Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Christopher J. Warner, Judge. No. SCVSS112953
The Cifarelli Law Firm, Thomas A. Cifarelli and Dawn M. Smith for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Robie & Matthai, Edith R. Matthai, Gabrielle M. Jackson, and Natalie A. Kouyoumdjian for Defendant and Respondent.
OPINION
HOLLENHORST Acting P. J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff and appellant B.R. (through a guardian ad litem) sued defendant and respondent Little League Baseball, Inc. and others, alleging that Little League Baseball had been negligent in its supervision of the local league, East Baseline Little League, and in its failure to conduct or require background investigations of local volunteers, as a result of which, volunteer Norman Watson, a registered sex offender, molested him. Plaintiff appeals from judgment following the trial court’s grant of Little League Baseball’s motion for summary judgment, contending the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis of the public policy element of proximate causation because triable issues of fact exist as to proximate cause and whether the sexual abuse of B.R. was reasonably foreseeable. We find no error, and we affirm.
B.R. also sued East Baseline Little League, which is not a party to this appeal.
This is the third appeal in a series of cases arising from criminal acts of molestation of children committed by Watson, a volunteer with and later an employee of East Baseline Little League. In the prior appeals, Hickman v. Little League Baseball, Inc. (Nov. 30, 2006, E036838, nonpub. opn.) and J.A., et al. v. Little League Baseball, Inc., et al. (May 3, 2007, E038529, nonpub. opn.), this court held that Little League Baseball could not be held liable to other victims of Watson’s molestations because the public policy considerations element of proximate cause did not support the imposition of liability against it.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Organizational Structure of Little League Baseball and East Baseline Little League
Little League Baseball is a nonprofit organization founded in 1939 and granted a federal charter in 1964. Little League Baseball’s purpose is “‘to promote, develop, supervise, and voluntarily assist in all lawful ways the interest of those who will participate in Little League Baseball.’” Little League Baseball operates through local leagues, which apply for a charter from Little League Baseball.
Little League Baseball has promulgated a Little League Operating Manual (Operating Manual) under which each local league establishes its own administration, elects its own board of directors, and establishes guidelines that best suit the needs of the community in which it is established. The local league is responsible for the selection and supervision of coaches, managers, umpires, and other volunteers.
Little League Baseball has also promulgated Official Regulations and Playing Rules (Regulations). The Regulations address the manner in which the teams are to be established, the official playing rules, and the basic safety rules for players. The rules also dictate the playing divisions, age ranges for each division, registration and tryouts, the start and end dates of each season, and other rules relating to the game of baseball. The Operating Manual and the Regulations do not give Little League Baseball any control over day-to-day operations of the local leagues.
Little League Baseball offers administrative support to local leagues at their request but does not require that local leagues consult with Little League Baseball. Little League Baseball offers local leagues the option of enrolling in the Little League blanket accident insurance plan, but does not require them to do so. Similarly, Little League Baseball recommends that local leagues operate as nonprofit corporations but does not require them to do so.
East Baseline Little League is a nonprofit California corporation that obtained a charter from Little League Baseball in the mid-1950’s. East Baseline Little League operates in Highland, California.
In 1994, Little League Baseball entered into a contract with Romano & Associates to create a child abuse prevention program for distribution to local leagues. In 1996, Little League Baseball recommended a statement that was incorporated into Little League Baseball’s 1997 Operating Manual and distributed to every local league. However, until 2003, Little League Baseball did not implement a rule requiring background checks for all local volunteers.
The 1997 Operating Manual incorporated a section entitled “BACKGROUND CHECKS” and subtitled “LITTLE LEAGUE RECOMMENDATION.” That section recommended that each local league should create a formal written policy defining abuse and stating that it was unacceptable; that all managers, coaches, and other volunteers undergo a background check at the time of their applications; that procedures be set up to receive and act on allegations of abuse; that local law enforcement should be involved in implementing preventive measures and responding to allegations; that the application procedure should ask for criminal history, employment history, and references; and that a preseason meeting should be held annually for managers, coaches, and parents to explain prevention and detection mechanisms.
B. Watson’s Affiliation with East Baseline Little League
East Baseline Little League relied on volunteers to staff its program. In the late 1980’s, Watson began to act as an umpire for East Baseline Little League when the scheduled umpire failed to appear. Watson acted as a substitute umpire for the rest of the season, eventually became a regular umpire and later a team manager and coach, and finally became the league’s umpire-in-chief, a paid position. At all relevant times, Watson was a registered high-risk sex offender. During the 1990’s, East Baseline Little League did not require its officials or volunteers to fill out any written application or undergo a background check or other investigation, and no background check was ever conducted as to Watson.
C. Watson’s Molestations of B.R.
In 1996, when B.R. was 10 years old, he lived two blocks from East Baseline Little League’s baseball field. He frequently visited the field to watch his friends play baseball, although he was not then a participant. B.R. first met Watson when Watson asked B.R. and the other boys to help pick up the field after practices and games.
B.R. is the oldest of four children of the same mother; all four children have different fathers, and B.R. never lived with his father. His mother testified that she used drugs daily from 1994 to 1997, and in 1998 she was convicted of felony drug possession. She spent two weeks in jail and the remainder of the year in rehabilitation, including three months in a residential facility. She did not remember B.R.’s age when he participated in Little League, how many years he played, or the names of the parents of any of his schoolmates or teammates. She had never met B.R.’s baseball coaches or managers. As of her deposition in 2005, she was not aware of the name Norman Watson or that anyone from East Baseline Little League had been arrested for molestation.
In 1997, when B.R. was 11 years old, he played baseball with East Baseline Little League for one season. Watson was not B.R.’s coach but was the umpire for some of B.R’s games. B.R. testified that sometime during that season, which extended from April 11 through June 21, Watson molested him four times in the snack bar and three or four times in the scorekeeper’s board. The molestations included sodomy and touching of genitals.
None of the molestations occurred during any East Baseline Little League sponsored activity. The games usually ended at 9:00 or 9:15 p.m., and B.R. frequently stayed at the field after games and “mess[ed] around for a while” with other players. He and other players also commonly picked up bags and put equipment away after games. B.R. was often at the field until 10:00 p.m. All the molestations occurred during those after-hours periods. B.R. went into the snack bar because Watson asked him to, although nothing was ever put away or stored in the snack bar. Some of the molestations occurred after B.R. was at the field to watch friends’ games, and once after his own game. The molestations all occurred after he had picked up the bags. The first time, no one else was in the area of the snack bar, although there may have been other people still at the field.
D. East Baseline Little League’s Discovery of Watson’s Sex Offender Status
In summer of 1997, East Baseline Little League board members learned that Watson was listed on the Megan’s Law CD-ROM database as a high-risk sex offender. The East Baseline Little League president was informed immediately, and a day or two later, the Western Regional office of Little League Baseball was informed. In September 1997, Watson was arrested and charged with multiple counts of child molestation against multiple victims. He entered a plea of guilty and is serving an 84-year prison sentence.
Although B.R. contends the board members learned that Watson was a registered sex offender in June 1997, a detective testified at his deposition that the Megan’s Law database went online at the San Bernardino Sheriff’s Department on July 1, 1997.
E. Procedural History
In February 2004, B.R. and two other plaintiffs, J.A. and S.W., filed a complaint against Little League Baseball, East Baseline Little League, and others for negligence in screening, retention, and supervision; negligence in failing to take reasonable protective measures; negligence in violation of a special relationship; breach of fiduciary duty; violation of statutory duties; negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress; and sexual assault, battery, and harassment.
In 2005, Little League Baseball and East Baseline Little League filed motions for summary judgment as to J.A. and S.W. only. The motions were granted and appealed, while B.R.’s claims were stayed. In the appeal from the grant of summary judgment as to J.A. and S.W., we affirmed as to Little League Baseball on the ground that the public policy element of proximate cause precluded imposing liability. However, we reversed as to East Baseline Little League, holding that there were triable issues of fact “as to whether East Baseline Little League ha[d] reason to believe Watson was unfit and failed to use reasonable care to investigate him.” (J.A., et al. v. Little League Baseball, et al., supra, at pp. 17-18.)
On December 5, 2007, Little League Baseball filed a motion for summary judgment as to B.R. on the ground that the public policy considerations element of proximate cause precluded liability against Little League Baseball for Watson’s crimes. The trial court granted the motion and thereafter entered judgment against B.R.
Other facts are set forth in the discussion of the issues to which they pertain.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
After a motion for summary judgment has been granted, this court “examine[s] the record de novo and independently determine[s] whether [the] decision is correct. [Citation.]” (Colarossi v. Coty U.S. Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1149.) In doing so, we use the same three-step process employed by the trial court. First, we identify the issues raised by the pleadings. Second, we determine whether the moving party’s showing establishes facts sufficient to negate the opposing party’s claims, and to justify judgment in the moving party’s favor. If so, third, we determine whether the opposing party has raised a triable material issue of fact. (Dawson v. Toledano (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 387, 392.) In making the determination whether a triable issue of material fact exists, “the court may not weigh the plaintiff’s evidence or inferences against the defendants[] as though it were sitting as the trier of fact.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 856.)
B. Analysis
Proximate cause involves two elements: (1) cause in fact, and (2) the extent to which public policy considerations limit a defendant’s liability for its acts. (PPG Industries, Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 310, 315-316 [holding that an insurer’s negligent failure to settle a personal injury lawsuit was a cause in fact, but not a proximate cause, of the award of punitive damages].) The first element, cause in fact, is established if an act “‘is a necessary antecedent of an event,’” and this element “‘is a factual question for the jury to resolve.’” (Ferguson v. Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1037, 1045.) The second element is “‘“concerned, not with the fact of causation, but with the various considerations of policy that limit an actor’s responsibility for the consequences of his conduct.”’” (Id. at p. 1045 [holding that public policy considerations strongly militated against allowing a plaintiff to recover lost punitive damages as compensatory damages in a legal malpractice action].) Because “the purported causes of an event may be traced back to the dawn of humanity,” the law imposes additional limits on liability that are not related to “‘simple causality.’” (Ibid.)
In Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, the court explained that the public policy considerations element of proximate causation is a “‘policy-based legal filter on “but for” causation’” that courts apply “‘“to those more or less undefined considerations which limit liability even where the fact of causation is clearly established.”’” (Id. at p. 464.) Because this prong focuses on the public policy considerations limiting liability, and not on the fact of causation, it is a question of law for the court. (Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 547, 563; Brewer v. Teano (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1035 [“‘Whether a defendant’s conduct is an actual cause of a plaintiff’s harm is a question of fact, but the existence and extent of a defendant’s liability is a question of law and social policy.’”].) Thus, when the underlying facts are essentially undisputed, resolution of the public policy issue is appropriate in a motion for summary judgment. (See Evan F. v. Hughson United Methodist Church (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 828, 834 (Evan F.).)
In Evan F., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th 828, the court refused to impose liability on a church that was sued by a molestation victim because public policy considerations did not support such liability. In that case, the pastor of a church molested a 13-year-old boy, who in turn molested his younger sister. A psychiatrist testified that the boy had molested his sister as a result of his own molestation by the pastor. (Id. at pp. 831-832.) The children and their parents sued the pastor, the local church, and the California-Nevada Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church (the Conference), the larger organization to which the local church belonged. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Conference and the local church as to the parents’ claims because they were time barred and as to the sister’s claims because the court concluded that defendants’ alleged conduct was not the proximate cause of her damages. (Id. at pp. 833-834.)
The summary judgment apparently did not encompass the boy’s claims against the Conference. (Evan F., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at pp. 833-834.)
The appellate court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that the sister could not proceed against the Conference for negligence because the Conference’s alleged negligent hiring was not the proximate cause of her damages under the public policy considerations element of the proximate cause analysis. The court explained, “‘“Proximate cause”—in itself an unfortunate term—is merely the limitation which the courts have placed upon the actor’s responsibility for the consequences of the actor’s conduct.”’” (Evan F., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 835.) Legal responsibility, therefore, is limited “‘to those causes which are so closely connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in imposing liability.’” (Ibid.) In other words, “‘[s]ome boundary must be set to liability for the consequences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy.’” (Ibid.) To set this boundary, the court must examine “‘the nature and degree of the connection in fact between the defendant’s acts and the events of which the plaintiff complains.’” (Ibid.)
The court reversed summary judgment with respect to the boy’s complaint against the local church for negligent hiring, holding that that cause of action did not implicate the same public policy considerations as his sister’s cause of action. The court further held that summary judgment was unavailable because triable issues of fact existed as to whether the church had reason to believe the pastor was unfit and whether the church had failed to use reasonable care in investigating him. (Evan F., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at pp. 841-843.)
Applying these guidelines, the court in Evan F. held that the Conference was not the proximate cause of the damage to the sister. (Evan F., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 837.) The court explained that “[t]o conclude otherwise would impose liability on the person who hired the person who molested the person who molested the person in [the sister’s] position,” and “[t]his convoluted syntax alone argues against imposing liability in this situation.” (Ibid.)
In the present case, the syntax is nearly as convoluted: Plaintiff seeks to impose liability on the national organization that chartered the local organization for which the molester volunteered and later worked as an employee when the molester, through the local organization, met and befriended the child he later molested on occasions outside official Little League activities. Plaintiff’s theory of liability is that the national organization, Little League Baseball, was negligent in failing to require local leagues to investigate and screen local volunteers. We agree with the trial court that the nature and degree of the connection between the defendant’s acts and the events of which the plaintiffs complain was, as a matter of public policy, too attenuated to support imposing liability on Little League Baseball.
Plaintiff argues, however, that summary judgment was improper under Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377 (Juarez), in which the court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant in the plaintiff’s action against the Boy Scouts of America, the national organization, after the plaintiff was molested by a scoutmaster for his local Boy Scouts troop. The court reasoned there was “sufficient evidence to raise triable issues of fact that the Scouts failed to take reasonable protective measures to protect [the plaintiff] from the risk of sexual abuse by adult volunteers involved in scouting programs, and that the failure to take such steps exposed him to an increased danger of sexual molestation.” (Id. at pp. 411-412.)
Juarez did not turn on the public policy considerations element of the proximate cause analysis; rather, the Juarez court found triable issues of fact regarding duty, breach, and causation. The court acknowledged that the evidence might “ultimately establish there was no breach of the Scouts’s duty or that any breach was neither a cause in fact nor legal cause of any damages....” (Juarez, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 413.) Moreover, in Juarez, the molestations were committed during “officially sanctioned scouting events, such as overnight camping trips, and at [the perpetrator’s] home.” (Id. at p. 385.) Here, in contrast to the facts in Juarez, it was undisputed that none of the molestations occurred during any Little League-sponsored activity. Although the molestations took place in the snack bar and scorekeeper’s booth at East Baseline Little League’s field, they all occurred after hours.
In the context of discussing whether the Scouts owed a duty of care to the victim, the Juarez court addressed each of the factors set forth in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112-113, including “the policy of preventing future harm.” (Juarez, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 401.) In addressing this factor, the court stated, “Our greatest responsibility as members of a civilized society is our common goal of safeguarding our children, our chief legacy, so they may grow to their full potential and can, in time, take our places in the community at large.” (Id. at p. 407.) The court further discussed the harm to children from sexual predators and the public policy against victimization of children that is evident in our criminal laws. (Ibid.) Based on this discussion, the plaintiff argues that public policy supports imposing liability on Little League Baseball as the entity in the best position to implement effective screening measures.
Plaintiff’s argument, however, goes to the duty element of a cause of action for negligence. The issue presently before this court is the public policy considerations element of proximate cause, and under that element, legal liability is imposed only based on “those causes which are so closely connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in imposing liability.” (Evan F., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 835.) Juarez therefore provides no guidance in the present case when the sole issue is the public policy element of proximate cause.
Plaintiff also contends triable issues of fact exist as to whether Watson’s sexual abuse of B.R. was reasonably foreseeable to Little League Baseball and as to when Little League Baseball learned Watson was a registered sex offender. Even assuming that such factual issues exist, they are relevant only to causation-in-fact. Because we have concluded the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the basis of the public policy element of proximate cause, we need not further address whether triable issues of fact existed as to some other element of liability. We find no error in the trial court’s grant of Little League Baseball’s motion for summary judgment.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
We concur: RICHLI J., KING J.