Before reaching the merits of petitioner's claims, this Court notes its limited role in reviewing a decision by the Parole Commission. The appropriate standard of review, set forth in Zannino v. Arnold, 531 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1976), and followed in this district, provides that the district court "insure that the Board has followed criteria appropriate, rational and consistent with the statute and that its decision is not arbitrary and capricious, nor based on impermissible considerations." Brach v. Nelson, 472 F. Supp. 569, 575 (D.Conn. 1979); Battle v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 925, 928 (D.Conn. 1973). Where a decision above guidelines is rendered, there is an added responsibility on the district court to assure that the Commission has documented the decision by a written notice, stating with particularity the reasons for the determination.

Id. See generally Little v. Hadden, 504 F. Supp. 558, 562 (D.Colo. 1980); Brach v. Nelson, 472 F. Supp. 569, 574 (D.Conn. 1979). Several courts have held that the commission cannot use information to determine offense severity or salient factor score, and then use the same information as a justification for going beyond the guidelines.

(c) The Commission may grant or deny release on parole notwithstanding the guidelines referred to in subsection (a) of this section if it determines there is good cause for so doing: Provided, That the prisoner is furnished written notice stating with particularity the reasons for its determination, including a summary of the information relied upon. As the District Court of Connecticut pointed out in Brach v. Nelson, 472 F. Supp. 569 (D.Conn. 1979): Good cause has not been defined specifically in either the enabling legislation or the Commission's own regulations.

While the standard for reviewing the Commission's decision is quite narrow, it is well-established that a decision "`cannot stand when it is shown to be based on a reason that is outside the scope of statutory authority.' Battle v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 925, 928 (D.Conn. 1973)." Brach v. Nelson, 472 F. Supp. 569,575 (D.Conn. 1979). Admittedly, the Commission is not bound by its published guidelines, and it may depart from them "if it determines there is good cause for so doing."

The similarity of a prior conviction to the one for which a prisoner is currently incarcerated therefore may constitute good cause for concluding that he is a particularly poor parole risk. See, e.g., Brach v. Nelson, 472 F. Supp. 569, 574 (D.Conn. 1979). Consideration of the nature of a prior conviction to justify departing from the parole guidelines thus does not constitute double counting.

However, this does not relieve the Commission of its responsibility to state its reasons for denying parole "with particularity," 18 U.S.C. § 4206(b) (1982), in order to provide a clear and accurate basis for its determinations, consistent with the goals of objectivity and consistency which the Parole Commission guidelines were designed to promote. See Brach v. Nelson, 472 F.Supp. 569, 572 (D.Ct. 1979). The decision of the district court is affirmed.

Once the commission develops guidelines which it determines will appropriately measure parole risk, it should either follow the guidelines or amend them. See Myrick v. Gunnell, 563 F. Supp. 51, 54 (D.Conn. 1983); Allen v. Hadden, 536 F. Supp. 586, 596 (D.Colo. 1982); Baker v. McCall, 543 F. Supp. 498, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd without opinion, 697 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1982); Brach v. Nelson, 472 F. Supp. 569, 574 (D.Conn. 1979). The reasons for deviating from the guidelines must be beyond and apart from the factors the commission uses in applying them.

Iuteri contends that the Commission acted without rational justification by going above the guidelines on the basis of the Satmary and Foote incidents. He argues that even if he had been tried, convicted and sentenced on the charges of assault and prostitution, pursuant to the guidelines he would have received a substantially earlier parole release date than the one he actually received after the Commission reconsidered his case. Iuteri attempts to bring this case within the scope of a series of decisions in the District Court for the District of Connecticut, see Hearn v. Nelson, 496 F.Supp. 1111, 1115 (D.Conn. 1980); Brach v. Nelson, 472 F.Supp. 569 (D.Conn. 1979); Lupo v. Norton, 371 F.Supp. 156 (D.Conn. 1974), which state that it is irrational for the Commission to go above the guidelines for the same reason used initially to select the prisoner's applicable guidelines. We need not however, consider the validity of those cases since, unlike in Hearn, Brach and Lupo, the Commission herein did not use the same factors twice — first to determine the applicable guideline and then to go above it. Rather, the Commission only considered the Satmary and Foote incidents after it had determined the applicable guideline, and then it did so to go above the guidelines.

To do so, he reasons, results in "double-counting," i.e., using the amount first to place him within the guidelines and second as a reason to exceed the guidelines. Courts have frequently condemned the double-counting practice. See e.g., Allen v. Haddon, 558 F. Supp. 400 (D.Colo. 1983); Lupo v. Norton, 371 F. Supp. 156 (D.Conn. 1974); Brach v. Nelson, 472 F. Supp. 569 (D.Conn. 1979); Hearn v. Nelson, 496 F. Supp. 1111 (D.Conn. 1980). In this case, however, the district court concluded that double counting had not occurred. Petitioner's offense involved several times the amount required for placement in the Greatest I category. So it is the magnitude of the particular offense, not the nature of the violation which supplies the good cause element required to exceed the guidelines.

The initial question raised by this appeal is whether the District Court was correct in concluding that the Commission engaged in impermissible double counting when it set Alessi's parole date beyond the guideline period. While the Commission has considerable latitude in setting parole dates, see Moore v. Nelson, 611 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1979); Baker v. McCall, 543 F.Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd mem., 697 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1982), decisions in the District Court for the District of Connecticut have concluded that it is irrational — and therefore a violation of due process — for the Commission to confine a prisoner beyond the applicable guideline for the same reason used to select the prisoner's guideline in the first place. Lupo v. Norton, 371 F.Supp. 156 (D.Conn. 1974); see Hearn v. Nelson, 496 F.Supp. 1111, 1115 (D.Conn. 1980); Brach v. Nelson, 472 F.Supp. 569 (D.Conn. 1979). The Government does not challenge this rule on this appeal, and, in view of our disposition of the appeal, we need not consider its validity.