Braden v. Bell

10 Citing cases

  1. Wesley Chapel Foot Ankle Ctr. v. Johnson

    286 Ga. App. 881 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 10 times
    Finding that, if "the initial complaint gives a defendant fair notice of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence called into question," the defendant is protected from "stale claims" by the statute of limitation even if the initial complaint is subsequently amended

    Consequently, her wrongful death claim met the definition of "an action for medical malpractice" subject to the statute of repose. See OCGA § 9-3-70; Braden v. Bell, 222 Ga. App. 144, 147 (3) ( 473 SE2d 523) (1996) (wrongful death claim was subject to medical malpractice statute of repose). It follows that if Mrs. Johnson's wrongful death claim, filed on October 15, 2004, had been the initiation of legal proceedings asserting a claim for damages arising out of Dr. Byrd's diagnosis and care of Mr. Johnson, the statute of repose would have barred the claim as not having been "brought" within five years after the allegedly negligent act. See Braden v. Bell, 222 Ga. App. at 147 (3) (wrongful death claim filed less then two years after patient's death but more than five years after failure to diagnose was barred by the medical malpractice statute of repose).

  2. Cleaveland v. Gannon

    288 Ga. App. 875 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 3 times

    (Citations omitted.) Braden v. Bell, 222 Ga. App. 144, 148 ( 473 SE2d 523) (1996) (Beasley, C. J., concurring specially). In this case, it is undisputed that the Gannons filed their original complaint within five years after the negligent or wrongful acts and omissions and within two years after the resulting injury and that Ms. Gannon brought her wrongful death claim within two years after Mr. Gannon died, by filing an amendment to that pending action.

  3. Canas v. Al-Jabi

    282 Ga. App. 764 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 20 times
    In Canas, the plaintiff presented evidence that the decision to implement the donor look-back program was an administrative one, "based on concerns about the expense, logistical complexity, and legal implications."

    Because OCGA §§ 9-3-71 and 9-3-73 have previously been held constitutional against similar attacks, all of Canas's arguments challenging the constitutionality of the statutes are without merit. Braden v. Bell, 222 Ga. App. 144, 146 (1) ( 473 SE2d 523) (1996). See also Craven v. Lowndes County Hosp. Auth., 263 Ga. at 659-660 (1), (2) (the classification created by the medical malpractice statute of repose, victims of medical malpractice who discover their injuries within five years after the negligent act or omission versus those who discover their injuries more than five years later, bears a rational relationship to a legitimate end of government, that is, eliminating stale claims); OCGA § 9-3-73 (f) (state objectives of the Code section were "providing quality health care, assuring the availability of physicians, preventing the curtailment of medical services, stabilizing insurance and medical costs, preventing stale medical malpractice claims, and providing for the public safety, health, and welfare as a whole").

  4. Rahman v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust

    532 S.E.2d 699 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 5 times

    O.C.G.A. § 5-6-48 (c).Braden v. Bell, 222 Ga. App. 144, 145 (1), 146 ( 473 S.E.2d 523), citing Ogletree v. State, 211 Ga. App. 845, 846 ( 440 S.E.2d 732).Crowe v. Smith, 151 F.3d 217, 234 (c), 235, cert. denied, 119 SC 2047 (1999).

  5. Schmidt v. Feldman

    497 S.E.2d 23 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 16 times
    Holding affidavit improperly notarized when paralegal administered the oath over the telephone

    " (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Braden v. Bell, 222 Ga. App. 144, 145-146 (1) ( 473 S.E.2d 523) (1996). As such circumstances are not present in this case, plaintiffs' constitutional argument is not properly before this Court for review.

  6. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell

    227 Ga. App. 830 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 6 times

    (Citations and punctuation omitted). Braden v. Bell, 222 Ga. App. 144, 146 (1) ( 473 S.E.2d 523) (1996) (physical precedent only); see also Pollard v. State, 229 Ga. 698 ( 194 S.E.2d 107) (1972). Because the issue was not addressed in the trial court, we are also unable to transfer this case to the Supreme Court for determination. Decatur Fed., supra.

  7. Zach, Inc. v. Fulton County

    487 S.E.2d 602 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 3 times

    The transfer apparently reflects the fact that although the equal protection argument was raised below, the superior court did not distinctly pass or rule on it. Accordingly, the equal protection enumeration presents nothing for review by any appellate court. Raskin v. Wallace, 215 Ga. App. 603, 604 (1) ( 451 S.E.2d 485). See also Braden v. Bell, 222 Ga. App. 144, 146 (1) ( 473 S.E.2d 523); Ashton v. State of Georgia, 217 Ga. App. 337, 338 ( 457 S.E.2d 226); and Turner v. State, 213 Ga. App. 309 (1) ( 444 S.E.2d 372). Motion for reconsideration is denied.

  8. City of Atlanta v. Bankhead Enterprises

    482 S.E.2d 466 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)

    However, as this issue has not been raised below, and as this court has no jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of an ordinance, we do not rule on such issue. Braden v. Bell, 222 Ga. App. 144, 146 ( 473 S.E.2d 523) (1996). Judgment affirmed.

  9. Simmons ex rel. Estate of Elliott v. United States

    225 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Ga. 2004)   Cited 5 times
    Finding an FTCA action barred by a statute of repose for medical malpractice actions

    Georgia courts have enforced strictly this " in no event" language. Not surprisingly, they have held that the statute of repose bars actions brought after the expiration of the five-year statute of repose, even where the injury occurred more than five years after the alleged medical malpractice. Braden v. Bell, 222 Ga.App. 144, 147, 473 S.E.2d 523, 525 (1996) (where an alleged misdiagnosis of cancer occurred in 1984 and the resulting death occurred in 1993, the statute of repose barred any cause of action for medical malpractice or wrongful death filed in 1995). " A statute of repose ... limits the time within which an action may be brought and is not related to the accrual of any cause of action.

  10. Pryce v. Rhodes

    729 S.E.2d 641 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 7 times
    Assuming fraud and applying the rule in the dental context

    Because Pryce's own pleadings reveal that he filed his original complaint after the expiration of the period of limitation, the court below properly granted Dr. Rhodes's motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Braden v. Bell, 222 Ga.App. 144, 473 S.E.2d 523 (1996). See Pogue v. Goodman, 282 Ga.App. 385, 389(2), 638 S.E.2d 824 (2006) (fraud requires a knowing failure to reveal negligence).