Opinion
CIVIL 3:23-CV-1705
11-14-2023
JOHNNY ENRIQUE BOYNTON Plaintiff, v. TPR. JONATHAN HOUSENICK, Defendant.
MUNLEY, JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARTIN C. CARLSON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Statement of Facts and Procedural History
This case, which was reassigned to us on November 10, 2023, comes before us for a legally mandated screening review of the plaintiff's complaint. (Doc. 1). In this complaint, the pro se plaintiff, Johnny Boynton, brings Fourth Amendment, false arrest and malicious prosecution claims against Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Jonathan Housenick. (Id.)
According to Boynton's complaint, these claims stem from a June 9, 2020, traffic stop encounter in which Trooper Housenick allegedly recovered a 9 mm handgun from the vehicle being operated by Boynton. Based upon the recovery of this firearm, and the trooper's report that he smelled the odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle, Boynton was charged with a variety of state criminal offenses and was held in custody until October of 2021,when Boynton alleges that his state charges were dropped. (Id.)
Boynton's complaint is somewhat enigmatic regarding the precise reason why he was detained but alludes to the fact that he was held in Department of Corrections' custody, suggesting that he may have also been charged with an unrelated parole violation since a mere pretrial detainee would typically not be held in state custody.
Based upon these averments, Boynton sues Trooper Housenick seeking nominal and punitive damages, as well as expungement of his criminal record. Along with his complaint, Boynton has filed a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc.2). We have granted this motion and directed that the lodged complaint be filed on the docket for screening purposes only. (Doc. 8). However, because the complaint is legally flawed, we will recommend that this complaint be dismissed.
II. Discussion
A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints-Standard of Review
This court has an on-going statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Specifically, we are obliged to review the complaint to determine whether any claims are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This statutory text mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this benchmark standard for the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do.” Id. at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.Id. at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, [ ] “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.' ”Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1861 (2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment”). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining whether to dismiss a complaint or when determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which defines what a complaint should say and provides that:
(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff's complaint must recite factual allegations that are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action.
It is against these legal guideposts that we assess this pro se complaint and find that Brown's complaint fails as a matter of law for a host of reasons.
B. This Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted.
In this case, Boynton's complaint runs afoul of a series of legal obstacles. Indeed, we believe that, in its current form, this complaint is flawed in at least two ways.
At the outset, many of Boynton's claims which stem from this June 2020 police encounter and arrest seem to be time-barred. When conducting a screening review of a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a court may consider whether the complaint is barred under the applicable statute of limitations. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently explained when it affirmed the screening dismissal of a pro se complaint on statute of limitations grounds:
Civil rights claims are subject to the statute of limitations for personal injury actions of the pertinent state. Thus, Pennsylvania's two year statutory period applies to [these] claims. See Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 368 (3d Cir.2000). The limitations period begins when the plaintiff knows or had reason to know of the injury forming the basis for the federal civil rights action. Gera v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 256 Fed.Appx. 563, 564-65 (3d Cir.2007). Although we have not addressed the issue in a precedential decision, other courts have held that although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint under § 1915(e) where the defense is obvious from the complaint and no development of the factual record is required. See Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir.2006); see also Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 656-57 (4th Cir.2006) (citation omitted)(finding that a district court's screening authority under § 1915(e) “differentiates in forma pauperis suits from ordinary civil suits and justifies an exception to the general rule that a statute of limitations defense should not be raised and considered sua sponte.”).Smith v. Delaware County Court 260 F. App'x. 454, 455 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Jackson v. Fernandez, No. 08-5694, 2009 WL 233559 (D.N.J. Jan. 26, 2009); Hurst v. City of Dover, No. 04-83, 2008 WL 2421468 (D. Del. June 16, 2008).
It is well-settled that claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985). In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524. A cause of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that constitutes the basis of the cause of action. Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998); see also, Nelson v. County of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010 (3d Cir. 1995).
While this two-year limitations period may be extended based upon a continuing wrong theory, a plaintiff must make an exacting showing to avail himself of these grounds for tolling the statute of limitations. For example, it is well settled that the “continuing conduct of [a] defendant will not stop the ticking of the limitations clock [once] plaintiff obtained requisite information [to state a cause of action]. On discovering an injury and its cause, a claimant must choose to sue or forego that remedy.” Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 154 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Kichline v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 800 F.2d 356, 360 (3d Cir. 1986)). See also Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 266-68 (3d Cir. 2000). Instead:
The continuing violations doctrine is an “equitable exception to the timely filing requirement.” West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 754 (3d Cir.1995). Thus, “when a defendant's conduct is part of a continuing practice, an action is timely so long as the last act evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitations period; in such an instance, the court will grant relief for the earlier related acts that would otherwise be time barred.” Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1295 (3d Cir.1991).In order to benefit from the doctrine, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant's conduct is “more than the occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts.” West, 45 F.3d at 755 (quotation omitted). Regarding this inquiry, we have recognized that courts should consider at least three factors: (1) subject matter-whether the violations constitute the same type of discrimination, tending to connect them in a continuing violation; (2) frequency-whether the acts are recurring or more in the nature of isolated incidents; and (3) degree of permanence-whether the act had a degree of permanence which should trigger the plaintiff's awareness of and duty to assert his/her rights and whether the consequences of the act would continue even in the absence of a continuing intent to discriminate. See id. at 755 n. 9 (citing Berry v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ., 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir.1983)). The consideration of “degree of permanence” is the most important of the factors. See Berry, 715 F.2d at 981.Cowell v. Palmer Township. 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001).
In the context of false arrest claims, like those lodged by Boynton against Trooper Housenick, additional considerations apply. On this score, the Supreme Court has held that “the statute of limitations upon a § 1983 claim seeking damages for a false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 1100, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007). Thus, false arrest claims accrue at the time of the arrest. Similarly, to the extent that Boynton is premising a Fourth Amendment claim upon the search of the vehicle he was operating it has been held that the claim accrues at the time of the search. As the Third Circuit has observed:
Federal law, not state law, determines when a limitations period begins to run. Kach, 589 F.3d at 634. Under federal law, the statute of limitations runs from the moment that a claim accrues. Id. And a claim accrues when the last act needed to complete the tort occurs. Id. For a search, that is the moment of the search.Nguyen v. Pennsylvania, 906 F.3d 271, 273 (3d Cir. 2018).
Applying these legal benchmarks, Boynton's Fourth Amendment and false arrest claims lodged against Trooper Housenick are time-barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. In this case, Boynton alleges that the search and arrest both took place on June 9, 2020. Yet Boynton's complaint was filed more than three years later, in October of 2023. (Doc. 1). Thus, on the face of the complaint, the statute of limitations applies and bars these claims.
Liberally construed, Boynton's complaint can also been read to level a malicious prosecution claim against Trooper Housenick. While this claim may not be time-barred since the limitations period period for such claims only begins to run once “the criminal proceedings against the defendant (i.e., the § 1983 plaintiff) have terminated in his favor,” McDonough v. Smith, 139 S.Ct. 2149, 2155, 204 L.Ed.2d 506 (2019), there is a second obstacle to Boynton's pursuit of this federal civil rights claim against Trooper Housenick, the sole defendant named in this case. This obstacle stems from the fact that it is the prosecutor rather than Trooper Housenick, a police officer, who typically makes these prosecutorial judgments. Therefore, a special showing must be made to hold a police officer liable for a malicious prosecution claim. As one court has aptly noted:
In order to state a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in [the plaintiff's] favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 8182 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must allege the first four elements, but not the fifth. Thomas v. City of Philadelphia, 290 F.Supp.3d 371, 379 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (citing Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 791 (3d Cir. 2000)). While malicious prosecution claims are most commonly associated with prosecutors, the law makes clear that police officers who influence or participate in a prosecutorial decision to institute criminal proceedings by concealing or misrepresenting material facts to district attorneys may also be liable for malicious prosecution. Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 297 (3d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted); Brooks v. Dooley, Civ. A. No. 16-6136, 2017 WL 2480734, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 7, 2017) (recognizing that that police officer may be liable for malicious prosecution where they “knowingly provided false information to the prosecutor or otherwise interfered with the prosecutor's informed discretion”).Ogrod v. City of Philadelphia, 598 F.Supp.3d 253, 263 (E.D. Pa. 2022). Thus, with respect to a §1983 malicious prosecution claim “a police officer may only be liable if he concealed or misrepresented material facts to the prosecutor.” Brazil v. Scranton Sch. Bd., No. 3:22-CV-01514, 2023 WL 5916470, at *18 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2023).
In the instant case, Boynton's complaint does not set forth well-pleaded facts indicating that Trooper Housenick improperly influenced or participated in the prosecutorial decision to institute criminal proceedings against Boynton by concealing or misrepresenting material facts to district attorneys. In the absence of such well-pleaded facts, this malicious prosecution claim fails as it is currently pleaded with respect to the trooper and should be dismissed.
While Boynton's claims as set forth in his complaint encounter these legal obstacles, we recognize that in civil rights cases, pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in its entirety, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless granting further leave to amend would be futile or result in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). In this case, it cannot be said that allowing leave to amend would be a wholly futile exercise. Therefore, acting out of an abundance of caution, it is recommended that the Court provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to correct these deficiencies in the pro se complaint by dismissing this deficient complaint at this time without prejudice to one final effort by the plaintiff to file an amended complaint containing any proper claims that he may have.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiff endeavoring to correct the defects cited in this report, provided that the plaintiff acts within 21 days of any dismissal order.
The plaintiff is further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.