remanded to the district court to grant appropriate relief and to consider Bradley's claim for attorney fees pursuant to Iowa Code section 625.29 (1999).
Following a hearing on remand, the district court entered a ruling denying Bradley's request for attorney fees. The court noted, pursuant to the directions of the supreme court, that IDP had violated the executive order and administrative rule in the special computer training programs for the Iowa Department of Transportation for the fiscal year 1995. However, it declined to award any attorney fees or costs to Bradley after concluding Iowa Code section 625.29(1)(g) specifically prohibits such an award when the proceeding involved IDP under chapter 19A. Bradley has appealed from this order.
Scope of review . On appeal from judicial review of agency action, review of the judgment is for correction of errors at law. Gaffney v. Dep't of Employment Servs., 540 N.W.2d 430, 433 (Iowa 1995). The sole question on appeal is whether the district court correctly applied the law. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 318 N.W.2d 162, 165 (Iowa 1982).
Attorney fees under Iowa Code section 625.29 . Bradley contends the district court erred in failing to grant her attorney fees. Iowa Code section 625.29(1) provides generally that a "prevailing party" in an action for judicial review shall be awarded attorney fees and other expenses. However, that section also enumerates a number of exceptions to that rule including that such an award shall not be made if "[t]he proceeding involved the department of personnel under chapter 19A." Iowa Code § 625.29(1)(g).
Bradley maintains the above-mentioned exception for proceedings involving IDP is limited to merit system or personnel related decisions made by IDP. As support for this contention, she notes that in 1988 the legislature re-worded section 625.29(1)(g) from "[t]he proceeding involved the Iowa Merit Employment Commission under chapter 19A" to instead read "[t]he proceeding involved the department of personnel under chapter 19A." She offers that because the instant case substantively involved a challenge to illegal actions in awarding State contracts and is not an objection to a personnel or merit decision under chapter 19A, she is not prevented from obtaining an award of attorney fees by the meaning of section 625.29(1)(g).
The primary goal in statutory construction is to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent. State v. Johnson, 528 N.W.2d 638, 640 (Iowa 1995). That intent is evidenced by the words used in the statute. State v. Adams, 554 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Iowa 1996). When the text of a statute is plain and its meaning clear, the court should not search for a meaning beyond the express terms of the statute or resort to rules of construction. Krull v. Thermogas Co., 522 N.W.2d 607, 612 (Iowa 1994).
We find it unnecessary to engage in the statutory analysis which Bradley urges. On its face, the statute is clear. A court shall not make an award of attorney fees when the "proceeding involved the department of personnel under chapter 19A." Iowa Code § 625.29(1)(g). The substance of this judicial review action, IDP's method of contracting for computer training services, clearly involved IDP and its authority outlined in and granted by chapter 19A. See Iowa Code §§ 19A.1(1)(e) (providing IDP is responsible for education and training); 19A.8(4) (granting the director of IDP authority to develop programs for employee training); 19A.9(19) (authorizing the director to adopt rules regarding employee training programs); 19A.12 (requiring IDP to establish an Iowa management training system). Thus, we may not attempt to derive some unexpressed meaning to this language by resorting to Bradley's interpretation utilizing former statutory language. Iowa Code section 625.29(1)(g) clearly and unambiguously prohibits the granting of attorney fees in this matter. The district court was correct in so concluding and we therefore affirm its judgment.
AFFIRMED.