Opinion
C. A. 1:20-1373-DCN-SVH
11-18-2020
Dakin Adam Braddick, Plaintiff, v. Richland County, a political subdivision of the State of South Carolina, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SHIVA V. HODGES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dakin Adam Braddick (“Plaintiff”) originally brought this action in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, asserting claims against Richland County (“Defendant”) for (1) negligence brought pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, SC Code Ann. § 15-78-70 (“SCTCA”), (2) violations of the South Carolina State Constitution, and (3) violations of the United States Constitution brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [See ECF No. 1-1].Defendant removed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 on April 10, 2020. [ECF No. 1].
Plaintiff lists two separate causes of action for “violation of U.S. Constitution” and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [ECF No. 1-1 at 4-5]. However, “Section 1983 . . . is not an independent source of substantive rights, but simply a vehicle for vindicating preexisting constitutional and statutory rights.” Safar v. Tingle, 859 F.3d 241, 245 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393- 94 (1989)).
This matter is before the court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment. [ECF No. 17]. The motion having been fully briefed [ECF Nos. 18, 19], it is ripe for disposition.
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(f) (D.S.C.). Because the summary judgment motion is dispositive, this report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and remand Plaintiff's remaining state law claims.
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff's claims arise out of allegations that on March 1-2, 2013, detention officers twice assaulted Plaintiff while he was detained at the Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center (“ASGDC”) in Richland County, South Carolina. [ECF No. 1-1; see also ECF No. 17-1].
Local Civ. Rule 7.05 provides that a party filing a motion for summary judgment will provide “[a] concise statement of the facts that pertain to the matter before the court for ruling with reference to the location in the record” and that “[w]here the memorandum opposes a motion for summary judgment, [a party will provide] a concise statement of the material facts in dispute with reference to the location in the record.” Inconsistent with this rule, neither party has provided a statement of the facts and instead have generally summarized the allegations made in the complaint. [See ECF No. 17-1 at 1, ECF No. 18 at 1-2]. Both parties have, however, submitted evidence in support of their motion and opposition, respectively, including sworn statements made to the Richland County Sheriff's Department in March 2013 by Plaintiff, detention officer Ronald Chapman (“Chapman”), and detention officer Thomas Gilliard (“Gillard”) concerning the events in question. [ECF No. 18-1 at 7-12, 14-18; see also ECF No. 17-2].
A. Plaintiff's Version of Events
Plaintiff alleges on Friday, March 1, 2013, he was housed in ASGDC in unit lima and had been issued a black and white uniform for a minor disciplinary action. [ECF No. 18-1 at 7]. Plaintiff had been informed by Lieutenant Williams (“Williams”) that he would “be off stripes” by the coming weekend. Id. That afternoon Plaintiff had missed visitation due to “a problem with the paperwork, ” but because it was Friday, Plaintiff was due to receive a new visitation form for the following week. Id. Plaintiff requested a new visitation form, but the detention officer refused because Petitioner was “in stripes.” Id. at 8. An argument ensued, resulting in the detention officer informing Plaintiff that he would be going to the special housing unit (“SHU”). Id.
Gilliard arrived at Plaintiff's unit and told him to put his hands behind his back. Id. Plaintiff states he was “already frustrated” and informed Gilliard he would not go anywhere until he spoke with Williams. An argument ensued. Id. Gillard exited Plaintiff's pod, and Plaintiff began to pack. Id.
Moments later, Gilliard, Sergeant Boston (“Boston”), and another detention officer returned, and Boston told Plaintiff to put his hands behind his back and that Plaintiff was going to lockup. Id. Plaintiff repeated he would not comply until he spoke with Williams. Id. Boston said Williams would talk to Plaintiff in SHU, but Plaintiff told Boston “no I wasn't going down there because Lt. Williams wouldn't come and talk to me there.” Id.
Boston grabbed Plaintiff's right hand and told him to put his hands behind his back. Id. Plaintiff held his arm straight and said he wanted to speak to Williams. Id. According to Plaintiff:
The other two C/O grabbed my other arm and tried to force my hands behind my back. Because I am so much taller than the C/O's, I just ended up being pushed forward. One of the C/O's then put his foot in front of me and tried to trip me up. Then another C/O did the same and as I tripped, they slammed me to the ground. I fell on my left shoulder hard. The C/Os put the cuffs on me and picked me up. My roommate was yelling at the C/Os that they didn't have to treat me like that. I never tried to assault the C/Os; I just wanted to talk with Lt. Williams before I went to lockup. When the cuffs were put on my wrist, the C/O put the right cuff on too tight. C/O Gilliard intentionally squeezed the right cuff as tight as he could. I told them the cuffs were too tight. I was handcuffed behind my back and Sgt. Boston and C/O Gilliard escorted me to lockup.Id. at 8-9.
About an hour later, Plaintiff noticed his shoulder was hurting and his wrist was cut up, and he requested to be taken to medical. Id. at 9. After another hour, Plaintiff was transported to medical in handcuffs and shackles, which he described as “normal procedure.” Id. The detention officers escorting Plaintiff handed him over to two other detention officers, one of whom was Gilliard, to complete his transport to medical. Id. Plaintiff and Gilliard argued about the earlier incident, including both making statements the other characterized as threats. Id.
Plaintiff states they “turned the corner to the hallway” and were “about 30 yards outside of lockup” and “about 15 yards down the new hallway, ” when Gilliard struck Plaintiff in the nose. Id. at 10. According to Plaintiff:
The next thing I knew, my head was being struck. I don't know if I hit the wall with my head or what happened. After that, I don't remember anything. I must have blacked out. The next thing I know, I was in medical and Lt. Williams was in front of me with a camera, filming me. I remember the nurse telling them that I needed to be transported to the hospital, that I had a head injury.Id. Plaintiff states he suffered a bruised shoulder, a broken nose in two places, a chipped tooth, a busted lip, bruising on his left bicep and left hip bone, scratches on his right hip, a “busted” right eye, and two black eyes. Id. at 11. Plaintiff also states he was informed a few days after the incident that there was no camera in the hallway where he alleges Gilliard struck him, and “[t]hat's when it all made sense to me, that C/O Gilliard waited until we were on that hallway to assault me.” Id. at 12.
Plaintiff has also submitted medical records dated March 2, 2013, providing the following clinical impression: “Bilateral minimally displaced nasal bone fractures. Nose abrasion. Laceration to right lateral eyebrow. Periorbital ecchymosis. Left shoulder pain.” [ECF No. 18-1 at 5]. Additionally, Plaintiff briefly references video evidence, [see ECF No. 18 at 2; ECF No. 18-1 at 1], but this evidence has not been submitted to the court. Based on Plaintiff's representations, see id., it does not appear this evidence would impact the court's analysis.
B. Defendant's Version of Events
Gilliard states that on the day in question, Williams had called him and Chapman to meet in Unit Lima to escort Plaintiff to SHU. Id. at 16. Gilliard and Chapman gave Plaintiff three verbal directives to place his hands behind his back so handcuffs could be used for transport. Id. Plaintiff refused to comply. Id. Gilliard called Williams to inform him Plaintiff was not complying, and Boston reported to Unit Lima to assist. Id. Plaintiff continued to refuse to comply and became physically aggressive with Boston. Id. Gilliard states “[w]e took Braddick to the floor and restrained him, ” and Boston, Sergeant Richardson, and Chapman escorted Plaintiff to SHU around 7:40 p.m. Id. at 16-17.
About two or three hours later, “we received a call from Lt. Williams . . . to escort Braddick to medical from unit SHU.” Id. at 17. Gilliard states he and Chapman were exiting SHU and heard Plaintiff, who was in handcuffs, make threatening statements. Id. Gilliard states once he and Chapman turned the corner onto the phase two hallway, Plaintiff continued to make threatening comments. Id. Gilliard instructed Plaintiff to stop talking and continue walking. Id. According to Gilliard:
He snatched away from Chapman and myself. He lowered his shoulders and tried to ram me and push off with his chest at the same time. He also tried to “head butt” me, and I pushed him away from me, into the wall. Chapman and I took Braddick to the ground to restrain him. When Braddick went down, he fell fact first on the floor. Braddick started bleeding from a gash over his eye.Id. Gilliard contacted Williams by radio and requested assistance. Id. Williams and Chapman then escorted Plaintiff to medical, and Gilliard stayed behind and then returned to SHU. Id., see also Id. at 14-15.
II. Discussion
A. Standard on Summary Judgment
The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;” or “showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248.
B. Analysis
1. Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim
Turning first to Plaintiff's federal claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant operates the jail under customs, policies, and practices that violate the Constitutional (U.S.) rights of the Plaintiff.” [ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 26].
In a § 1983 action, liability is imposed on “any person who shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person . . . to the deprivation of any rights . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although Defendant, Richland County, is a “person” within the meaning of § 1983, the doctrine of supervisory liability is generally inapplicable to § 1983 suits, such that an employer or supervisor is not liable for the acts of his employees, absent an official policy or custom that results in illegal action. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Fisher v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Authority, 690 F.2d 1133, 1142-43 (4th Cir. 1982). More specifically, a defendant is liable when a “policy or custom” is “fairly attributable to the municipality as its ‘own,' and is . . . the ‘moving force' behind the particular constitutional violation.” Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1386-87 (4th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).
The undersigned rejects Defendant's argument that “Defendant Richland County is not a ‘person' subject to suit under § 1983, ” [ECF No. 17-1 at 13-14, ECF No. 19 at 1], to the extent that Defendant is arguing that it is not subject to Monell liability. See, e.g., Davis v. Richland Cty., C/A No. 4:12-2057-RMG-TER, 2012 WL 6186470, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 18, 2012), supplemented, C/A No. 4:12-2057-RMG-TER, 2012 WL 6186492 (D.S.C. Nov. 7, 2012) (“As to Defendant Richland County, under Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, a municipality or other local government entity may be liable under § 1983 for the violation of a plaintiff's constitutional rights, but only where the constitutionally offensive actions of employees are taken in furtherance of some municipal policy or custom.”) (citations and footnote omitted); Davis v. Richland Cty., C/A No. 4:12-2057-RMG, 2012 WL 6186468, at *1 (D.S.C. Dec. 12, 2012) (“The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff made no allegation of a policy or custom that could form the basis of liability for Defendant Richland County under [Monell] and its progeny”); Mincy v. Richland Cty. Det. Ctr., C/A No. 4:12-00741-MGL, 2013 WL 4018604, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 6, 2013) (denying Plaintiff's motion to amend to add Richland County as a defendant as futile, holding “in order to maintain a claim against Richland County, Plaintiff would need to produce evidence to show not only that his constitutional rights have been violated, but that these violations were the result of Richland County's policies or customs, or flowed from edicts or acts which may fairly be said to represent official county policy.”).
Plaintiff argues that he has established that Defendant has a custom that resulted in a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights in that “Defendants allowed the existence of a major hallway and corridor without video surveillance, ” Defendant's “video surveillance is not developed in major sectors of the facility, ” and this is a “practice and custom [that] is grossly negligent and a spawning ground for the incidents in this case.” [ECF No. 18 at 9-10].
Plaintiff additionally asserted in his complaint that “Defendant's decisions to hire certain detention officers indicates Defendant's customs and practices that violated Plaintiff's rights under the Constitution.” [ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 27]. Plaintiff has put forth in briefing no argument or evidence in support of this assertion. [See ECF No. 18].
Even assuming that inadequate surveillance were considered a practice or custom of Defendant, Plaintiff has failed to identify how this policy or custom caused a violation of his rights or, in other words, caused Defendant's employees to employ excessive force against Plaintiff or violate his constitutional rights in any other way. The connection between the alleged policy of inadequate surveillance and Plaintiff's injuries is too attenuated. See Best v. Sonoma Cty. Sheriffs Dep't, C/A No. 19-02252-YGR, 2020 WL 5517192, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2020) (rejecting Monell claim for “installing a surveillance system that did not record”). The proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries are the actions taken by the relevant detention officers. Additionally, Plaintiff provides no argument or evidence that other similar incidents have occurred as a basis for his claim that there exists a policy that caused his alleged damages. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985) (“But where the policy relied upon is not itself unconstitutional, considerably more proof than the single incident will be necessary in every case to establish both the requisite fault on the part of the municipality, and the causal connection between the ‘policy' and the constitutional deprivation.”).
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. If the district judge accepts this recommendation, only Plaintiff's state law claims would remain. It is therefore further recommended that the court exercise its discretion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) and remand any remaining state law claims to the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, particularly because Plaintiff's remaining claims are quintessential state law questions. See In United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); see also Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988); Hinson v. Norwest Fin. SC, Inc., 239 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2001). Should the district judge choose to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims, the undersigned addresses Defendant's remaining arguments for summary judgment.
2. Plaintiff's SCTCA Claim
The SCTCA is “the exclusive remedy for any tort committed by an employee of a governmental entity.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70(a). “The State, an agency, a political subdivision, and a governmental entity are liable for their torts in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, subject to the limitations upon liability and damages, and exemptions from liability and damages, contained” within the SCTCA. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-40. As relevant here, the SCTCA additionally provides a “governmental entity is not liable for the loss resulting from” (1) “employee conduct outside the scope of his official duties or which constitutes actual fraud, actual malice, intent to harm, or a crime involving moral turpitude, ” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(17); see also Id. at § 15-78-70(b), and (2) “responsibility or duty including but not limited to supervision, protection, control, confinement, or custody of any student, patient, prisoner, inmate, or client of any governmental entity, except when the responsibility or duty is exercised in a grossly negligent manner.” Id. at § 15-78-60(25).
Defendant first argues that Plaintiff's SCTCA claim fails because Plaintiff “alleges in this matter that detention officer, acting in a deliberate and intentional manner, physically assaulted him twice, ” highlighting Plaintiff's deposition testimony in which Plaintiff opines that the detention officers in question hurt him intentionally and deliberately and may have acted criminally. [ECF No. 17-1 at 3-10 (citing ECF No. 17-3)]. Based on Plaintiff's testimony, Defendant invokes S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(17), arguing “Plaintiff alleges herein that the Defendant's employees acted with actual malice, intent to harm, and having committed crimes involving moral turpitude.” Id. at 10.
Although Defendant puts forth multiple cases discussing malice, intent to harm, and moral turpitude generally, none of the cases addresses the issue currently before the court: the application of the S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(17) exception at the summary judgment stage where the relevant facts at issue are in dispute. [See ECF No. 17-1 at 3-10].
The burden of showing a liability limitation or exception to the SCTCA's waiver of immunity is on the government entity asserting the affirmative defense. Steinke v. S.C. Dep't of Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 520 S.E.2d 142, 152 (S.C. 1999). The evidence Defendant has put forth is insufficient to carry his burden.
This court has addressed a similar instance in which a defendant-employer invoked S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(17) at the summary judgment stage because the plaintiff had alleged that the employee's actions at issue were intentional and based on malice. The court rejected the defendant's argument, stating as follows:
Defendant SCDPS contends that because gross negligence, recklessness, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment are all traditionally considered “intentional torts, ” and because Plaintiff's position is that Defendant Enzor “is a racist, and his actions from the very beginning of the encounter were intentional and based on malice, ” that the listed tort claims are forestalled by the § 15-78-60. SCDP's view attempts to shoehorn traditional notions of “intent” into an exemption that discusses “actual fraud, actual malice, intent to harm, or . . . moral turpitude.” These statutory phrases are terms of art clearly intended to apply to specific situations where an employee's behavior is so wildly beyond what could have been anticipated or managed by his or her employer that the state cannot reasonably be held responsible for it . . . . The governmental entity claiming an exception to the waiver of immunity under the Tort Claims Act has the burden of establishing any limitation on liability. At this point, SCDPS has failed to do so, and these claims are inappropriate for disposition on a Rule 56 motion. CDPS also argues that, based on Plaintiff's testimony, Enzor's “actions were outrageous, far outside any reasonable conception of ‘scope of duty or employment.'” This may be so, but because Defendants dispute that characterization, determining the actual nature of Enzor's actions would be premature at this stage, and there remains a genuine issue of material fact to be determined by a jury.Newkirk v. Enzor, C/A No. 4:13-01634-RMG, 2015 WL 3853148, at *4 (D.S.C. June 19, 2015) (citations omitted); see also Watson v. Adams, C/A No. 4:12-3437-BHH, 2017 WL 1001122, at *12 (D.S.C. Mar. 15, 2017) (same).
Here, too, the parties have put forth differing accounts of the incident, rendering determination of the “actual nature of [the detention officers'] actions . . . premature at this stage, ” see id., and precluding grant of summary judgment as to this issue.
Plaintiff argues that summary judgment also should not be granted because the S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(17) exception must be read in conjunction with the S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(25) exception, rendering the ASCGDC officers' actions subject to a “gross negligence” analysis. [ECF No. 18 at 3-4]. Defendant disagrees, arguing it has invoked the SCTCA as an affirmative defense only with regard to the S.C. Code Ann. §15-78-60(17) exception, this exception does not contain a gross negligence standard, and, therefore, “the Defendant has not pled any such separate affirmative defense which could be interjected into subsection (17).” [ECF No. 19 at 3-5 (citing Repko v. Cty. of Georgetown, 818 S.E.2d 743, 750 (S.C. 2018) (“in order for the gross negligence standard from one immunity provision to be read into an immunity provision that does not contain a gross negligence standard, the immunity provision containing the gross negligence standard must first apply to the case.”) (emphasis added))]. Given the recommendation above, it is unnecessary to resolve this issue at this time.
Somewhat similarly, Defendant also argues Plaintiff's SCTCA claim fails because Plaintiff has alleged the detention officers were negligent and grossly negligent at the relevant times, but South Carolina state law does not recognize a cause of action for a negligent assault and battery and does not allow recovery on a claim of simple negligence based on a defendant's intentional act. [ECF No. 17-1 at 15-16]. In support, Defendant references paragraph 7 of Plaintiff's complaint, see Id. at 15, which provides as follows:
Plaintiff alleges that at all times material to this complaint the staff and guards of the detention center operated by the county, were engaged in the regular course of employment and within the scope of their employment for the county, through the operation of the detention center, and as a consequence, the Defendant county is liable for the actions of its officers and agents, pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act as S.C. Code Ann. Section 15-78-10, et seq. (2011 Supp.).[ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 7].
As stated above, because the parties have put forth differing accounts of the incidents, determination of the actual nature of the detention officers' actions is premature at this stage. Additionally, based on a review of the complaint, including the allegations above, Plaintiff does not allege the detention officers were negligent or grossly negligent. Instead, Plaintiff's negligence-based claims concern Defendant's, not the detention officer's, alleged “grossly negligent manner” in executing, for example, “its duty to supervise, control, train, and monitor its guards and staff” and “its duty to protect the Plaintiff from its guards and staff.” [ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 10].
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends Defendant's motion for summary judgment be denied as to Plaintiff's SCTCA claim.
3. Plaintiff's South Carolina Constitutional Claim
Defendant argues Plaintiff's claim seeking monetary damages for state constitutional violations fail as a matter of law because “there is no statutory scheme in South Carolina which enables a citizen to bring a private right of action for civil damages under the State Constitution.” [ECF No. 17-1 at 11]. Plaintiff does not argue otherwise, arguing instead that because a plaintiff, for example, can bring “a federal cause of action under the Fourth Amendment for which damages are recoverable upon proof of injuries resulting from the federal agents violation of that Amendment, ” a plaintiff likewise can bring a claim under the South Carolina Constitution. [See ECF No. 18 at 6-9 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971))].
As this court has held, no viable cause of action exists where, as here, the South Carolina Constitution does not provide for a private cause of action for civil rights violations and the legislature has not enacted a statute enabling this type of action. See, e.g., Shuler v. Orangeburg Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, C/A No. 5:19-88-MGL-PJG, 2019 WL 9341416, at *5 (D.S.C. July 8, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, C/A No. 5:19-00088-MGL, 2020 WL 1933781 (D.S.C. Apr. 22, 2020) (“Finally, as to Plaintiff's claims that the defendants violated her rights under the South Carolina Constitution, no private right of action for damages exists to vindicate those rights. See generally Georgetown Cty. League of Women Voters v. Smith Land Co., 713 S.E.2d 287, 289 (S.C. 2011); Whitworth v. Fast Fare Markets of S.C., Inc., 338 S.E.2d 155, 156 (S.C. 1985).”); see also Palmer v. State, 829 S.E.2d 255, 261 (S.C. Ct. App. 2019) (“the South Carolina Constitution does not provide for monetary damages for civil rights violations and the legislature has not enacted an enabling statute . . . .”).
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claim based on the South Carolina Constitution.
In its reply [ECF No. 19 at 1 n.1], Defendant withdrew its statute of limitations argument raised in its motion [ECF No. 17-1 at 14-15].
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and remand Plaintiffs remaining state law claims to the Richland County Court of Common Pleas. [ECF No. 17]. To the extent the district judge decides to retain supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs remaining state-law claims, the undersigned recommends granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs claim based on the South Carolina Constitution and denying Defendant's motion as to Plaintiffs claim brought pursuant to the SCTCA.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).