No. 09-09-00291-CR
Submitted on April 2, 2010.
Opinion Delivered April 21, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH.
On Appeal from the 258th District Court Polk County, Texas, Trial Cause No. 20,023. Affirmed.
Before GAULTNEY, KREGER, and HORTON, JJ.
HOLLIS HORTON Justice.
A jury found Linda Louise Rider Bradford guilty of intentionally or knowingly causing bodily injury to an elderly individual. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.04(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2009). The trial court found four enhancement paragraphs "true" and sentenced Bradford to forty years' confinement. In two issues, Bradford challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction and contends that the trial court erred when it refused to include the lesser-included offense of reckless injury to an elderly individual in the jury charge. We overrule Bradford's issues and affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
E.B., Bradford's mother, filed a complaint with the sheriff's department about Bradford's assault. E.B. gave different accounts of the incident, the first in a written statement given shortly after the incident, and later when she testified at the trial. According to the statement that E.B. provided to the sheriffs department, E.B. picked Bradford up to take her to a store. On their way back from the store, Bradford "got out of control". Bradford then grabbed E.B.'s head while E.B. was driving and hit E.B. on the side of her head with a soda can. After grabbing E.B. by the hair, Bradford then poured the soda can's contents "all over" E.B.'s head. Bradford continued to make verbal threats against E.B. until she dropped Bradford off at her house. At trial, E.B. testified that at the time of the alleged offense she was sixty-eight years old. E.B.'s account at trial differed in some important respects from the account she had previously given in her written statement. E.B. explained that while she and Bradford did begin to argue on their way back from the store, she really did not recall what Bradford did to her or the sequence of events. E.B. stated that she wanted the State to "drop this case because [she] thought it was more of a mental issue" and that she was only trying to seek assistance for Bradford because Bradford has mental health issues and has been "in and out of treatment" for the past eighteen years. Additionally, E.B. claimed at trial that Bradford's actions did not cause her pain, illness, or impairment. E.B. stated that she did not believe Bradford intentionally or knowingly tried to cause her injury. E.B. then explained that she initially contacted one of Bradford's prior mental health service providers to request assistance following the incident but was informed that Bradford was no longer a patient. E.B. admitted that she filed a complaint against Bradford with the sheriff's office on the date the incident had occurred. However, E.B. claimed that she filed the complaint in an effort to get assistance for Bradford. C.D., E.B.'s friend, was travelling as the front-seat passenger in E.B.'s car when the incident occurred. C.D. testified that Bradford hit E.B. in the head with the soda can. C.D. explained that she thought E.B. experienced pain because of E.B.'s facial expression and that E.B. "grabbed her face" when the incident occurred and continued to "rub her face" after the incident. C.D. also said that she had seen a bruise on E.B.'s face. C.D. accompanied E.B. to the sheriff's office when E.B. filed charges. C.D. acknowledged that she was aware that Bradford had mental health issues, but testified that she thought that Bradford intentionally hit E.B. with the soda can. A deputy sheriff with the sheriff's office testified that E.B. and C.D. came to the sheriff's office regarding the incident: E.B. gave the deputy her written statement. The deputy explained that he saw "a spot on [E.B.'s] cheek" and that E.B. told him that "her cheek was very sore." Pictures of E.B.'s injuries were admitted into evidence. Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence
When reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we determine whether, after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational fact-finder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Klein v. State, 273 S.W.3d 297, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). The fact-finder resolves conflicts in the testimony, weighs the evidence, and draws "reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). "Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt." Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Injury to an elderly individual occurs when a person "intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, by act . . . causes to [an] . . . elderly individual . . . bodily injury." TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.04(a)(3). An "elderly individual" is defined as a person age sixty-five years or older, and "bodily injury" is defined as physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.04(c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2009); TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.07(8) (Vernon Supp. 2009). Bradford's indictment charged that she intentionally or knowingly caused E.B. bodily injury. "A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to . . . a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to . . . cause the result." TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 6.03(a) (Vernon 2003). "A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result." Id. § 6.03(b) (Vernon 2003). A culpable mental state may be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as acts, words, and conduct of the defendant and surrounding circumstances. Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). While the accounts of the incident varied, the jury heard evidence that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, allowed it to find that Bradford had intentionally or knowingly injured her mother. The circumstances of the incident, as were described by the witnesses at trial, allowed the jury to determine that Bradford either intended to hit her mother, or that she hit her mother knowingly. The record from the trial also contains admissible testimony that E.B. suffered pain from the blow to her cheek. We are not persuaded by Bradford's argument that the State's evidence on Bradford's mens rea is legally insufficient due to Bradford's evidence of her pre-existing mental issues. "Texas law, like that of all American jurisdictions, presumes that a criminal defendant is sane and that he intends the natural consequences of his acts." Ruffin v. State, 270 S.W.3d 586, 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Moreover, "Texas does not recognize diminished capacity as an affirmative defense i.e., a lesser form of the defense of insanity." Jackson v. State, 160 S.W.3d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Rather, the diminished-capacity doctrine is "simply a failure-of-proof defense in which the defendant claims that the State failed to prove that the defendant had the required state of mind at the time of the offense." Id. While a defendant may offer evidence of a mental disease to rebut or disprove the State's evidence establishing the defendant's culpable mens rea, it is up to the fact-finder to weigh the evidence and determine whether the defendant possessed the requisite culpable mental state. Ruffin, 270 S.W.3d at 595-96; Jackson, 160 S.W.3d at 574-75. Based on the witnesses' descriptions of the incident, the fact-finder could have reasonably inferred from Bradford's acts, words, conduct, and from the surrounding circumstances that she possessed the requisite culpable mental state to support her conviction for intentionally or knowingly causing bodily injury to E.B. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational fact-finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Bradford committed the offense. See Klein, 273 S.W.3d at 302. We hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support Bradford's conviction. We overrule Bradford's first issue. Lesser-Included Offense
In her second issue, Bradford complains that the trial court erred by denying her requested question that would have allowed the jury to determine whether she had recklessly caused bodily injury to an elderly individual. The State concedes that recklessly causing bodily injury to an elderly person is a lesser-included offense of intentionally or knowingly causing bodily injury to an elderly person. However, the State contends there was no evidence that supported including this lesser-included offense in the court's charge. Determining whether an offense has lesser included offenses is a two-step process. See Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524, 535-36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Step one generally requires the pleadings to be analyzed to compare the elements of the proposed lesser-included offense, and step two requires an analysis of whether there is some evidence adduced at trial to support the instruction. See id.; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.09(1), (3) (Vernon 2006) (directing that an offense is a lesser-included offense if: (1) the elements of the lesser offense are "established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged," or (2) the elements of the lesser offense "differ[] from the offense charged only in the respect that a less culpable mental state suffices to establish" the commission of the lesser offense). In this case, the parties do not dispute that Bradford's requested issue complies with the first requirement, as Bradford's proposed lesser offense would be established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish that she committed the charged offense. Therefore, we address the second step to determine whether there is "some evidence adduced at trial to support such an instruction." Hall, 225 S.W.3d at 535. The second step of the analysis requires that we determine whether the evidence establishes that the lesser-included offense is "`a valid, rational alternative to the charged offense.'" Id. (quoting Forest v. State, 989 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). In our opinion, the circumstances that were shown regarding how the event occurred do not establish reckless injury as a valid and rational alternative to the jury's determination that Bradford acted knowingly or intentionally. The evidence on which Bradford relies consists of E.B.'s testimony that she did not believe that Bradford intentionally or knowingly tried to cause her bodily injury. Bradford also points to the testimony that she had mental health issues as evidence supporting her claim that she had acted recklessly. "A person acts recklessly . . . when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur." TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 6.03(c) (Vernon 2003); but see id. § 6.03(a) ("A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to . . . a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to . . . cause the result."); id. § 6.03(b) ("A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result."). In this case, the evidence was that Bradford, while seated in the rear of E.B.'s car, struck E.B. from behind by hitting the side of E.B.'s head with a soda can. Given the positions of the occupants in a vehicle, no rational jury would have interpreted E.B.'s testimony that Bradford's acts were "not intentional" as proof that Bradford knew of but consciously disregarded the risk that the can would strike E.B.'s head. Bradford presented no evidence that she knew that she would contact E.B. with the can but decided to disregard the risk created by doing so. By choosing to state that the incident was not intentional, without any further explanation about Bradford's state of mind, the jury was free to conclude that E.B. thought that Bradford's conduct was at least knowing. The test in Hall requires us to conclude that the evidence would permit the fact-finder to find that Bradford is guilty only of the lesser-included offense and not of the charged offense. See Hall, 225 S.W.3d at 536. On this record, we cannot do so. We conclude that on this record, the second prong of the Hall test is not met. We hold that Bradford was not entitled to her requested charge on the lesser-included offense of recklessly causing bodily injury to an elderly individual. See id., 225 S.W.3d at 535-36. We overrule Bradford's second issue. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.