What distinguishes a resulting trust from a constructive trust is that the resulting trust is focused on the intent of the parties, while the constructive trust is imposed irrespective of the parties' intent. Bozeman v. Sheriff, 42 Ill.App.3d 228, 355 N.E.2d 624, 626 (Ill.App. 1 Dist.1976). In construing the phrase “similar device,” consideration should be given to Congress's purpose in enacting § 548(e).

What distinguishes resulting trust from constructive trust is that the former is focused solely on the intent of the parties while the latter is imposed irrespective of the parties intent. Bozeman v. Sheriff, 42 Ill. App.3d 228, 355 N.E.2d 624, 626 (1976). Resulting trust arise by operation of law and are generally created where an express trust fails, or where an express trust terminates prior the exhaustion of the trust estate, or where one person pays for property and another takes title.

A resulting trust, like a constructive trust, arises by operation of law, but its existence depends on the intent of the parties and, as such, it is more like an express trust than a constructive trust. (See Bozeman v. Sheriff (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 228, 230-31, 355 N.E.2d 624, 626.) Resulting trusts arise in three situations: when an express trust fails; when an express trust is fully performed but the trust estate has not been exhausted; and when one party pays for property and directs the vendor to convey it to another.

A reviewing court will not disturb that decision unless it clearly resulted from an abuse of discretion. 106 Ill. App.3d 878, 882. • 3 We summarily reject plaintiffs' initial argument that no election against rescission is made simply because a plaintiff claims inconsistent or alternative remedies (see Pinelli v. Alpine Development Corp. (1979), 70 Ill. App.3d 980, 1005; Bozeman v. Sheriff (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 228, 233), because the court's conclusion was clearly based on the plaintiffs' actions rather than their pleadings. See Walsh v. Oberlin (1971), 2 Ill. App.3d 987, 990.

A constructive trust will be imposed to prevent a person holding title to property to profit from his wrong or be unjustly enriched by retaining the property. Bozeman v. Sheriff (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 228, 355 N.E.2d 624. • 4 A constructive trust will arise when there is a breach of a fiduciary relationship or when fraud is proved.

" ( Doner, 381 Ill. 106, 113-14, 45 N.E.2d 20, 24.) Furthermore an unauthorized conveyance of one's property to another has been held to give rise to an implied trust. ( Mauricau v. Haugen (1944), 387 Ill. 186, 56 N.E.2d 367; Bozeman v. Sheriff (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 228, 355 N.E.2d 624.) Accordingly, if we accept plaintiff's allegations as true, as we must on a motion to dismiss, Conners became a constructive trustee of the stock and of other assets of the partnership and corporation which rightfully belonged to plaintiff for plaintiff's benefit.

A constructive trust is imposed by a court because the person holding title to property would profit by a wrong or would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to keep the property. ( Price v. State of Illinois (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 143, 398 N.E.2d 365; Bozeman v. Sheriff (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 228, 355 N.E.2d 624.) An action to prevent such unjust enrichment is maintainable in all cases where one person has received money under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not retain. M.J. McCarthy Motor Sales Co. v. Van C. Argiris Co. (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 725, 396 N.E.2d 1253; Cohon v. Oscar L. Paris Co. (1958), 17 Ill. App.2d 21, 149 N.E.2d 472. We do not agree with Stavros that he owed no legal duty to plaintiff or that his conduct amounted to no more than that of any paid lobbyist.

( Williams v. Teachers Insurance Annuity Association (1973), 15 Ill. App.3d 542, 304 N.E.2d 656.) A constructive trust is imposed because the person holding title to property would profit by a wrong or would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to keep the property. ( Bozeman v. Sheriff (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 228, 231, 355 N.E.2d 624.) A resulting trust arises from the presumed intent of the parties. ( Williams, at 547.)

Also, the doctrine of election of remedies does not apply when inconsistent or alternative remedies are joined in the same pleading. Walsh v. Oberlin (1971), 2 Ill. App.3d 987, 276 N.E.2d 728. See Bozeman v. Sheriff (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 228, 355 N.E.2d 624. • 13 The fact that John Pinelli's 1966 tax return indicated that he had sold the Dempster property does not indicate that he was aware of the facts which only came out at trial.

As acknowledged in Prater, this is commonly done. (See also Nogacz v. Procter Gamble Manufacturing Co. (1975), 37 Ill. App.3d 636, 347 N.E.2d 112, and Valerio v. R. R. Construction Co. (5th Dist. 1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 48, 312 N.E.2d 713.) Furthermore, such practice is consistent with the well-established rule that a party has the right to plead and introduce proof on all possible theories of recovery, even if they are inconsistent. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110, par. 43; Ervin v. Sears, Roebuck Co. (1976), 65 Ill.2d 140, 357 N.E.2d 500; Bozeman v. Sheriff (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 228, 355 N.E.2d 624; Downs v. Exchange National Bank (1959), 24 Ill. App.2d 24, 163 N.E.2d 858. Our decision in the instant case is that Northwestern is not indemnified against acts of its own negligence under the provisions of the purchase order issued to M M. Nothing in our decision should be construed to affect Northwestern's right to pursue a recovery under any other theory.